

CHAPTER III

ONTOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION AS "GROUNDING"

Du Dunkelheit, aus der ich stamme
ich liebe dich mehr als die Flamme,
welche die Welt begrenzt,
indem sie glänzt
für irgend einen Kreis,
aus dem heraus kein Wesen von ihr weiß.

Aber die Dunkelheit hält alles an sich:
Gestalten und Flammen, Tiere und mich,
wie sie's erschafft,
Menschen und Mächte

Und es kann sein: eine große Kraft
rührt sich in meiner Nachbarschaft

Ich glaube an Nächte

Rilke
September 22, 1899

"Im dunklen Bechergrund
Erscheint das Nicht des Lichts.
Der Gottheit dunkler Schein
Ist so: Das Licht des Nichts."

Wilhelm Weischedel 1975
in Bernhard Welte, Das
Licht des Nichts, p. 54.

In addressing the question of salvation, we are concerned with more than simply a central question/affirmation of our Western religious heritage. Our understanding of the meaning of salvation reflects what we understand to be "real," i.e., it reflects an understanding of human experience in the world in its relationship to its wholeness. There is no other question that could draw us more to the very core of the human condition (tradition, history, self, world, community, time, the divine) than the question of salvation.

What follows in no way attempts to exhaust the possible meanings of the term salvation. Rather it is an investigation of the "how" of salvation given our condition of being confronted by a symbol in the primary language of our tradition that has always been understood as challenging us with salvation.

What are the conditions of the possibility and/or the structure that might account for how the transformations, that we can name as soteriological, take place? It will be suggested that we may speak of salvation occurring in terms of the two "dimensions" of experience announced in the "ontological difference." These two dimensions correspond, it will be argued, to the dual (split reference) character of a symbol whose "intention" is to disorient in order to reorient, to use Paul Ricoeur's discussion, but in so doing, particularly as religious symbols, confront us as limit-language drawing us to encounter the limit experiences of our being in the world. In symbol itself we encounter a challenge not only to our ontic ordering of world, but it presses us beyond the ontic to that which escapes language as the unsayable, the ontological. The symbol, as metaphor functioning within the horizon of myth, announces a "more," a "transcendence," a going beyond of limit, that elevates and ennobles. Hence, the disorientation occurring in the symbol may occur in terms of a re-assessment of the adequacy of our perception of possibility in our ontic experience of the life-world resulting from the claim to more in the symbol, but at the same time this disorienting can occur in terms of the limits of that ontic world itself

and the human dependence upon the conditions of the possibility of the givenness of our ontic life-world (the ontological here understood in terms of the Being-of beings as no-thing, that is enigmatically revealed, but more readily concealed, in our encounter with beings in the world).

Salvation is a "turning." At its core is "a freeing." A discussion of the "how" of its occurrence must address the questions of "turning" from; "turning" to; and the meaning of freedom. It will be argued in the final Chapter of this project that a "turning" occurs only within the context of "world." We must address the question of the meaning of salvation in a manner that confronts the meaning of our being "in a world." What is the meaning of world, and how do we have, or how are we, a "world?"

This discussion is a specifically theological task, for it is involved in a second order of reflection about religious language/experience. The claim of our religious language/experience is salvation. The task of theology is to investigate the coherence and adequacy of such a claim.¹ Theology is a search for "conceptual" understanding by investigating the phenomena of religious language/experience though recognizing that religious

¹See David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), especially chapter 3 entitled "A Revisionist Model for Contemporary Theology." See also, Schubert M. Ogden, "The Task of Philosophical Theology" in Robert A. Evans, ed., The Future of Philosophical Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1971), pp. 55-84, especially section 2 entitled "Philosophy in general is the fully reflective understanding of the basic existential faith which is constitutive of human existence."

language/experience is concerned precisely with limit-language/experience and therefore escapes any and all "conceptuality." On the other hand, we cannot remain silent before that which transcends. We stand on this side of the transcendence is a world, and our task is to speak, i.e., to attempt to make sense out of our experience. The enigmatic character of language, as both saying and unable to say, calls us to reflection. Paul Ricoeur writes:

. . . religious language itself requires the transposition from "images" or rather "figurative modes" to "conceptual modes" of expression. . . .

If it is true that a religious vocabulary is understood only within an interpreting community and according to a tradition of interpretation, it is also true that there exists no tradition of interpretation which is not "mediated" by some philosophical conception. . . .

It is now with an anti-ontological conceptuality that theology has to come to grips. But the fundamental situation is not radically changed. It is still as a function of an external problematic that theology has to interpret its own meanings. . . .

Now, whatever may be the epistemological status of "concepts" appropriate to our present cultural and philosophical situation, the problem is to look at religious language itself and to explicate its conceptual potentialities, or, if you prefer, its capacity to be conceptually articulated in the space of confrontation of our present culture.

With the challenge of salvation, our tradition calls our understanding of experience into question, for it asks us to examine "who" we are in terms of the expectation that our understanding is not adequate. There is "more" to experience, we are being told. There is a challenge to turn from what we have understood to be the meaning of our being in the world to a new

¹Ricoeur, Semeia 4, pp. 129-132.

understanding. We encounter in this question, then, not only a concern for "how" salvation might occur; we encounter/are confronted with, in addition, the challenge of salvation as a setting in question in terms of our limits.

The search for "conceptual" understanding of the soteriological claims for the symbol of the Kingdom of God in the teaching material of the historical Jesus will be here pursued in terms of the disclosive possibilities achieved through investigating certain themes from the work of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. These consist of the following: 1) from Heidegger, the claim of the ontological difference and the priority of Dasein as the point of entry to understanding this "identity" and "difference" allows for a thinking that orients us in world; 2) from Husserl, an understanding of the temporal and praxis structure of intentional consciousness allows for a thinking at the "ontic level" of experience that suspends the judgment that thinking is either a thinking related to "pure, eternal ideas" or to things in themselves "behind" their appearance profiles (Ideas are to be thought phenomenologically, i.e., as arising out of the encounter with the phenomean themselves in a life-world.¹ At this

¹This betrays a glossing over, I realize, of Husserl's transition from Phenomenology understood as an apodictic, eidetic science to constituting consciousness understood as a genetic process. See the Fourth Meditation entitled "Development of the Constitutional Problems Pertaining to the Transcendental Ego Himself" in Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. by Dorian Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960). See also, Robert Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964). See, in addition, "On Intentional Consciousness, p. 229, n. 1.

Phenomenological level of description, we have, however, no simple subject-object split. Rather, we have a subject-object polarization that must be thought together. Ideas are here understood not as eternal objects that are only approximately announced in the encounter with things. Ideas are "intuitively," hence only "adequately," constituted out of our encounter with/in phenomena. Yet this is no pure "subjectivizing" of ideas. There is no absolute consciousness without a life-world; no ideas outside of the relationship "consciousness-of;" no truth outside of the continual testing (or "fulfilling") of our adequate approximations in relationship to the phenomena encountered within the structure of intentionality. Consciousness is praxis.); 3) from Heidegger, precisely because of the recognition of the ontological difference, however, consciousness is more than an event of consciousness-of things within a life world (The event character of consciousness is more than an event of constituting consciousness of ideas out of a relationship to things. As the condition of the possibility for the "polarization" subject-object, the Being-of beings and time, themselves, must be thought in terms of event, if we are to think the claim of Husserl's Phenomenological enterprise in its most radical manner, i.e., Phenomenology here understood as the clarification of presuppositions rather than the defense of, or assumption of, sacrosanct ideas or philosophical "positions" within the tradition.

The impulse to research must proceed not from philosophies but from things and from the problems connected with them. Philosophy, however, is essentially a science of true beginnings, or origins, of rizomata

panton. The science concerned with what is radical must from every point of view be radical itself in its procedure. Above all it must not rest until it has attained its own absolutely clear beginnings, i.e., its absolutely clear problems, the methods preindicated in the proper sense of these problems, and the most basic field of work wherein things are given with absolute clarity. But one must in no instance abandon one's radical lack of prejudice, prematurely identifying, so to speak, such "things" with empirical "facts." . . . We are too subject to the prejudices that still come from the Renaissance. To one truly without prejudice it is immaterial whether a certainty comes to us from Kant or Thomas Aquinas, from Darwin or Aristotle, from Helmholtz or Paracelsus. What is needed is not the insistence that one see with his own eyes; rather it is that he not explain away under the pressure of prejudice what has been seen.

When we in fact press Husserl's Phenomenological enterprise in terms of its presuppositions, we encounter the question of the "ground" of our experience as a re-thinking of nothingness. Nothingness is not here considered in terms of a dualism between being and non-being. The Being-of beings as no-thing is to be thought as always a Being-of beings, i.e., transcendence is a transcendence in the experience of Dasein as the condition of possibility. Nothingness, rather than negation, is the condition of the possibility for world.); 4) we have learned to fear nothingness and to love freedom, but in both instances, it will be suggested, we must carefully examine the meaning of the terms. The functioning of the symbol of the Kingdom of God may then be

¹Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. by Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), pp. 146-147. See also, Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 195.

understood as a breaking open to "nothing" as the very condition of the possibility for our accepting freedom/world. Freedom is a "horror" as well as the most prized. Freedom, understood in terms of condition of possibility, is then more primordial than choice, and becomes that which allows us to escape the paralysis of understanding good as only possible in terms of its opposite of evil by calling us forth out of the particular evil through the manifesting of possibility. In more religious terms: were the divine reality to be absent from evil in whatever form the latter may be manifest, what follows wants to suggest, we would not be able to "transcend" evil as it is manifest in the world.

The Ontological Difference

The Ontological Difference as a Beginning in the Middle

Central to Martin Heidegger's reflections is the distinction he names as the "ontological difference." This theme is addressed specifically in two essays published in 1929 entitled "Vom Wesen des Grundes" and "Was ist Metaphysik?"¹ The theme is addressed

¹ Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen des Grundes (1929)" and "Was ist Metaphysik?" in Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978). The essay "Vom Wesen des Grundes" appeared originally in a Fest volume marking Husserl's 70th birthday. I take it as no accident that Heidegger offered this essay for the occasion. The English translation of the essay (The Essence of Reasons, trans. by Terrence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969)), particularly the title, conceals the question Heidegger is addressing (a question fundamental to Husserl's Phenomenology). The English title has two problems: 1) the meaning of "der Grund" and 2) the genitive construction. Der Grund may be translated as "reason." It also has the meaning, however, of "foundation"/"ground"/"first principle." As such it is often employed in metaphysics as the "foundation" of experience. In terms of the genitive construction: in the German title it is

again in an essay published in 1957 entitled "Identität und Differenz."¹ It is the identity in difference, named as the ontological difference, which is an integrating element in all of Heidegger's reflections even though we may speak of a "turn" within his thought with the publication of the "Brief über den Humanismus" in 1946.²

singular rather than plural. These two observations suggest in relation to the content of the essay and to the "problem" of "givenness" in Husserl's Phenomenology the more appropriate translation: "On the Essence of the Foundation" or "On the Essence of Grounding." See Ernst Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, 2. unveränderte Auflage (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1970), p. 229 and his introduction, p. 6, where he writes of his attempt to think Husserl's and Heidegger's understandings of truth together: "Die gemeinsame Interpretation gerade dieser beiden Wahrheitsbegriffe rechtfertigt sich jedoch nicht nur aus der heutigen Problemlage, zwischen ihnen besteht auch eine innere sachlichgeschichtliche Kontinuität. Sie bilden zusammen ein geschlossenes Kapitel innerhalb der metaphysischen Tradition des Wahrheitsproblems. Dieses Kapitel ist gekennzeichnet durch Husserls Erschließung und Heideggers Radikalisierung eines bis dahin in dieser Weise noch nicht thematisierten 'Bereichs', der weder schlicht objektiv noch einfach subjektiv ist und auch nicht, wie im deutschen Idealismus, die Synthesis von Objekt und Subjekt betrifft, sondern sich bei Husserl als Bereich des 'Phänomenologischen', der verschiedenen 'Gegebenheitsweisen' der Gegenstände zeigt und von Heidegger, nun nicht mehr in der Orientierung auf Gegenstände und nicht mehr im Rückgang auf eine Transzendente Subjektivität, als 'Lichtung' gedacht wird." See also my essay entitled "Husserl and Heidegger on Plato's Cave Allegory: A Study of Philosophical Influence," in International Philosophical Quarterly, 16, No. 3 (1976): 331-348.

¹Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, Pub., 1969)

²I am well aware that the "later" Heidegger speaks of a "four-fold" of earth, sky, the gods, and mortals as the new beginning for thinking the event character of the truth of Being. This occurs, in part, out of a dissatisfaction with his earlier discussion of the Being-of beings and Being-in-the-world as too rooted in traditional metaphysics, i.e., where being is thought as the continuous presence of a static substance as the foundation of all/each thing(s). My discussion, recognizing these pitfalls to be sure, attempts to think through with this vocabulary of the

What is this difference which is an identity? What is this difference that is "a telling silence"?¹ What is this "unconcealing" in "concealing"? What is this forgottenness of our Western tradition? What is this "circle" within which we already and always are?² What is this that "makes possible" intentionality?³

These questions have their root in the unfolding of the question informing Sein und Zeit. At the very beginning of this text Heidegger asks:

Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'being'? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being. . . . Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible⁴ horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being.

That Being is placed in question anew should not conceal the manner in which this question is here addressed. We should not lose sight of the terms "meaning" and "concrete" in this questioning. It is precisely the question of the meaning of Being, addressed not as an abstraction⁵ but concretely, which places Heidegger in the

"early" Heidegger to an adequate understanding of the truth of the Being-of beings as event. I attempt this out of a self-understanding of coherence with Otto Pöggeler's work on Heidegger. See especially his Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1963).

¹Heidegger, "Identity and Difference," p. 73.

²Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 153.

³Heidegger, "Vom Wesen des Grundes," p. 166.

⁴Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 19.

⁵Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 11.

Phenomenological movement. Heidegger places himself in the Phenomenological movement specifically in terms of a hermeneutic phenomenology as he names it in Sein und Zeit.¹ This concreteness is betrayed by his insistence that Being is always to be understood as the Being-of beings. This insistence occurs throughout his writings.² What does it mean to think of Being as always the Being-of beings? Heidegger writes:

The unconcealedness of Being . . . is always the truth of the Being-of beings, whether this is actual being or not. Reciprocally, in the unconcealedness of a being lies as such its Being. Ontic and ontological truth concern each different being in its Being and the Being-of beings. They belong essentially together out of the ground of their relationship to the difference between Being and beings (the ontological difference).³

In What is Called Thinking? Heidegger turns to the peculiarity of the participle being:

¹See especially the discussion of paragraph 7 in Sein und Zeit, pp. 27-38 (English trans., pp. 61-63).

²Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 29. "One may . . . ask what purpose this question /the question of Being/ is supposed to serve. Does it simply remain--or is it at all--a mere matter for soaring speculation about the most general of generalities, or is it rather, of all questions, both the most basic and the most concrete?

Being is always the Being of an entity" (p. 29). See also Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), a series of lectures given in Marburg in the Spring of 1927, pp. 22 and 466; "Vom Wesen des Grundes," from 1929, p. 132; and "Identity and Difference," from 1957, p. 61.

³Heidegger, "Vom Wesen des Grundes," p. 132. This is my translation of: "Unverborgenheit des Seins . . . ist immer Wahrheit des Seins von Seiendem, mag dieses wirklich sein oder nicht. Umgekehrt liegt in der Unverborgenheit von Seiendem je schon eine solche seines Seins. Ontische und ontologische Wahrheit betreffen je verschieden Seiendes in seinem Sein und Sein von Seiendem. Sie gehören wesenhaft zusammen auf Grund ihres Bezugs zum Unterschied von Sein und Seiendem (ontologische Differenz)."

Participles take part in both the nominal and the verbal meaning. . . . "being" means something in being, and the act of being.

But why do participles have two meanings? Is it because they take part in two meanings? No, rather these words are participles because what they state is always applied to what is in itself twofold. . . .

The participle εόν, being, is not just one more participle among countless others; εόν, ens, being is the participle which gathers all other possible participles into itself. The dual meaning of participles stems from the duality of what they tacitly designate. But this dualism in its turn stems from a distinctive duality that is concealed in the word εόν, being. . . .

The participle in which all the rest have their roots, in which they grow together (concrescere), and from which they continuously grow, though without specifically expressing it, is that participle which speaks from a unique and therefore distinctive duality. In keeping with that dual nature, a being has its being in Being, and Being persists as the Being of a being. There does not exist another kind of twofoldness that can compare with this.¹

Heidegger is quick to add that this is a duality of twofoldness and not a duality of synthesis; as if a being somehow had Being added to it and vice versa.² For the sake of thought, we may speak of a difference between the Being-of beings and being, but in fact they always occur in meaning as a unity in multiplicity (identity in difference).

What are we trying to express by this duality of the ontological difference? What is this difference between Being-of being and being? How can we articulate this "nominal" and "verbal" meaning of "being"?

¹Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, Pub., 1968), pp. 220-221.

²Ibid., pp. 226 and 242.

What is the Meaning of "Is"?

Since Aristotle the meaning of being has been understood as the "copula." What is the meaning of this "is," or better, what is the meaning of "is?"¹

Heidegger addresses the question of the copula, among other places, in a series of lectures entitled "Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie." He traces the meaning of the "copula" through the work of Aristotle (Kant), Hobbes, Mill, and Lotze suggesting that:

We will see in this way, how this apparently simple problem of the "is" was developed from different perspectives; how the different solutions, i.e., the different attempts at the interpretation of the "is," are to be understood as originating out of the unity of the properly formulated ontological question.²

Aristotle, Heidegger tells us, understood the "is" as belonging to a particular art of expression, i.e., the art of expression concerned with articulating that a thing is as it is (the copula is the form of expression through which the truth or falsehood of a particular thing comes to understanding). This form of expression is: S is P. Here the "is" expresses a binding

¹See Otto Pöggeler, "Metaphysik und Seinslogik bei Heidegger" in Philosophisches Jahrbuch: Im Auftrag der Görres-Gesellschaft (Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1962/63), p. 122. Pöggeler suggests that the question of the meaning of Being in Heidegger's work is the question of the meaning of "is" rather than merely the question of a thing as a being.

²Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, p. 254. This is my translation of: "Wir werden auf diese Weise sehen, wie sich dieses scheinbar einfache Problem des 'ist' von verschiedenen Seiten her verwickelt, so daß für uns die Frage entsteht, wie die verschiedenen Lösungs-, d.h. Interpretationsversuche des 'ist' ursprünglich aus der Einheitlichkeit der ontologischen Fragestellung zu verstehen sind."

relationship between a subject (S) and its predicate (P).

Heidegger says, however:

Only in the thinking of a binding, of something that can be combined, can σύνθεσις, binding together (synthesis) be thought. As long as Being means this binding in the expression S is P, Being has a meaning only in the thinking of binding. Being has no meaning of its own. . . .

Aristotle suggests, however, that Being is not simply another thing among things.

Of this "is" Aristotle said: . . . that which this "is" means is not an entity that comes forth among other things, as if it was like these as present-at-hand, but it is εν διανοία, is in thinking. This "is" is synthesis, . . . as Aristotle said, σύνθεσις νοημάτων, binding together of that which is thought in thinking. Aristotle is speaking here of the synthesis of S and P.²

Heidegger suggests that for Aristotle (and for Kant, who Heidegger suggests is at this point dependent upon Aristotle) the "is" is understood as subjective:

The "is" is /by Aristotle/ meant as that Being of a being that does not arise out of what is present-at-hand, but is something in understanding; said directly, in the Subject, subjective. . . . Being in the sense of the copula, according to the logic of Kant, is synthesis according to the logos of Aristotle. Because

¹Ibid., p. 257. This is my translation of: "Nur im Denken von Verbundenem, von Verbindbarem, kann σύνθεσις, Verbundenheit, gedacht werden. Sofern das Sein diese Verbundenheit meint in dem Satz S ist P, hat Sein nur eine Bedeutung im Denken von Verbundenem. Sein hat keine eigenständige Bedeutung. . . ."

²Ibid., p. 258. This is my translation of: "Von diesem 'ist' sagt Aristoteles: . . . dasjenige, was dieses 'ist' meint, ist nicht ein Seiendes, unter den Dingen vorkommend, ein wie sie Vorhandenes, sondern ist εν διανοία, ist im Denken. Dieses 'Ist' ist Synthesis, und zwar ist sie, wie Aristoteles sagt, σύνθεσις νοημάτων, Verbundenheit des im Denken Gedachten. Aristoteles spricht hier von der Synthesis des S und P."

this being, this ens, is according to Aristotle not εν πράγμασιν, does not come forth under things, but εν διανοία /is in thought/, it means that it is not ens reale, but ens rationis, as the Scholastics said.¹

It is in this sense that Kant said that being is not a "real" predicate.² The "is" is not a thing among things, but is a synthesis of the understanding.

In Thomas Hobbes' work, Heidegger, on the other hand, finds a paradigmatic Nominalist. "All problems, advanced in terms of the sentence, including the problem of true being and the question of the copula, are oriented in terms of the relationship of words by nominalism." According to Hobbes, S is P is a sequence of words in which a prior name (S) is combined with a later name (P). The copula is a signal that the reader/hearer understand that the two names refer to the same thing. But the "is" expresses not only the combination (synthesis) as it does for Aristotle. In nominalism it is the announcement of where the combination is "grounded," i.e., its cause.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 259. This is my translation of: "Dieses 'ist' soll das Sein eines Seienden meinen, das nicht unter dem Vorhandenen vorkommt, wohl aber etwas ist, das im Verstande ist, roh gesprochen, im Subjekt, subjektiv. . . . Das Sein im Sinne der Kopula ist respectus logicus nach Kant, Synthesis im Logos nach Aristoteles. Weil dieses Seiende, dieses ens, nach Aristoteles nicht εν πράγμασιν ist, nicht unter den Dingen vorkommt, sondern εν διανοία, bedeutet es kein ens reale, sondern ein ens rationis, wie die Scholastik sagt."

²Ibid., p. 47.

³Ibid., p. 260. This is my translation of: "Alle Probleme, die sich bezüglich des Satzes erheben, somit auch das Problem des Wahrseins und die Frage nach der Kopula, orientiert die nominalistische Fragestellung am Wortzusammenhang."

⁴See Ibid., p. 264: "Die Kopula ist nicht einfach das Zeichen einer Verbindung, ein Verbindungsbegriff, sondern die Anzeige dessen, worin die Verbundenheit gründet, causa."

Now it becomes clear what function the copula has for Hobbes. As the pointing in thought to the ground of the combination of names, it is the announcing that in the propositio (in the statement) we think the quidditas, the what, of the thing. The propositio is the answer to the question: what is the thing? In the orientation of nominalism that means: what is the ground of the distinction indicated by the two names to the same thing? The "is" expressed in the sentence, i.e., the thinking concerned with the copula, states the thinking of the ground of the possible and necessary identity in the relationship of the subject and predicate to the same thing. What is thought with the "is," the ground, is the whatness (realitas). Thereby, the "is" announces the essentia or the quidditas of the res, about which the assertion is concerned.

According to Hobbes, the abstract names could not express the whatness without the "is" of the copula. The "is" establishes here the ground for the possible relating of two names to the same thing. It expresses the cause, or the reason, for thinking the two names together. As a Nominalist, Hobbes understands "reality" to be what occurs in the language event. Hence, the copula expresses the reality of the thing to which different names, i.e., predications, are applied. In contrast to Aristotle and Kant, the copula is here thought as the "real." Language speaks about things, and it is because of the "is" that the thing comes to

¹Ibid., pp. 264-265. This is my translation of: "Jetzt wird erst deutlich, welchen Funktionssinn Hobbes der Kopula zuweist. Sie ist als die Indikation des Denkens des Grundes der Verkoppelung der Namen die Anzeige davon, daß wir in der propositio, in der Aussage, die quidditas, das Wassein der Dinge denken. Die propositio ist die Antwort auf die Frage: Was ist die Sache? In nominalistischer Orientierung heißt das: Was ist der Grund der Zuteilung zweier verschiedener Namen zur selben Sache? Das 'ist' aussprechen im Satze, die Kopula denken, besagt den Grund denken der möglichen und notwendigen identischen Bezogenheit von Subjekt und Prädikat auf dasselbe. Das im 'ist' Gedachte, der Grund, ist das Wassein (realitas). Demnach bekundet das 'ist' die essentia oder die quidditas der res, über die in der Aussage ausgesagt wird."

expression. The "is" is the present-at-hand of a thing in the linguistic event.

With John Stewart Mill, however, the copula is thought, Heidegger suggests, as more than the cause for predications applying to the same thing. He points out that the "is" has a double meaning. In addition to the linguistic function of cause identified by Hobbes, it expresses that the subject exists. The copula expresses more than the ability to say yes to the relationship between two names, it has its own meaning as "existence."¹ Mill makes a distinction between essential and accidental sentences. An essential sentence is "linguistic" and analytic. An accidental sentence is "actual" and synthetic.² The essential or linguistic sentence is the definition, i.e., nominalistic, word explanation. He escapes nominalism, however, by suggesting that for certain sentences more is happening than mere definition, i.e., more is happening than an explanation by means of words. A claim is being made about the existence of what is defined.

Mill says that the search for the distinction between the two sentences, which appear to have the same character, consists in that for the first sentence /linguistic, analytic/, "signifies" may be substituted for

¹See Ibid., p. 275: ". . . die Kopula etwas mehr als ein bloßes Zeichen der Prädizierung ist, daß sie auch Existenz /Vorhandensein/ bedeutet. In dem Satze: Sokrates ist gerecht, scheint nicht nur das enthalten zu sein, daß die Eigenschaft 'gerecht' von Sokrates ausgesagt werden kann, sondern überdies auch, daß Sokrates ist, d.h. daß er existiert. Dies zeigt jedoch nur, daß eine Zweideutigkeit in dem Worte 'ist' liegt--ein Wort, das nicht nur die Aufgabe der Kopula bei bejahenden Aussagen erfüllt, sondern auch eine eigene Bedeutung hat, vermöge deren es selbst das Prädikat eines Satzes bilden kann."

²See Ibid., p. 277.

the "is." With the first sentence I can say: A centaur signifies a living essence, etc., and I can say that without changing the meaning of the sentence. In the second case, however: the triangle is a straight sided, three cornered figure, I can't substitute "signifies" for the "is." For then it would be impossible, from this definition, which is not simply a word definition, to derive from it the Geometric truth which occurs here. In this second sentence, concerning the triangle, what is said of the "is" is not so much like "signifies" as containing within it an expression of existence.

Heidegger suggests, however, that this distinction can not be consistently maintained, because every linguistic, analytic sentence, which understands the "is" as "signifies," in fact presupposes a synthetic sentence of "existence." Hence, the distinction between Hobbes and Mill: "For Hobbes the 'is' says much the same as essentia, for Mill existentia."²

We find the copula understood by H. Lotze, again, as a "double judgment." It is a binding (synthesis) and a truth claim. Lotze maintains that a negative copula is not possible,³ for such a negation is not a binding.

¹Ibid., p. 279. This is my translation of: "Mill sagt, die Probe auf den Unterschied zwischen beiden Sätzen, die scheinbar denselben Charakter haben, besteht darin, daß man in den ersten Satz /linguistic, analytic/, für das 'ist' den Ausdruck 'bedeutet' einsetzen kann. Bei dem ersten Satz kann ich sagen: Ein Kentaur bedeutet ein lebendes Wesen usw., und ich kann so sagen, ohne daß der Sinn des Satzes sich ändert. Im zweiten Falle aber: Das Dreieck ist eine geradlinige dreiseitige Figur, kann ich für das 'ist' nicht 'bedeutet' einsetzen. Denn dann wäre es unmöglich, aus dieser Definition, die keine bloße Wortdefinition ist, irgendwelche Wahrheiten der Geometrie herzuleiten, was doch geschieht. In diesem zweiten Satze über das Dreieck besagt das 'ist' nicht soviel wie 'bedeutet', sondern birgt eine Existenz-aussage in sich."

²See Ibid., p. 281. This is my translation of: "Für Hobbes besagt das 'ist' und das est soviel wie essentia, für Mill existentia."

³See Ibid., p. 283: "Lotze sagt: 'Eine negative Kopula ist unmöglich', denn eine Trennung (Negation) ist keine Verbindungsweise."

The negation is in the negative judgment only a new, second judgment over the truth of the first, which is actually to be always thought positively. The second judgment is a judgment over the truth or falseness of the first. Therefore Lotze is led to say: Every judgment is at the same time a double judgment. S equals P says: S is P, yes, that is true. S is not equal to P says: no it is not in fact S equals P, which as a positive judgment lays always at the base.¹

Lotze developed this understanding of the double character of judgments in that he makes a distinction between "primary" and "secondary" conceptions.

The P-ness of the S is the "primary" conception expressed in the sentence. The subsequent "yes, it is so," "yes, it is true," is the "secondary" conception. We see here again . . . what Aristotle had already emphasized: The "is" means in one case binding and in another truth. . . . Lotze observes: 'There is little to teach over this form \overline{S} equals \overline{P} whose construction appears to be completely clear and simple; there is only to be shown, that this apparent clarity is completely enigmatical, and the darkness that floats around the meaning of the copula in the categorical judgment will mould for a long time forth the additional driving motive to the next reshaping of the logical task.' Lotze saw here in fact more than those who followed him (emphasis added).²

¹Ibid., p. 283. This is my translation of: "Die Negation ist im negativen Urteil nur ein neues, zweites Urteil über die Wahrheit des ersten, welches eigentlich immer positiv zu denken ist. Das zweite Urteil ist ein Urteil über die Wahrheit bzw. Falschheit des ersten. Das führt dazu, daß Lotze sagt: Jedes Urteil ist gleichsam ein Doppelurteil. S gleich P besagt: S ist P, ja das ist wahr. S nicht gleich P sagt: nein es ist nicht, nämlich das S gleich P, das immer als positives Urteil zugrunde liegt."

²Ibid., p. 284. This is my translation of: "Das P-sein des S ist der Hauptgedanke, der den Satzgehalt ausdrückt. Das dazu kommende 'ja es ist so', 'ja es ist wahr', ist der Nebengedanke. Wir sehen hier wieder . . . was schon Aristoteles betonte: Das 'ist' bedeutet einmal Verbindung und besagt zum anderen Wahrsein. . . . bemerkt Lotze: 'Zu lehren ist kaum etwas über diese Form, deren Bau ganz durchsichtig und einfach scheint; es ist nur zu zeigen, daß diese scheinbare Klarheit völlig rätselhaft ist, und daß die Dunkelheit, die über dem

At the end of his review of the understanding of the copula in the tradition, Heidegger observes: "The Being-of beings is identical with objectivity, and objectivity expresses nothing other than truth judgment."¹ This is in the sense of the twofoldness expressed in the "is." We have a twofoldness of "binding" and of a "truth claim." Heidegger then asks: "Does this understanding of the 'is' as copula encounter the ontological meaning that comes to expression as Being in the 'is'?"² The answer is implied by the question: according to Heidegger, No! The tradition's understanding of the "is" (the options having been represented by these philosophers) remains concerned with things (is ontic) rather than encountering the ontological meaning of the "is." "Is" in the tradition is understood 1) as a synthesis/binding in thought (ens is not a real predicate) by Aristotle/Kant; or 2) it is understood as the ground/cause for the relationship between two names by Hobbes (representing Nominalism); or 3) it is thought in terms of the double meaning, i.e., the nominalistic meaning and an empiricist meaning of existence (Mill); and 4) Lotze represents this same double

Sinne der Copula in dem kategorischen Urteile schwebt, auf lange hinaus den weitertreibenden Beweggrund zu den nächsten Umformungen der logischen Arbeit bilden wird.' Lotze hat hier in der Tat mehr gesehen als diejenigen, die ihm folgten."

¹Ibid., p. 284. This is my translation of: "Das Sein des Seienden wird identisch mit Gegenständlichkeit, und Gegenständlichkeit besagt nichts anderes als wahres Geurteiltsein."

²Ibid., p. 291. This is my translation of: "Trifft diese Kennzeichnung des 'ist' als Kopula den ontologischen Sinn des mit dem 'ist' ausgedrückten Seins?"

judgment character of the "is," but he drives us forward, in Heidegger's judgment, by pointing out the darkness concealed in what appears as a clear and simple statement: S is P. What is to be understood by the "ontological" meaning of being that is not a thing, but is also not to be thought in terms of a synthesis of the understanding as it was by Aristotle and Kant? What is the meaning of "is"?

Transcendence as Being-in-the-world

In his series of lectures entitled "What is Called Thinking?" Heidegger returns again to the "is." Without this enigmatic "is," he tells us, everything would rush into the void, but, he adds, without the "is" there could "be" no rushing away into a void. For this rushing "away" to occur there must first be a "here."¹ We might still be able even at this point to think of the "is" in terms of "understanding," language, or as an empirical claim to existence. We are, in fact, no closer to understanding the meaning of this "is" overagainst (or through) the multiplicity of things. The ontological difference remains for us still only in terms of a stating of what it is not: we have been told that the Being-of beings is not itself a being, though, on the other hand, this meaning of Being is always to be thought as the Being-of beings. Is it possible for us to think through this enigmatic "is"? How do we come to a positive understanding of the meaning

¹See Heidegger's discussion of the "is" in What is Called Thinking?, pp. 172-174.

of the Being-of beings? Can we only saw what it is not (reminiscent of "negative theology" in our tradition)?

In the essay "Vom Wesen des Grundes" we are told that the ontological difference is possible only ". . . as one unity with the breaking open of this difference."¹ The breaking open of this difference occurs with a particular being, who has a peculiar relationship (we are told here and in Sein und Zeit²) to the question of the meaning of Being. This peculiar being, is what we ourselves are: Dasein.³ For us to reach a fuller understanding of the positive meaning of the Being-of beings, we have to enquire into the peculiarity of this being, Dasein. We are told that the "ground" of the ontological difference is the "transcendence" of Dasein.⁴ What does this transcendence mean?

How is Dasein transcendence? Heidegger names this transcendence as a "surpassing," a going beyond. He suggests that this is constitutive of Dasein, but not in the sense of being a subject that is somehow related to objects as along side of objects. He writes:

¹Heidegger, "Vom Wesen des Grundes," p. 132. The full sentence reads as follows: "Das dergestalt notwendig ontisch-ontologisch gegabelte Wesen von Wahrheit überhaupt ist nur möglich in eins mit dem Aufbrechen dieses Unterschiedes."

²See Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 12f.

³Ibid., p. 12.

⁴See Heidegger, "Vom Wesen des Grundes," p. 133: "Diesen Grund der ontologischen Differenz nennen wir vorgreifend die Transzendenz des Daseins."

Kennzeichnet man alles Verhalten zu seiendem als intentionales, dann ist die Intentionalität nur möglich auf dem Grunde der Transzendenz, aber weder mit dieser identisch noch gar umgekehrt selbst die Ermöglichung der Transzendenz."

If we choose the term "subject" for the being which all of us are and which we understand as Dasein, then transcendence can be said to denote the essence of the subject or the basic structure of subjectivity. The subject never first exists as "subject" and then, in the event objects are present-at-hand, goes on to transcend as well. Instead, to be¹ a subject means to be a being in and as transcending.

The "being in" as transcending, we are challenged to think, is the being-in of "world."

We name that, toward which Dasein as such transcends, the world, and define now transcendence as Being-in-the-world. World determines the unified structure of transcendence; as belonging to this structure, the ² concept of world is named a transcendental concept.

In order for us to understand the unified structure of transcendence that belongs to Dasein as the breaking open of the difference between the Being-of beings and beings, we must investigate the meaning of "world." This, however, is itself no obvious concept. Heidegger states:

The expression: to be in the world ("next" to other beings of necessity presents itself as well) belongs to Dasein's essence, shows itself to be false. The thesis: Being in the world belongs as such to the essence of Dasein contains the problem of transcendence.³

¹Quoted from the English translation of Heidegger's "Vom Wesen des Grundes," The Essence of Reasons, p. 37.

²Heidegger, "Vom Wesen des Grundes," p. 136. This is my translation of: "Wir nennen das, woraufhin das Dasein als solches transzendiert, die Welt und bestimmen jetzt die Transzendenz als In-der-Welt-sein. Welt macht die einheitliche Struktur der Transzendenz mit aus; als ihr zugehörig heißt der Weltbegriff ein transzendentaler."

³Ibid., p. 139. This is my translation of: "Die Aussage: zum Wesen des Daseins gehört, daß es in der Welt ist ('neben' anderem Seienden notwendig auch vorkommt), erweist sich als falsch. Die These: zum Wesen von Dasein als solchem gehört das In-der-Welt-sein, enthält das Problem der Transzendenz."

What is the meaning of "world"?

We are not to think of world as nature or as the subjective possession of the human species as a whole. World is constitutive of Dasein and aims at articulating Dasein's relationship to beings as a whole.¹ Heidegger writes: "The always pre-comprehending and pre-encompassing understanding of this totality is the going beyond /̄transcending/ to world."² Yet,

/e/ntering the world is no event of an entering into beings, but something that "happens" "with" beings. And this happening/event is the existing of Dasein that as existing transcends. . . . And only when this pre-history, the transcendence, occurs/happens, i.e., when beings with the character of Being-in-the-world /̄Dasein/ breaks open in beings, only then does the possibility occur that beings are revealed.³

The ontological difference is a distinction to be made between the Being-of beings and beings. Being is the most unique participle as the condition of the possibility for the encountering

¹See Ibid., pp. 153-154: "Es ist daher gleich irrig, den Ausdruck Welt entweder als Bezeichnung der Allheit der Naturdinge (natürlicher Weltbegriff) oder als Titel für die Gemeinschaft der Menschen (personaler Weltbegriff) in Anspruch zu nehmen. Vielmehr liegt das metaphysisch Wesentliche der mehr oder minder klar abgehobenen Bedeutung von mundus, Welt darin, daß sie auf die Auslegung des menschlichen Daseins in seinem Bezug zum Seienden im Ganzen abzielt."

²Ibid., p. 155. This is my translation of: "Das je vor-greifend-umgreifende Verstehen dieser Ganzheit aber ist Überstieg zur Welt."

³Ibid., p. 157. This is my translation of: "Welteingang ist kein Vorgang am eingehenden Seienden, sondern etwas, das 'mit' dem Seienden 'geschieht'. Und dieses Geschehen ist das Existieren von Dasein, das als existierendes transzendiert. . . . Und nur wenn diese Urgeschichte, die Transzendenz, geschieht, d.h. wenn Seiendes vom Charakter des In-der-Welt-seins /̄Dasein/ in das Seiende einbricht, besteht die Möglichkeit, daß Seiendes sich offenbart."

of things. The verbal character of being we have reviewed in terms of the various options of understanding found for it in the tradition as the copula, but have been told that this understanding of the tradition remains an ontic discussion rather than breaking open to the ontological. The breaking open to the ontological occurs in the uniqueness of one being, i.e., Dasein. Dasein is transcending. This transcending is a transcending to world as Being-in-the-world which is an occurrence "with" the totality of beings (rather than merely an alongside-of), and this totality is not the mere adding together of all things either as an objective totality or as the subjective "achievement" of humanity as a species. This transcending "whole" is a pre-history of a pre-comprehending, pre-encompassing understanding. Can we find a more accessible path to what is here to be thought without leveling it down to a triviality?

We are not to think of the meaning of Being as outside of Being-in-the-world. This is the same as saying that Being is always to be understood as the Being-of beings. Two extremes are to be avoided. We are neither concerned with a metaphysical reality "beyond" the world (as something objective) nor are we concerned with a merely abstract and empty concept. This thinking of the meaning of Being, then, is no call to a mystical withdrawal from the world. It is a call to engage the world at its deepest level. On the other hand, we are not being challenged to think of Being as an abstract concept. It is not an intellectual event of the philosopher who breaks through to the ultimate

meaning and goal of all events. This is no new gnosticism confronting us here. The meaning of the Being-of beings as transcendence is expressed as a pre-comprehending and pre-encompassing of understanding as an event in everydayness, i.e., of a being in the world.

Dasein is transcending Being-in-the-world. This means to suggest, that constitutive to Dasein is a unified structure of transcendence. Dasein is not "outside" of the world. Our Being, as human being, is a pre-understanding wholeness of world. Only then can we have what we could call a particular "life-world."

World is only when and as long as Dasein exists. Nature can be without an existing Dasein. The structure of Being-in-the-world announces the essential characteristic of Dasein, that it throws before itself a world, not as something that occurs afterwards or occasionally, but the motif world belongs to the Being of Dasein. That Dasein is with this motif always and already emerging out of itself, an existing, it is in a world. Therefore, Dasein is no such thing as a subjective inner sphere. The reason that we reserve the concept "existence" for the way of Being that¹ is Dasein is that to Dasein belongs Being-in-the-world.

Dasein is transcendence "to" a world. This suggests that Dasein is more than "in" the midst of a conglomeration of things that are simply to be calculated, predicted, manipulated, and

¹Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, pp. 241-242. This is my translation of: "Welt ist nur, wenn und solange ein Dasein existiert. Natur kann auch sein, wenn kein Dasein existiert. Die Struktur des In-der-Welt-seins bekundet die Wesenseigentümlichkeit des Daseins, daß es eine Welt sich vorwirft, nicht nachträglich und gelegentlich, sondern der Vorwurf der Welt gehört zum Sein des Daseins. Das Dasein ist in diesem Vorwurf immer schon aus sich heraus getreten, ex-sistere, es ist in einer Welt. Daher ist es nie so etwas wie eine subjektive Innensphäre. Der Grund, warum wir den Begriff 'Existenz' für die Seinsart des Daseins reservieren, liegt darin, daß zu diesem Sein das In-der-Welt-sein gehört."

controlled. Dasein's transcendence is announced in what is named the ontological difference: that the Being-of beings is different from beings as "the same." The ontological difference is in turn announced and concealed in the enigmatic participle "being." The ontic, nominal, "thing" meaning of "a" being, and the complex inter-relatedness of things (which we could name as an ecological inter-relatedness), conceals the ontological meaning of the "is." Yet without the event of this "is" there would be no ontic, ecological interrelatedness of things. To be sure, this is not the "is" of the copula as our Western tradition has understood it. It is not a synthesizing of names by the understanding, of language, or a claim for the existence of a being. How is it that Dasein is world? How does this "is" work/happen that Dasein is transcendence to a world? How is it that Dasein alone ex-ists?

The transcending unity that is the presupposition of Dasein's transcending to a world can neither come to complete expression through language nor can it be "seen" in the multiplicity itself. It is in fact concealed by the very multiplicity that reveals it. Multiplicity conceals the unity that it is. There is only one being that can make the unity of multiplicity a question for itself, and that is the one being that can and does understand the complexity of its limits, i.e., Dasein. Only as such can Dasein be the "there" where the Being-of beings can crash up against itself and be named.¹ It is in this sense that Dasein is spoken of

¹See Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by Ralph Manheim (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 137: "The being-there of historical man means: to be posited as

as "the clearing," i.e., the opening in the "forest" where the limit and expansiveness of the forest is announced. The difficulty is that the limitedness of beings and their expansiveness can conceal the transcending unity of that expansiveness. It is Dasein's task, then, to hold open the clearing in a manner that the fullness of the "is," the Being-of beings, is announced in the multiplicity of beings. As a being among beings, Dasein is neither "outside" nor "in." Dasein is with world because of the transcending event of the Being-of beings as the condition of the possibility for Being-in-the-world.

The Being-of beings as event (not stasis), i.e., as history,¹ is the condition of the possibility that Dasein transcends to world.

the breach into which the preponderant power of being bursts in its appearing, in order that this breach itself should shatter against being." See in addition, p. 171: "The question of who man is is closely bound up with the question of the essence of being. But the definition of the essence of man required here cannot be the product of an arbitrary anthropology that considers man in basically the same way as zoology considers animals. Here the direction and scope of the question of being-human are determined solely through the question of being. In accordance with the hidden message of the beginning, man should be understood, within the question of being, as the site which being requires in order to disclose itself. Man is the site of openness, the there. The essent juts into this there and is fulfilled. Hence we say that man's being is in the strict sense of the word 'being-there.' The perspective for the opening of being must be grounded originally in the essence of being-there as such a site for the disclosure of being." It should be noted that Manheim chooses to translate das Sein as being and das Seiende as essent.

¹History/historicity is to be distinguished from "historicism," the observing of events as a chain of cause and effect in which "prior" events explain subsequent events, and from "actualism," as "the other side" of historicity, i.e., a viewing of the past in terms of weighted values of the present (see below, pp. 287-288). History is the more complex process of the revealing/concealing of "mystery" (see below, pp. 303f.) in the clearing, which is human Being-in-the-world. Thus, the intimate relationship of the Being-of beings to time as an ontic, clock time, and as ontological present-ing as a future-past-present "whole."

As the clearing in which this transcending is named, along with the multiplicity, Dasein exists, i.e., it breaks open as ecstasis the reigning power of multiplicity controlling consciousness to the transcendent unity within experience. Heidegger writes concerning pantheism:

The expressions concerning pantheism are: 1. Everything is God. 2. Singular things are God. 3. God is everything. . . . Only the third expression is permissible, but above all as a question. And the question concerns itself with what the "is" means. It amounts to: The only and properly understood identity expressed from S and P, God and everything, can not be grasped as a simple sameness, but the belonging together of differences out of the priority of a primordial unity.

It is with the unique and particular being among beings, that is Dasein, that the ontological difference of the Being-of beings and being, concerned with the primordial core of experience, is encountered and named.

This transcending unity in multiplicity is always and already understanding. It is because of this always and already relatedness as participating in the Being-of beings that Dasein can then in interpretation treat something as something.² There is a primordially prior to language as ontic (Rede) (not here understood

¹Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 103. This is my translation of: "Die Pantheismusätze lauteten: 1. Alles ist Gott. 2. Die einzelnen Dinge sind Gott. 3. Gott ist alles. . . . Der dritte Satz ist allein zulässig, aber zunächst als Frage. Und die Frage muß sich darauf richten, was das 'ist' bedeutet. Es ergab sich: Die im Satz überhaupt und erst recht die in diesem Satz ausgesagte Identität von S und P, Gott und Alles, kann nicht begriffen werden als bloße Einerleiheit, sondern als Zusammengehörigkeit des Verschiedenen auf Grund einer ursprünglichen Einheit."

²See Sein und Zeit, paragraph 32, "Verstehen und Auslegung" ("Understanding and Interpretation").

as discourse, but as merely an ontic phenomenon), prior to any particular form of engagement of things to a particular purpose, that is this transcending unity of the Being-of beings as the condition of the possibility for our interpretive observing, engaging and speaking with/in world. It is this "identity" of the Being-of beings that as understanding allows for the possibility of our interpreting within multiplicity. It is this "difference" between the Being-of beings and beings that allows for the possibility of the unity, concealed in multiplicity, to be revealed (and by Dasein to be announced and named).

This ontological pre-understanding is in fact the hermeneutical circle from which we cannot escape (nor would we want to), but must first "come into" in the right way.

. . . if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just 'sense' it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up.

. . . If the basic conditions which make interpretation possible are to be fulfilled, this must rather be done by not failing to recognize beforehand the essential conditions under which it can be performed. What is decisive is not to get out of the circle, but to come into it in the right way. . . .

The 'circle' in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein--that is, in the understanding which interprets. An entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure.

This is not a circle of experiential determinism. It is not that in reading a text, encountering a work of art, engaging in an activity, etc., we "understand," "interpret," or "see" only what we have previously understood out of our past accumulation of

¹Ibid., p. 153 (English trans., pp. 194-195).

experience. That there is a certain circularity determining what we encounter at this ontic level, is not to be denied, but it is not the ontological circularity that is being discussed here. This "ontological circularity" is not the determining, it is, rather, the enabling of possibility. In the analysis of Husserl's description of constituting consciousness, it will be suggested that the ontic circularity is broken by the very call of "to the things themselves," i.e., it is precisely the call of the things themselves as phenomena, to which we are always (as intentional consciousness) related, that forces us to re-examine such prejudices of an ontic circularity of experience. Only then are we able to be surprised, i.e., that our noetic assumption(s) is/are not fulfilled by the noemata. The ontological circularity meant here, on the other hand, is another type of circularity altogether. It is not a "vicious" circularity that closes us off from possibility; it is the circularity of the Being-of beings as pre-understanding, i.e., as the very condition of the possibility (the having of possibilities) whatsoever. Rather than a circularity closing us off, this circularity is an opening up, and in fact an opening up as a "clearing" allowing us to understand (by means of our transcending to a world because of the Being-of beings) the fullness that we are as history/time. Here we find a meaning to Heidegger's often repeated phrase: "Higher than actuality stands possibility."¹

¹Ibid., p. 38 (English trans., p. 63).

Summary

By thinking the ontological difference, we always find ourselves as middle. This middle has two meanings: 1) the unity, as the possibility of our transcending to a world, i.e., the Being-of beings, is an always and already presencing (event) which overwhelms us as participant; and 2) as the placedness where the Being-of beings comes to meaningful encounter with itself in our thrownness, i.e., we are in the "middle" of an historical horizon.

What is the meaning of this historical horizon? In the discussion of the ontological difference, I have discussed a possible meaning for Being, but I have yet to engage the question of the ontic "how" of our encounter with/in particular beings. To this end I turn to a discussion of the description of consciousness presented by Edmund Husserl as intentionality.

On Intentional Consciousness

Husserl's Phenomenology as Description of Intentional Consciousness

The pre-understanding of Dasein as Being-in-the-world (i.e., as that being where the Being-of beings can be encountered and named) is the condition of the possibility that Dasein can have a life-world (as understood by Husserl's Phenomenological enterprise).¹ With the description of Husserl's work that follows,

¹See Otto Pöggeler, "Sein als Ereignis: Martin Heidegger zum 26. September 1959" in Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung (Meisenheim/Glan: Verlag Anton Hain KG, 1959), pp. 609-610: "Indem Heidegger vom Seinsverständnis des Menschen aus die Seinsfrage stellt, lenkt er in gewisser Weise in die Transzendentalphilosophie ein. Zu einer Lehre von der transzendentalen

we are concerned with his understanding of intentional consciousness as the "how" of our making sense out of our ontic life-world.

Konstitution hatte Husserl die Phänomenologie radikalisiert, in deren Schulzusammenhang Heidegger sich stellt. Husserl hatte versucht, der philosophischen Forschung jenes Ursprungsfeld zu eröffnen, auf dem die Konstitution eines jeden Seienden erfolgt. Sein und Zeit ist Husserl gewidmet: Heidegger macht sich Husserls Richtung auf die Ursprungsfragen zu eigen und fragt in seiner Analytik des Daseins nach der Seinsweise jenes transzendentalen ego, das die Konstitution des Seienden leistet. Er gesteht es Dilthey sowie Husserl und Scheler zu, daß sie die Person nicht mehr als etwas Dingliches, als etwas substantiell Seiendes gefaßt haben. Aber, so sagt Heidegger, die eigentliche Seinsweise der Person ist noch nicht recht deutlich geworden, sondern wird immer neu von den traditionellen anthropologischen Bestimmungen her verdeckt (SuZ 46f.). Auch und gerade dann, wenn die Person nicht mehr 'seinshaft' verdinglicht, sondern geradezu vom Nichts her bestimmt wird, bleibt diese Bestimmung am unzulänglichen traditionellen Seinsbegriff orientiert. Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des Seienden, 'in dem sich 'Welt' konstituiert', ist, so schreibt Heidegger an Husserl, das zentrale Problem von Sein und Zeit: 'Es gilt zu zeigen, daß die Seinsart des menschlichen Daseins total verschieden ist von der aller anderen Seienden, und daß sie als diejenige, die sie ist, gerade in sich die Möglichkeit der transzendentalen Konstitution birgt.' Das transzendente ego ist für Heidegger aber nicht das cogito des Descartes und nicht das reine Bewußtsein Husserls, sondern die Existenz als das Wesen des Daseins, wie sie durch In-der-Welt-Sein, Sorge, Endlichkeit, durch Zeitlichkeit und Geschichtlichkeit gekennzeichnet ist. 'Die transzendente Konstitution ist eine zentrale Möglichkeit der Existenz des faktischen Selbst. . . .' See further, p. 611: "Die phänomenologische Konstitution wird ermöglicht durch ein unverfügbares 'Sein'. So wird die Phänomenologie für Heidegger zur Ontologie. . . .

Bei Husserl vollendet sich noch einmal der Wille der Metaphysik, alles Seiende auf einen letzten Grund zurückzustellen. Dieser Grund wird neuzeitlich in der unbedingten Subjektivität gefunden. Bei Heidegger wird der Wille zur unbedingten Subjektivität gebrochen: das unverfügbare Sein stellt den Menschen in das All des Seienden, aber so, daß der Mensch zum Seienden als Seienden sich verhält und damit die Lichtung, das Da des Seins ist. Die Unverfügbarkeit des Seins durchherrscht den Menschen in der Befindlichkeit. Diese deckt auf, daß der Mensch im All des Seienden sich befindet; sie eröffnet so auch den Zugang zur ursprünglich gedachten Natur oder, wie Heidegger später sagt, zur 'Erde'. Das Selbst ist befindliches Verstehen, nicht aber 'reines Bewußtsein'." See in addition, Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, and McGaughey, "Husserl and Heidegger on Plato's Cave Allegory: A Study of Philosophical Influence."

That Husserl's Phenomenology "presupposes" the ontological of the ontological difference,¹ must not distract from the radical character of his description of intentional consciousness.

Phenomenology is more than a methodology. It is an entirely new beginning in what the tradition calls transcendental philosophy. It has as its starting point the Cartesian ego, but it avoids the solipsism of this ego (and not by means of faith in a loving God who would not trick our senses as Descartes suggests in the Fifth Meditation). The cogito, ergo sum provides the indubitable starting point for Husserl's reflections, but this asserts only "that" an ego exists not "how."²

¹See McGaughey, "Husserl and Heidegger on Plato's Cavel Allegory: A Study of Philosophical Influence," p. 348. Michael Theunissen in his essay "Intentionaler Gegenstand und ontologische Differenz: Ansätze zur Fragestellung Heideggers in der Phänomenologie Husserls' in Philosophisches Jahrbuch: Im Auftrag der Görres-Gesellschaft, 70. Jahrgang (Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1962/3, pp. 344-362, argues that Husserl anticipates Heidegger's own discussion of the ontological difference (p. 358). He suggests that Husserl makes a distinction between Lebenswelt and world (reflecting the ontological difference between a world of things and the world as made possible by the Being-of beings). He wishes to maintain that Husserl saw the problem of "givenness" and spoke accordingly not only of world as the combination of all things (Life-world) as the passive synthesis in the background of each active event of intentional consciousness, but spoke, as well, of ". . . die eigentliche Gestalt der 'Welt selbst', . . . sie sei 'nicht wie ein Ding da' und 'nicht seiend wie ein Seiendes', ist der Weltsinn aber positiv das Sein überhaupt" (p. 355). Theunissen introduces confusion, however, when he speaks of "three ontological differences (p. 357): "So haben wir zwar formal drei Formen ontologischer Differenz: die Differenz des unmittelbar Vorliegenden und seines innergegenständlichen Sinnes, die Differenz von Weltuniversum und Weltsinn und schließlich die der Welt und des innerweltlichen Seienden. Konkret-erfahrungsmäßig aber ist der Unterschied zwischen dem Seienden in der Welt und der selbst die Stätte, an der die ontologische Differenz auch in ihren beiden anderen Formen ursprünglich aufleuchtet."

²Paul Ricoeur views the Cartesian "starting point" similarly. He writes: "Consciousness is not the first reality which we can

Let us take the cogito, ergo sum, or even more the simple sum as an evident claim (which is able to be upheld over against all doubt concerning it), then it is obvious that it is not the complete empirical I that passes here. . . . /S/o that we say better: In the judgment I am, the evidence does not depend upon a fixed (in the sharpness of our conceptualizing), unrestricted kernel of the empirical I representation. Taking the question further, concerning what might belong to this conceptually limited, and therefore unutterable, kernel, what actually with evident certainty the I consists of, then it comes immediately to a pointing to the judgment of inner (i.e., adequate) perception. Not only is the I am evident, but innumerable judgments of the form I take this or that to be true--namely inasmuch as I don't merely presume, but am with evidence certain, that perception as it is thought to be, is in fact given: that I comprehend it in fact as it is. . . . In these steps further, what remembering presents as an earlier haven been present according to a belonging to my past I.

know but the last. We must arrive at it, not begin with it" (The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 323). Further, "'Consciousness is not immediate, but mediate; it is not a source, but a task, the task of becoming more conscious'" (Ibid., p. 324). "When we say that philosophy is reflection, we mean this in the sense of reflection on itself. But what do we mean by the self? . . . Incapable of being either verified or deduced, it is simultaneously the positing of a being and an act, a form of existence and an operation of thought: I am, I think; to exist for myself is to think; I exist insofar as I think. Since this truth can be neither verified as a fact nor deduced as a conclusion, it must be posited in reflection; its own self-positing is reflection. Fichte termed this first truth the thetic judgment. Such is our philosophical point of departure.

. . . We must introduce a second characteristic of reflection, which may be stated in this way: reflection is not intuition; or, in positive terms: reflection is the effort to recomprehend the ego of the ego cogito in the mirror of its objects, its works, and ultimately its acts. . . . The first truth--I think, I am--remains as abstract and empty as it is unassailable. It must be 'mediated' by representations, actions, works, institutions, and monuments which objectify it; it is in these objects, in the largest sense of the word, that the ego must lose itself and find itself" (Ibid., p. 327).

¹ Edmund Husserl, Fünfte Logische Untersuchung: Über intentionale Erlebnisse und ihre 'Inhalte' (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, Philosophische Bibliothek Band 290, 1975), pp. 14-15. This is my translation of: "Nehmen wir das cogito, ergo sum, oder vielmehr das einfach sum als eine Evidenz in Anspruch, die allen

We find here the kernel of the Phenomenological enterprise, i.e., the claim that consciousness is not something over against/outside of the things of its life-world; consciousness is rather itself consciousness-of. We must pursue the implications of this claim.

The claim announces in fact the newness within transcendental philosophy that characterizes Phenomenology. Consciousness is understood as other than a "picture" theory of the world, i.e., that "outside" is the thing itself, and "inside" (consciousness) is merely a picture constituted of the thing; or 2) the other extreme, neither is the real solely the "immanent."¹ Husserl suggests, to the contrary, that in consciousness there is no "outside"/"inside" split, i.e., no subject-object split. Consciousness cannot be understood without "objects," and "objects"

Zweifeln gegenüber ihre Geltung behaupten dürfe, so ist es selbstverständlich, daß hierbei als Ich nicht das volle empirische Ich passieren kann. . . . so werden wir am besten wohl sagen: Im Urteil ich bin hängt die Evidenz an einem gewissen, in begrifflicher Schärfe nicht umgrenzten Kern der empirischen Ichvorstellung. Werfen wir nun weiter die Frage auf, was zu diesem begrifflich umfassten und daher unsagbaren Kern wohl gehören mag, was also jeweils mit evidenter Sicherheit das Ich ausmacht, so liegt es am nächsten, auf die Urteile der innern (= adäquaten) Wahrnehmung hinzuweisen. Nicht nur das ich bin ist evident, sondern ungezählte Urteile der Form ich nehme dies oder jenes wahr--nämlich sofern ich dabei nicht bloß vermeine, sondern dessen mit Evidenz versichert bin, daß Wahrgenommenes als das, was es vermeint ist, auch gegeben ist; daß ich es selbst erfasse als das, was es ist. . . . Zu diesem Bereich tritt nun weiterhin das, was die Erinnerung als früher uns evident gegenwärtig Gewesenes, somit als zum eigenen gewesenen Ich Gehöriges darstellt. (Evidenz bzw. evidente Wahrscheinlichkeit des ich war.)"

¹See Ibid., pp. 77-82 and Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. by W.R. Boyce Gibson (London: Collier Books, 1969), pp. 122-124.

cannot be understood outside of their relationship to consciousness, or, without consciousness there is no meaning.¹

Hence, there is a strong tendency to misunderstand the meaning of Husserl's often quoted shibboleth: "to the things themselves." What is the "thing," and "how" do we engage it?

This shibboleth contains different meanings as a consequence of the new understanding of transcendental philosophy that here comes forth. 1) It means a "bracketing" of pre-judgments from the tradition that have come to understand the "thing" in a particular manner (e.g., as the Ding-an-sich, as illusion, as the ephemeral over against the eternal idea: as "existing," etc.), i.e., we are to go to the phenomena themselves with a freshness that is threatened by such pre-judgments, that then might pre-consciously guide our reflections; and 2) the shibboleth is a challenge that praxis (as "accomplishment" or as a process of "fulfillment") is constitutive of consciousness, i.e., that consciousness is no passive movie camera recording a series of pictures of an outside world. Consciousness is action/act in Husserl's Phenomenological descriptions.²

¹The term meaning is not here understood as a value claim. Such a value claim, i.e., that all value is reduced to conscious experience or that all conscious experience has positive value, such a claim has nothing to do with a description of the intentional structure of consciousness as the condition of the possibility for our constituting of meaning in consciousness. Meaning is here understood as "making sense out of" something.

²See Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff, pp. 188-189: "Die Idee eines 'von allen sonstigen Abzweckungen befreiten theoretischen Interesses' . . . bedeutet also nicht, daß sich die Philosophie aus der Praxis auf einen rein theoretischen Bereich zurückzieht, sondern daß sie die Praxis selbst durchdringt, so

Now at last it was possible and necessary to become aware of the fact . . . that the life of consciousness is a life of accomplishment: the accomplishment, right or wrong, of ontic meaning, even sensibly intuited meaning, and all the more of scientific meaning.

Constitutive of consciousness is involvement with its life-world of relationships, imaginings, phantasies, actions, etc. Consciousness is consciousness-of.

The first Phenomenological epoche by Husserl is an immediate signal that something new is happening from the starting point of the Cartesian ego. The motivating power of Cartesianism is doubting: that we can doubt the existence of everything except for the ego, for only with the ego is the attempt to contradict its existence an affirmation of its existence. In order to say that

daß diese alle ihre Interessen dem Interesse an der Wahrheit dieser Interessen unterordnet. Sofern das menschliche Leben im ganzen Praxis ist, ist 'Erkenntnisvernunft . . . Funktion der praktischen Vernunft, der Intellekt ist Diener des Willens' (Hu VIII 201). Aber der Wille erreicht seine Wahrheit nur sofern er seine theoretische Komponente aktualisiert: 'Das Erkennenwollen ist vorausgesetzt für alles andere Wollen, wenn dieses die höchste Wertform besitzen soll' (a.O). Philosophie ist dann 'keine theoretische Liebhaberei' (Hu VIII 197), sondern, wie Husserl bei der Interpretation der sokratisch-platonischen Idee der Philosophie formuliert, 'ein Leben, in dem der Mensch in unermüdlicher Selbstbesinnung und radikaler Rechenschaftsabgabe Kritik - letzttauswertende Kritik - an seinen Lebenszielen . . . übt' (Hu VII 9). Das Telos der Philosophie, wie sie durch Husserls Vorbegriff bestimmt ist, ist also letztlich eine 'philosophische Kultur,' d.h. 'eine wahrhaft mündige Menschheit, . . . die allzeit gewillt ist, der 'Vernunft' zu folgen . . . und die allzeit befähigt und bereit sein möchte, die absolute Normgerechtigkeit ihres Tuns aus letzten Quellen der Endgültigkeit zu vertreten' . . ."

¹Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, p. 90. See also, p. 182f. entitled "The Resolution of the paradox: We as human beings, and we as ultimately functioning-accomplishing subjects."

I don't think, I must be thinking, i.e., to say I don't exist presupposes that I am existing: cogito, ergo sum. Husserl begins his "absolute" philosophy from this point, but he views the situation of the ego differently from Descartes.

Descartes had not pondered the fact that, just as the sensible world, that of everyday life, is the cogitatum of scientific cogitationes; so the scientific world is the cogitatum of scientific cogitationes; and he had not noticed the circle in which he was involved when he presupposed, in his proof of the existence of God, the possibility of inferences transcending the ego, when this possibility, after all, was supposed to be established only through this proof. The thought was quite remote from him that the whole world could itself be a cogitatum arising out of the universal synthesis of the variously flowing cogitationes and that, on a higher level, the rational accomplishment of the scientific cogitationes, built upon the former¹ ones, could be constitutive of the scientific world.

The cogito, ergo sum tells us that the ego exists, but not how.

. . . how various perceptions or appearances come to the point of "bringing to appearance" one and the same object so that it can be "the same" for them and for the consciousness of unity or identity that unifies their variety, is a question that can be put clearly and answered only by phenomenological, essential investigation. . . .

Methodological doubting has a value only that through it we reach the beginning of our philosophical reflections. When we turn to the question "how" am I the cogito, Husserl begins by suspending the entire question of the "existence" or non-"existence" of the "objects" of consciousness.

¹Ibid., p. 90.

²Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," p. 114. See The Crisis of European Sciences, pp. 143f. entitled "The two possible fundamental ways of making the life-world thematic: the naive and natural straightforward attitude and the idea of a consistently reflective attitude toward the 'how' of the subjective manner of givenness of life-world and life-world objects."

One must . . . take phenomena as they give themselves, i.e., as this flowing "having consciousness," intending, appearing, as this foreground and background "having consciousness," a "having consciousness" as present or pre-present, as imagined or symbolic or copied, as intuitive or represented emptily, etc. Thus, too, we must take phenomena as they turn this way or that, transforming themselves, according as the point of view or mode of attention changes in one way or another. All that bears the title "consciousness-of" and that "has" a "meaning," "intends" something "objective," which latter--whether from one standpoint or other it is to be called "fiction" or "reality"--permits being described as something "immanently objective," "intended as such,"¹ and intended in one or another mode of intending.

Consciousness is nothing other than the phenomena it encounters, and the philosophical question is concerned with describing the structure enabling this constituting of meaning by consciousness.

. . . the experiencing Ego is still nothing that might be taken for itself and made into an object of inquiry on its own account. Apart from its "ways of being related" or "ways of behaving," it is completely empty of essential components, it has no content that could be unravelled, it is in and for itself indescribable: pure Ego and nothing further.

There is therefore occasion for a variety of important descriptions, bearing on the special forms or modes of experience of the experiencing Ego, as actually enjoyed. In this connection we continue to distinguish--despite the necessary interrelationship--the experience itself from the pure Ego of the experiencing process; and again: the pure subjective phase of the way of experiencing from the remaining Ego-diverted content of the experience, so to speak. Thus there is a certain, extraordinarily important two-sidedness in the essential nature of the sphere of experience, concerning which we can also say that in experiences we must distinguish between a subjectively and an objectively oriented aspect: a form of expression which should not indeed be misunderstood, as though we taught that the "object" of knowledge might, in this respect, be something analogous to the pure Ego. However, the form of expression will justify itself. And we hasten to add that to this two-sidedness

¹Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," pp. 108-109.

there corresponds, to a considerable extent at any rate, a division (though not any real separation) between two different sections of our inquiry, the one bearing on pure subjectivity, the other on that which belongs to the "constitution" of objectivity as referred to its subjective source.¹

With no little critical re-evaluation, Husserl adapts a term found in Brentano to describe the structure of consciousness. He names it as intentionality:

In perception something is perceived, in the picture representation something graphic is represented, in the statement something said, in love something loved, in hate something hated, in desire something desired, etc. Brentano had the secret to be found in such examples when he said: "Every psychical phenomenon is characterised through what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages named as the intentional (better mental) immanence of an object, and what we would name (although not without being entirely unambiguous) the relationship to a content, the directing toward an object (whereby here reality is not meant) or the immanent objectivity. Each contains something as an object within it, although not each in the same manner." . . .

If one is of the opinion that Brentano's classification of "psychical phenomenon" is correct, and if one even recognizes this foundational meaning for the entire treatment of psychology, which Brentano maintained; this is not here the question. Only one thing do we hold before us as important: that there are essentially specific differences of the intentional relationship, or in short of intention² (which amount to the descriptive species of "act").

¹Husserl, Ideas, pp. 214-215.

²Husserl, Fünfte Logische Untersuchung, pp. 26-27. This is my translation of: "In der Wahrnehmung wird etwas wahrgenommen, in der Bildvorstellung etwas bildlich vorgestellt, in der Aussage etwas ausgesagt, in der Liebe etwas geliebt, im Hasse etwas gehasst, im Begehren etwas begehrt usw. Das Geheimnis, das an solchen Gespielen zu erfassen ist, hat Brentano im Auge, wenn er sagt: 'Jedes psychische Phänomen ist durch das charakterisiert, was die Scholastiker des Mittelalters die intentionale (auch wohl mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes genannt haben, und was wir, obwohl mit nicht ganz unzweideutigen Ausdrücken, die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt, die Richtung auf ein Objekt (worunter hier nicht eine Realität zu verstehen ist) oder die immanente Gegenständlichkeit

The intentional relationship, understood purely descriptively, as the inner possession of specific experiences [Erlebnisse], let us conceive as the essential definiteness of the "psychical phenomena" or "psychical acts," so that we see an essential definition in Brentano's definition: they are "such phenomena, which themselves contain intentionally an object."

In the Logical Investigations we have a sketching of the structure of intentional consciousness as the condition of the possibility for meaning to occur in consciousness. It can be argued that at this stage of his work Husserl remains within what might be called an implicit Platonism, i.e., he suggests that the ideas themselves, though only occurring in relationship to the encounter with the intentional object, are not constituted in the event of encounter, but somehow remain permanent and transcendent to that encounter. This recognition in Husserl's thought accounts for the observation of a distinction between what he called eidetic phenomenology and

nennen würden. Jedes enthält etwas als Objekt in sich, obwohl nicht jedes in gleicher Weise'. . . .

Ob man Brentanos Klassifikation der 'psychischen Phänomene' für zutreffend erachtet, und ob man ihr sogar jene grundlegende Bedeutung für die ganze Behandlung der Psychologie zuerkennt, welche Brentano für sie in Anspruch genommen hat, darauf kommt es hier nicht an. Nur eins halten wir als für wichtig im Auge: daß es wesentliche spezifische Verschiedenheiten der intentionalen Beziehung, oder kurzweg der Intention (die den deskriptiven Gattungcharakter des 'Aktes' ausmacht) gibt."

¹Ibid., p. 28. This is my translation of: "Die intentionale Beziehung, rein deskriptiv verstanden, als innere Eigentümlichkeit gewisser Erlebnisse, fassen wir als Wesensbestimmtheit der 'psychischen Phänomene' oder 'psychischen Akte', so daß wir in Brentanos Definition, sie seien 'solche Phänomene, welche intentional einen Gegenstand in sich enthalten', eine essentielle Definition sehen. . . ." To be distinguished are two meanings to the word "experience," corresponding to the "two poles" of intentional consciousness, i.e., the noetic and noematic. Noetic experience is named "Erlebnis" and noematic experience is named "Erfahrung."

his later work entitled as genetic phenomenology, i.e., where the ideas themselves, as an enduring in memory, are no more "outside" of the intentional act/event than the intentional object. The ideas are constituted in experience, and therefore are not to be thought as somehow transcendent to experience.¹ In a letter to P. Natrop on June 29, 1918, Husserl wrote: ". . . ich noch bemerken darf, daß ich schon seit mehr als einem Jahrzehnt die Stufe des statischen Platonismus überwunden und der Phänomenologie als Hauptthema die Idee der transzendentalen Genesis gestellt habe."²

¹This raises the question of the "early" and "late" Husserl. It is outside of the needs or purposes of the presentation here, but it can be seen as of significance for providing a sense of the problems which accompany this attempt to begin philosophy anew. There is an "early" and a "late" Husserl, but there remain questions concerning the relationship between the two (e.g., is it developmental, reversal, the move to a new position?). Two ingredients may be identified as indicating the shift from the early to the later Husserl. 1) The first is the function of "hyletic data" and their phenomenological status (see chapter 10 in Ideas, pp. 260f.). In the Ideas the hyletic data are understood as reelle (as distinct from objectively real) along with the noetic and in contrast to the noematic. What is the relationship of the hyletic data to the noematic? Is the noematic a Ding-an-sich? In the Cartesian Meditations occurs a similar three-part structure (cogito, cogitationes, cogitatum), but the cogitatum (noema, object) is given no independent status outside of its role in intentional consciousness, i.e., it is the "objective pole" as what is "meant" (Ibid., pp. 31f.) by means of the interaction between interpretive projection (Vorstellung/Darstellung and Erführung) and the perceptual profiles/admubrations (all that is ever encountered of the object). 2) A second issue arises in terms of the distinction between Eidetic Phenomenology (of the Logical Investigations and other early writings) and Genetic Phenomenology (arising in the Ideas and clearly articulated by the Cartesian Meditations). Indicating the difficulty in claiming a clear "early" and "later" Husserl is the necessity of recognizing that the lectures on The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, ed. by Martin Heidegger and trans. by James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), though published by Heidegger in 1928, were lectures given between 1904 and 1910. As will be seen in the subsequent discussion, these lectures (coming between the Logical Investigations, ending in 1901, and the Ideas, published in 1913) sound very much like the "later" Husserl.

²Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 229-230, n. 4.

It is precisely the discussion of the intentional structure of consciousness that marks the importance of Husserl's Phenomenological enterprise for this present project. Its importance cannot be overemphasized either in terms of its significance as an entirely new starting point for philosophical reflection or for our understanding of basic theological issues (e.g., the finitude of consciousness, the "here and now" of meaning; "relativism;" life-world as history; praxis as accomplishing/fulfilling of intentional consciousness; the unique, unrepeatable character of the individual consciousness; the unique role of individuum as originating datum of ideation, etc.). It is the task at hand to think through most radically the implications of this claim concerning our conscious experience. It will be seen that making the claim that consciousness is always consciousness-of (i.e., intentional) conceals as much as it reveals, and this is not simply a judgment made from the standpoint of the ontological difference, but in terms of the claim that for every foreground there is an implicit background.¹ Consciousness as consciousness-of is making a claim not only about consciousness and the event character of ideas, but in Husserl's Phenomenological enterprise, as a consequence of the transcendental bracketing, intentional consciousness is making a distinctive claim about "objects" within the context of a life-world (this theme is announced in the Cartesian Meditations in the distinction between passive and active genesis,

¹See Husserl, Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins, p. 412: "Vordergrund ist nichts ohne Hintergrund. Die erscheinende Seite ist nichts ohne nicht erscheinende."

but brought to its clearest articulation by Husserl in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology). The "concealing" of the life-world, by means of the always being in relationship to an individuum in the conscious act, must equally be brought to the fore in our descriptions.

The structure of consciousness is to be thought as a simultaneity: a simultaneous act of consciousness constituting an "idea" for a definite objective correlate(s) (as a "standing over against")--even when the constitution of the idea occurs without an "empirical," i.e., physical objective correlate (e.g., when the objective correlate is brought before consciousness in the form of a statement--here we have the complex act/event of consciousness that it represents a representation).¹ The "idea" occurs at no point without some reference to an individuum in multiplicity, on the one hand; and the "object" occurs at no point without some reference to ideation (i.e., even when a potential object is never the correlate of a specific ideation, e.g., when an object, such as the nucleus of the atoms constituting our material world or a politically explosive social movement, remain unobserved, the possibility of their coming to the attention of a particular consciousness makes them part of the "deep background" of consciousness--the life-world). Either as an element of life-world or as direct correlate of a particular conscious act, the object has meaning in relationship to the constituted ideation of a consciousness.

¹See Husserl, Fünfte Logische Untersuchung, pp. 61f.

Of course, Husserl said . . . , that the species is not sensually evident, but that depends for him only upon the form of ideation so that in the same sentence is emphasized, that the "abstract content," that the ideation is based upon, to be sure, "is simultaneously perceivable in moments of concrete perception." Upon this presupposition rests his entire argument. Should the whatness of a species not be sensually perceived, then it is unclear, where the categorial ideational act begins, and thereby the perception of the essence would hang in the air.

. . . Each individual, already found "what" can be put "into an idea," each "individual perception can be converted," therefore, "into a perception of essence," and vice versa the perception of essence is necessarily "based upon" "an appearance, a being clear-sighted concerning an individual." That is to be claimed for all levels of generality from the "highest category" "down to the fully concrete" (to "eidetic singularity").

Only through such interpretation is there a satisfactory solution to the nominalistic doubt, how the general can be actually represented as identically one: the what content of a general concept is not itself straightforwardly found in the sensual, but it is also not to be ideally grasped in a simple abstract/transcendental seeing, but it is constituted in the unity of a synthetic fulfilment, which on its part is directly related to the sensuous. . . . /A/ general concept, as we would normally mean, comes to its fulfilment, when we actually

¹Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff, p. 144. This is my translation of: "Zwar sagt . . . Husserl, daß die Spezies sinnlich unanschaulich ist, aber das liegt für ihn doch nur an der Form der Ideation und so betont er im gleichen Satz, daß die 'abstrakten Inhalte', die der Ideation zugrunde liegen, sehr wohl 'als Momente konkreter Anschauungen mitangeschaut sind'. Und auf dieser Voraussetzung beruht seine ganze Argumentation. Läßt sich der Wasgehalt einer Spezies nicht sinnlich anschauen, dann ist ungeklärt, woran der kategoriale Ideationsakt ansetzt, und damit hängt die Wesensanschauung in der Luft.

. . . Jedes an einem Individuum vorfindliche 'Was' kann 'in Idee gesetzt werden', jede 'individuelle Anschauung kann' also 'in Wesensanschauung (Ideation) umgewandelt werden', und umgekehrt liegt der Wesensanschauung 'ein Erscheinen, ein Sichtigsein von Individuellem' notwendig 'zugrunde'. Das wird ausdrücklich für alle Stufen der Allgemeinheit von der 'obersten Kategorie' 'bis herab zur vollen Konkretion' (zur eidetischen Singularität) in Anspruch genommen."

fulfil the rule of synthesis, concerning that to which it refers, in whatever variations chosen. In such a way what we subsequently are able to objectify as a "species," comes in "original givenness."

As Tugendhat observes: "Upon this presupposition rests his Husserl's entire argument."

The careful reader will have already asked, "where then rests the truth of our ideas?" When the object "itself" rests upon the manner (i.e., the complexity) with which its meaning is constituted in consciousness, and our ideas are only constituted in relationship to our representations of the object, then everything "hangs in the air." We encounter a radical relativism in Phenomenology, but not solipsism. We must examine this claim further, i.e., "how" is the idea constituted in consciousness (paying particular attention to the temporality of the act/event of consciousness and to the idea of "fulfilment" as the dynamic event of representation/putting-in-front-of as possibility, i.e., projection). We will see that both "polarities" of intentional consciousness (i.e., the subjective as well as the objective) can be the "source" of surprise, i.e., the unanticipated, as a creative

¹ Ibid., pp. 148-149. This is my translation of: "Nur durch eine Auffassung dieser Art lassen sich die nominalistischen Zweifel, wie das Allgemeine als identisch Eines eigentlich vorzustellen sei, befriedigend lösen: der Wasgehalt eines allgemeinen Begriffs läßt sich nicht im Sinnlichen schlicht vorfinden, aber er ist auch in keiner schlichten übersinnlichen Schau ideell zu erfassen, sondern er konstituiert sich in der Einheitlichkeit eines synthetischen Vollzuges, der seinerseits unmittelbar aufs Sinnliche bezogen ist. . . . ein allgemeiner Begriff, den wir normalerweise signitiv gebrauchen, kommt zur 'Erfüllung', wenn wir die Regel der Synthesis, auf die er verweist, bei beliebiger Variation aktuell vollziehen. Dann kommt, was wir nachträglich zu einer 'Spezies' vergegenständlichen können, zu 'ursprünglicher Gegebenheit'."

act of consciousness or as an unexpected quality of the object, can introduce a newness that forces a re-working of previous ideas. (This is reminiscent of Jasper's "un-understanding on both sides."¹) This character of intentional consciousness is part of the "givenness" of intentional consciousness, and it is in this sense that the term source is placed in quotation marks above. Givenness is a transcending category in Husserl's Phenomenology,² i.e., both sides of the intentional act (the subjective and the objective) are "given," and therefore Heidegger suggests that implicit in this "givenness" is the revealing/concealing character of the Being-of beings as the condition of the possibility for intentionality.

Equally important, however, is that implied in what I wish to call the surprise character of intentionality is a partial breaking out of solipsism. The objects of my conscious reflections do not "exist" (remember, we have bracketed any such claims) because of my conscious recognition of them. Rather, they confront and challenge the adequacy of my ideations as consciousness further "checks out"/fulfills/projects its constituted meaning in light of its perceptions/experiences [Erfahrungen]. Of course, that could leave us with a solipsism of the isolated consciousness with its unique, unrepeatable conscious life out of "contact" with the Other. In the Cartesian Meditations Husserl

¹ See above, pp. 177f.

² See McGaughey, "Husserl and Heidegger on Plato's Cave Allegory," p. 338 and the citation from Tugendhat below, pp. 236-237.

responds directly to the problem of intersubjectivity.¹ Basic to his entire understanding of the philosophical enterprise is a "philosophical culture."² Husserl's claim rests fundamentally upon an analogical argument from the structure of individual experience. The criterion for the accuracy of his descriptions is their adequacy in terms of our own individual experience.

Tugendhat describes Husserl's position as follows:

Philosophy is "an absolute justifying science, and be-
longs to universal science." "Philosophy, according
to its idea, means to me the universal and in the
radicalist sense 'strict' science. As such it is the
science out of the last grounding, or, equally, out of
the last self-evidence, in which no self-evidence func-
tions as an unquestioned ground of knowledge." That
the general idea of "science" (that no single science
can fulfil) is realized in philosophy, does not neces-
sarily mean, that the last grounding and complete uni-
versality will be actually achieved here, but above all
only, that the question is so methodologically laid out,
that it aims for such a goal. Philosophy "is, I want
to emphasize, an idea, . . . which is realized only in
a style of relative, temporary validity and in an un-
ending historical process." "Such a universal philo-
sophy is . . . one of an unlimited goal."

. . . Insofar as human life is praxis in its en-
tirety, reasoned knowing is . . . a function of prac-
tical reason; its truth only insofar as it realizes its
theoretical component: "The desire to know is the pre-
supposition of all other knowing, if they were to con-
tain the highest value." Philosophy is then "no theo-
retical fancy," but . . . "a life in which a person
exercises critique--critique in the fullest sense--on
his life goal in indefeasible personal consideration
and a radical accounting of problems." The aim of
philosophy . . . is in the end a "philosophical culture,"
i.e., "a truly mature humanity, . . . that wants at all

¹See Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, the "Fifth Meditation," pp. 89f.

²See Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff, p. 189. See also the appendix in The Crisis of European Sciences entitled "Philosophy as Kankind's Self-Reflection; the Self-Realization of Reason," pp. 335f.

times to follow 'reason' . . . and that at all times wishes to be capable and ready to advocate the absolute contesting of the norms, of its activity out of the source of its finalness.

. . . with Husserl we find for the first time an all-encoumpassing position, that does not proceed from a presupposed idea of truth, in order then from this idea of truth to build or to argue for it. Instead we encounter a beginning through a descriptive clarification that stays there [as description], meaning that philosophy as a whole engages in this task.

. . . The phenomenological clarification of adequacy shows, it can be understood only as a unity of the "signified" and "intuited" manner of being given of the object. The ideation theme is thereby not put in

¹Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff, pp. 188-189. This is my translation of: "Philosophie ist 'sich absolut rechtfertigende Wissenschaft, und zudem Universalwissenschaft'. 'Philosophie gilt mir, der Idee nach, als die universale und im radikalen Sinne 'strenge' Wissenschaft. Als das ist sie Wissenschaft aus letzter Begründung, oder, was gleich gilt, aus letzter Selbstverantwortung, in der also keine . . . Selbstverständlichkeit als unbefragter Erkenntnisboden fungiert'. Daß sich die allgemeine Idee von 'Wissenschaft', die sich in den einzelnen Wissenschaften nicht erfüllen kann, in der Philosophie realisiert, heißt nicht unbedingt, daß letzte Begründung und volle Universalität hier tatsächlich erreicht wird, sondern zunächst nur, daß das Fragen methodisch so angelegt ist, daß es sich auf ein solches Ziel überhaupt ausrichtet. Die Philosophie 'ist, wie ich betone, eine Idee, die . . . nur in einem Stil relativer, zeitweiliger Gültigkeiten und in einem unendlichen historischen Prozess zu verwirklichen ist--aber so auch in der Tat zu verwirklichen ist'. 'Eine solche universale Philosophie ist . . . ein im Unendlichen liegendes Ziel'.

. . . Sofern das menschliche Leben im ganzen Praxis ist, ist 'Erkenntnisvernunft . . . Funktion der praktischen Vernunft, der Intellekt ist Diener des Willens'. Aber der Wille erreicht seine Wahrheit nur sofern er seine theoretische Komponente aktualisiert: 'Das Erkennenwollen ist vorausgesetzt für alles andere Wollen, wenn dieses die höchste Wertform besitzen soll'. Philosophie ist dann 'keine theoretische Liebhaberei', sondern . . . 'ein Leben, in dem der Mensch in unermüdlicher Selbst-besinnung und radikaler Rechenschaftsabgabe Kritik--letztauswertende Kritik--an seinem Lebenszielen . . . übt'. Das Telos der Philosophie . . . ist also letztlich eine 'philosophische Kultur', d.h. 'eine wahrhaft mündige Menschheit, . . . die allzeit gewillt ist, der 'Vernunft' zu folgen . . . und die allzeit befähigt und bereit sein möchte, die absolute Normgerechtigkeit ihres Tuns aus letzten Quellen der Endgültigkeit zu vertreten'."

question, only the correctness of taking it as a claim to the term of truth. The thematic interest is, however, therefore changed. No longer are we concerned with the unity or agreement between subject and object (and that means the correlation to the manner in which the object is given)--it is concerned with the unity /togetherness/ of the "between," and only out of this phenomenological "between dimension" (that is indeed the claim) is the meaning of truth to be clarified.

Heidegger . . . no longer only asks concerning the modes in which an object is given, but about the possibility of the dimension of givenness and truth as such under the title of "disclosure" and "clearing," that is cut short neither as objective or subjective, but in those terms is equally a suspended foundation. Husserl's reflections develop the immediate preliminary stages not exclusively with the subject (not with subject-object-unity),¹ but with the how of the givenness (emphasis added).

¹Ibid., pp. 183-185. This is my translation of: ". . . bei Husserl ergibt sich zum ersten Mal eine umfassende Position, die nicht von einer vorausgesetzten Idee von Wahrheit ausgeht, um dann auf ihr aufzubauen oder sie zu begründen, sondern bei der deskriptiven Aufklärung des Wahrheitsbegriffs ansetzt und stehenbleibt und so die Philosophie im ganzen auf diese Aufgabe festlegt. . . . Die phänomenologische Aufklärung der Adäquationsformel zeigt . . . , daß sie nur als Einheit von 'signitiver' und 'intuitiver' Gegebenheitsweise des Objekts verstanden werden kann. Damit ist nicht die idealistische Thematik in Frage gestellt, sondern nur das Recht, den Terminus Wahrheit für sie in Anspruch zu nehmen. Jedoch ändert sich dadurch das thematische Interesse. Es geht nicht mehr auf die Einheit oder Übereinstimmung zwischen Subjekt und Objekt, sondern auf das (intentionale) Verhältnis des Subjekts zum Objekt und d.h. korrelativ auf die Gegebenheitsweisen der Objekte,--es geht statt auf die Einheit auf das 'Zwischen', und nur aus dieser phänomenologischen Zwischendimension--das ist allerdings der Anspruch--ist der Sinn von Wahrheit aufzuklären.

Heidegger . . . nicht mehr nur nach den Gegebenheitsweisen der Gegenstände fragt, sondern unter dem Titel 'Erschlossenheit' und 'Lichtung' nach der Möglichkeit der Dimension von Gegebenheit und Wahrheit als solcher, die schließlich weder objektiv noch subjektiv abgestützt, sondern ihrerseits zum gleichsam schwebenden Fundament wird. Husserls Reflexion nicht schlechthin auf das Subjekt, auch nicht auf die Subjekt-Objekt-Einheit, sondern auf das Wie der Gegebenheit bildet hier die unmittelbare Vorstufe."

The Phenomenological Description
of Intentional Consciousness

The description begins with the phenomenological epoche as the suspending of the claim to existence for what is encountered in conscious experience. This is a breaking out of what Husserl names as the "Natural Standpoint."¹ A second transcendental reduction brings us to the phenomenological ego as the absolute starting point for philosophical reflection/description. This is the Cartesian ego. Phenomenology is an "absolute science" not because of its claim to absolute truth, but because of its absolute starting point.² Meaning and any truth claim are relative to the constituted meaning, and adequacy of that meaning, in relationship to what is encountered by the particular consciousness. This uniqueness to the individual, particular consciousness leads, however, not to subjectivism. It is the recognition that meaning, the making-sense-out-of, is my meaning (the unique meaning of a particular consciousness), and that that is unrepeatable and relative to my encounter with my life-world and what becomes the "object" of my reflection. This is not a pure subjectivism, however, because the turn to the subject in phenomenology is never a turn to a subject outside of/separate from/or simply alongside of its life-world. Consciousness is always and only consciousness-of. A Third transcendental reduction is the suspending of all

¹See Ideas, Chapter 3 entitled "The Thesis of the Natural Standpoint and its Suspension," pp. 91f. See in addition The Crisis of European Sciences, pp. 143-151.

²See Cartesian Meditations, "First Meditation," pp. 7f.

claims from the tradition concerning consciousness or its objects, and we are challenged to turn to the things themselves. These "things themselves," we have already seen, are always to be thought in terms of "consciousness-of," i.e., the philosophical problem for Husserl is not the question of "agreement" between an isolated, existing subject and its objects of encounter "out there." Consciousness is nothing other than its relationships to objective correlates (either as "things" or "ideas," which in fact always presuppose a relationship to an individuum) within the horizon of temporality. On the other hand, objects have meaning (make sense) only in relationship to consciousness, and the more adequate the encounter, i.e., the more rigorous, the more "meaning" (An object may always remain in the background, never coming to the foreground of conscious reflection or encounter; therefore, remaining as part of the life-world without having a distinct meaning for that consciousness).

The transcendental bracketings bring us to examine the "how" of meaningful experience in consciousness. By turning our attention to conscious experience, we discover a structure to that experience as the condition of the possibility for our making sense out of that experience. It is not simply that there is a simultaneity of subjective ideas constituted out of our perceptual encounters with objective correlates (cogito, cogitatione, cogitatum), but implied in the term "constituted" is a temporality informing this structure. This temporality springs from an understanding of praxis, and possibility, indicative of how meaning is

continuously constituted in consciousness. Consciousness is always a projecting/a fulfilling of its meaningful understanding in relation to the objects ("empirical," phantasy, illusion, linguistic, etc.) it encounters.

The immanent unities are not known in their constitution in the same way as the appearing of the transcendent phenomenon. On the other hand, they must have an essence in common. While the immanent impression is present just as the perceived is present; in one case we have an immanent present, in the other a transcendent present "through" appearances. Therefore, whereas the transcendent appearances are unities (constituted in inner consciousness), "in" these unities ought to be constituted again other unities; the appearing object.

The immanent unities . . . are constituted in the flowing of the multiplicity of adumbrations. . . . The thing constitutes itself in the flowing away of its appearances, which themselves are constituted as an immanent unity in the stream of primordial impressions. The appearing thing constitutes itself, because itself is constituted as perceptual unity and unity of apprehension in the primordial stream. . . .

¹Husserl, Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins, pp. 444-445. This is my translation of: "Die immanenten Einheiten sind in ihrer Konstitution nicht in derselben Weise bewußt wie in der transzendenten Erscheinung das Erscheinende, in der transzendenten Wahrnehmung das Wahrgenommene. Andererseits müssen sie doch eine Gemeinsamkeit des Wesens haben. Denn die immanente Impression ist Gegenwärtigen, wie auch das Wahrnehmen Impression Gegenwärtigen ist; im einen Fall haben wir immanentes Gegenwärtigen, im anderen transzendentes Gegenwärtigen 'durch' Erscheinungen. Also, während die transzendenten Erscheinungen Einheiten sind, konstituiert im inneren Bewußtsein, sollen 'in' diesen Einheiten wieder andere Einheiten konstituiert sein: die erscheinenden Objekte.

Die immanenten Einheiten, . . . konstituieren sich im Fluß der temporalen Abschattungsmanigfaltigkeiten.

. . . Das Ding konstituiert sich im Abfluß seiner Erscheinungen, die selbst als immanente Einheiten im Fluß der ursprünglichen Impressionen konstituiert sind, und notwendig konstituiert sich eins mit dem anderen. Das erscheinende Ding konstituiert sich, weil sich im ursprünglichen Fluß Empfindungseinheiten und einheitliche Auffassungen konstituieren. . . ."

There is a speaking here of a unity in the givenness of both the "objective" and "subjective" poles of "perception." It is this difference in the manner of givenness that characterizes the difference between the two poles. One, the "objective," is something that either can be, or in principle could be, "returned" to for further encounter (Erfahrungen). The second, the "subjective," is an ongoing constitution in which "to go back to" is to go back to a representation (Darstellung) of an original datum in memory.

In the original and reproduced course of the "sinking away" arise many differences worthy of attention. The original appearing and flowing away of the process modes in the appearing is something firm, something conscious through "stimulation," towards which we can only look. . . . In contrast, the representation is something free, it is a free running through, we can accomplish representation "quickly" or "slowly," clearer or more explicitly, more confused and immediately, in one stroke or in articulated steps.

There is a further complication in terms of the givenness of a phantasy over against that of an encountering again in memory:

In mere phantasy there is given no bringing forth of the reproduced now and no coincidence of the same with a past. Re-remembering, on the other hand, brings forth the reproduction, and gives it in this coming forth a position in respect to the actual now and to the sphere of the original time field to which the re-remembering belongs. Only in original time consciousness

¹Ibid., p. 406. This is my translation of: "Im originären und im reproduzierten Ablauf des 'Zurücksinkens' treten bemerkenswerte Verschiedenheiten auf. Das originäre Erscheinen und Abfließen der Ablaufsmodi im Erscheinen ist etwas Festes, etwas durch 'Affektion' Bewußtes, auf das wir nur hinsehen können. . . . Dagegen das Vergegenwärtigen ist etwas Freies, es ist ein freies Durchlaufen, wir können die Vergegenwärtigung 'schneller' oder 'langsamer', deutlicher und expliziter oder verworrener, blitzschnell in einem Zuge oder in artikulierten Schritten usw. vollziehen."

can the relation between a reproduced now and a past now be accomplished. . . . It is considered generally true, that we are led back in phenomenological reflection to a stream of constituting phases by which appears, is represented, is thought, etc. in the widest sense, that experience /erfahren/ an immanent object: including those appearing in perception (outer perception), remembering, expecting, wishing, etc. as unity of inner consciousness. In addition, the representation of all types is the constituting of universal, time constituting forming of an immanent object as a flowing of experience: as "enduring" occurrence, yet somehow flowing away by the representation.

What is "original time consciousness" for Husserl, and what role does this understanding of temporality play in the constituting of meaning in consciousness?

Husserl distinguishes between "cosmic" and "phenomenological" temporality.² The former is what can be measured by means of the clock, the successions of seasons, the rotation of the earth in relationship to the sun, etc. He insists that such "cosmic" time

¹ Ibid., p. 409. This is my translation of: "In der bloßen Phantasie ist keine Setzung des reproduzierten Jetzt und keine Deckung derselben mit einem vergangenen gegeben. Die Wiedererinnerung dagegen setzt das Reproduzierte und gibt ihm in dieser Setzung Stellung zum aktuellen Jetzt und zur Sphäre des originären Zeitfeldes, dem die Wiedererinnerung selbst angehört. Nur im originären Zeitbewußtsein kann sich die Beziehung zwischen einem reproduzierten Jetzt und einem Vergangenen vollziehen. . . . Es gilt eben allgemein, daß wir von allem im weitesten Sinne Erscheinenden, Vorgestellten, Gedachten usw. zurückgeführt werden in der phänomenologischen Reflexion auf einen Fluß von konstituierenden Phasen, die eine immanente Objektivation erfahren: eben die zu Wahrnehmungserscheinungen (äußeren Wahrnehmungen), Erinnerungen, Erwartungen, Wünschen, usw. als Einheiten des inneren Bewußtseins. Also auch die Vergegenwärtigungen jeder Art als Erlebnisabflüsse von der universellen zeitkonstituierenden Gestaltung konstituieren ein immanentes Objekt: 'dauerender', so und so abfließender Vorgang der Vergegenwärtigung'."

² See Husserl, Ideas, p. 215 and Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins, p. 373.

has nothing to do with "phenomenological" time. The latter is the experience of temporality in the unitary flow of consciousness that is an individual. Temporality is an entire region of phenomenological investigation in and of itself, because it has its own peculiar characteristic over against the life-world of relationships and meanings peculiar to a given consciousness.

Husserl suggests that the ego is in fact not the simple absolute as the foundation for philosophical reflection which is disclosed by Cartesian doubting. There is a more primordial absolute:¹ the Now. The difficulty in describing phenomenological

¹See Husserl, Ideas, p. 216: "The transcendental 'Absolute' which we have laid bare through the reductions is in truth not ultimate; it is something which in a certain profound and wholly unique sense constitutes itself, and has its primeval source in what is ultimately and truly absolute." See the discussion of "das Jetzt als 'ideale Grenze'" in Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins, pp. 399-400 and 418-419: "Es ist eine allgemeine und grundwesentliche Tatsache, daß jedes Jetzt, indem es in die Vergangenheit zurücksinkt, seine strenge Identität festhält. Phänomenologisch gesprochen: das Jetztbewußtsein, das sich auf Grund der Materie A konstituiert, wandelt sich stetig in ein Vergangenheitsbewußtsein um, während gleichzeitig immer neues Jetztbewußtsein sich aufbaut. Bei dieser Umwandlung erhält sich (und das gehört zum Wesen des Zeitbewußtseins) das sich modifizierende Bewußtsein seine gegenständliche Intention.

. . . /D/ie gegenständliche Intention verbleibt als absolut dieselbe und identische. Gleichwohl besteht ein phänomenales Sichabstufen und zwar nicht nur hinsichtlich der Auffassungsinhalte, die ihr Abklingen haben, ein gewisses Herabsinken von der höchsten Empfindungshöhe im Jetzt bis zur Unmerklichkeit. Vor allem ist das Jetztmoment charakterisiert als das Neue. Das eben herabsinkende Jetzt ist nicht mehr das Neue, sondern das durch das Neue beiseite Geschobene. In dieser Beiseiteschiebung liegt eine Veränderung. Aber während es seinen Charakter des Jetzt verloren hat, hält es sich in seiner gegenständlichen Intention absolut ungeändert, es ist Intention auf eine individuelle Objektivität, und zwar ausschauende Intention. In dieser Hinsicht also liegt keinerlei Veränderung vor. Es ist aber hier wohl zu erwägen, was 'Erhaltung der gegenständlichen Intention' besagt. Die Gesamtaufhaltung des Gegenstandes enthält zwei Komponenten: die eine konstituiert das Objekt nach seinen ausserzeitlichen

temporality is that of distinguishing between "simultaneity" (a belonging together) and "succession" (individuality) in the unitary flow of experiencing that occurs in the individual consciousness of a particular "object." There is a continuous transition occurring of individual data in the conscious flow from one Now to another, while at the same time there is a simultaneity of a meaningful life-world informing each Now of conscious constitution of meaning. In addition, there is a dynamic interaction between the enduring of individual past Nows and our projecting of possible meaning into the future Nows that are coming. Consciousness is an ever anticipation of a future Now in light of its retention of particular past Nows in a coherence of meaning.

The essential property which the term "temporality" expresses in relation to experiences generally indicates not only something that belongs in a general way to every single experience, but a necessary form binding experiences with experiences. Every real experience (we ratify this as self-evident on the ground of the

Bestimmungen, die andere schafft die Zeitstelle, das Jetztsein, Gewesensein usw. Das Objekt als die Zeitmaterie . . . entspringt rein aus der Objektivation der Auffassungsinhalte. . . . Aber in ihrer Eigenschaft als Repräsentanten dinglicher Qualitäten ihrem reinen Was nach spielt ihr Zeitcharakter keine Rolle. Die unzeitlich gefaßten Auffassungsdaten konstituieren das Objekt nach seinem spezifischen Bestande, und wo dieser erhalten bleibt, können wir schon von einer Identität sprechen. Wenn aber vorhin von Erhaltung der gegenständlichen Beziehung die Rede war, so bedeutet das, daß nicht nur der Gegenstand in seinem spezifischen Bestande erhalten bleibt, sondern als individueller, also zeitlich bestimmter, der mit seiner zeitlichen Bestimmung in der Zeit zurücksinkt. Dieses Zurücksinken ist eine eigentümliche phänomenologische Modifikation des Bewußtseins, wodurch in Relation zu dem immer neu konstituierten aktuellen Jetzt vermöge der dahin führenden stetigen Änderungsreihe ein immer wachsender Abstand sich ausbildet." The "now" determines the individuality of the constituted "object" as it sinks into the background (See pp. 419, 421, and 422). In the sinking away, the individual datum remains individual because of its relationship to the now, the ego (See pp. 429f.).

clear intuition of an experienced reality) is necessarily one that endures: and with this duration it takes its place within an endless continuum of durations--a concretely filled continuum. It necessarily has a temporal purview concretely filled, and stretching away endlessly on all sides. And that at once tells us that it belongs to one endless "stream of experience." Every single experience can begin and end and therewith bring its duration to an end--for instance, an experience of joy. But the stream of experience cannot begin and end. Every experience, as temporal being, is an experience of its pure Ego. And to this the possibility (which, as we know, is no empty logical possibility) necessarily belongs, that the Ego may direct its pure personal glance to this experience, and grasp it as really being, or as enduring in phenomenological time.

Temporality then plays two essential roles in the description of intentional consciousness: 1) as the succession of Nows, it is what accounts for the individuality of all data of the consciousness-of, i.e., consciousness as consciousness-of is always relating to a particular in a Now whether present, past or future.

The Objectivation of temporal Objects rests, therefore, on the following moments. The content of sensation which belongs to the different actual now-points of the Objects can qualitatively remain absolutely unaltered, but even with so far-reaching an identity with regard to content it still does not have true identity. The same sensation now and in another now has a difference, in fact, a phenomenological difference which corresponds to the absolute temporal position. This difference is the primal source of the individuality of the "this" and therewith of the absolute temporal position. Every phase of the modification has "in essence" the same qualitative content and the same temporal moment, although modified. Furthermore, each phase has in itself the same temporal moment in such a way that precisely by means of it the subsequent apprehension of identity is made possible: this on the side of sensation, or of the foundation of apprehension. The different moments sustain different parts of the apprehension, of the true Objectivation. One aspect of the Objectivation finds its support purely in the qualitative content of the material of sensations. This yields the

¹Husserl, Ideas, p. 217.

temporal matter, e.g., the sound. This matter is held identically in the flux of the modification of the past. A second aspect of the Objectivation arises from the apprehension of the representatives of the temporal positions /Zeitstellenrepräsentanten/. This apprehension¹ is also continuously retained in the flux of modification.

Husserl adds later:

The temporally constitutive continuum is a flux of continuous generation of modifications of modifications. Starting from the actual now. . . . This is the characteristic of continuous generation. Modifications continuously beget ever new modifications. The primal impression is the absolute beginning of this generation --the primal source, that from which all others are continuously generated. In itself, however, it is not generated; it does not come into existence as that which is generated but through spontaneous generation. It does not grow up (it has no seed): it is primal creation. Does this mean that a fresh now is continuously added on to the now which is modified into a not-now? Or does the now generate, spring up all of a sudden, a source? These are the images. One can only say that consciousness is nothing without an impression.²

2) Temporality characterizes the "how" of this consciousness-of as praxis, i.e., as a constant constituting of meaning in the encounter of/with "objects," whether immanent or transcendent. Consciousness is ceaseless activity in relation to the "objects" of its encounter. This is informed by the "simultaneity in Succession" character of temporality. Always standing in the "background" or life-world are the constituted meanings of previous, particular and individual experiences in what Husserl at one point calls "passive genesis," and these continuously inform the engaging of consciousness in the Now of its "active genesis."³

¹Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, pp. 90-91 (German edition, p. 422).

²Ibid., pp. 130-131 (German edition, p. 451).

³See Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 77f.

With this recognition of Phenomenological temporality, we gain a description of consciousness as praxis/activity. Consciousness is the process of the constitution of meaning out of the perceptual adumbrations/profiles consisting of the "objects" of its encounters. This process of constitution is always and already within the horizon of a life-world of previously constituted meanings simultaneously informing the particular event of the present.

Summary

The ontological difference provides us with an understanding of how things are more than a mere collection side-by-side but "somehow" related. Things are related precisely because they are, i.e., they are the occasion for the concealing/revealing of the transcending unity of the Being-of beings. Dasein is, then, both the place where things are encountered and named, and where transcendence is encountered and named. In turning to the work of Edmund Husserl, a description of the "how" of our relatedness, as the occasion for the constituting of meaning in/for life-world, to ontic multiplicity occurs.

Consciousness, we are told, is always consciousness-of, i.e., it has as its structure a noetic-noematic polarity as temporality that is not merely a subject-object split. In this polarity occurs an active genesis of meaning as a constant positing, encountering, and fulfilling of projections (or non-fulfillment) within an infinitied horizon of investigation that presupposes as its "background" a life-world (the "reservoir" of passive genesis

always available with the new/other as the potential "object" of our attention). Consciousness is, then, unique to an individual, and ideation is grounded in particularity (that is to say, consciousness is intentional, i.e., consciousness-of). On the other hand, it is social (i.e., it is a life-world including dialogue and the furthering of clarity concerning the adequacy of shared understanding) and, above all, temporal (the subjectivity of the subjective is the point of the immediate now, and the particularity of the particular object is determined by its place in the succession of nows).

A description of consciousness as praxis/activity does not, however, exhaust the full meaning of "event" as either the condition of the possibility for our transcending to a world or the final significance of Husserl's Phenomenological enterprise for our philosophical reflections. Such a description must include the "event" character of the Being-of beings and a discussion of temporality appropriate to this ontological "event" as an always and already presencing. Only then would we have an adequate understanding of the meaning of the Being-of beings and time. At this point in the investigation, however, the purpose has been to provide the descriptive outline of consciousness as intentional, i.e., as event within the structure of relationship-to. Hence, we obtain only the suggestion of the full range of contribution Phenomenology has to offer our philosophical/theological reflections. For as much as Phenomenology is a new beginning, it is a methodology, and its task is to investigate

the infinite regions of conscious experience to test out the eidetic meanings constituted in consciousness for each region (of course always within the horizon of life-world). What is sufficient for the purposes at hand is the "breaking through" to the Phenomenological attitude, i.e., the winning of the new standpoint for beginning our philosophical/theological reflections/descriptions: intentional consciousness. For the moment it suffices to describe the "how" of our ontic experience as an endless process of the constitution of meanings in our encounter with the phenomena of our life-world. In pursuing further "how" it is that we have a life-world (the conditions of the possibility for our having such a life-world), we must return to Heidegger's description of the ontological difference, and not only in the sense that we can then for the first time grasp the significance of "event" of our transcendence to world (hence, for our having anything such as a life-world at all). In addition, it is important for our grasping the basic issues challenging us to theological reflection, that we come to terms with "event" as a relatedness to Nothing. On the basis of this discussion, a new perspective for the importance, i.e., positive significance, of Nothing for theology will be attained (to be sure, here is meant something quite different from Hegel's "positive" understanding of negation that drives the dialectical process forward¹). The Nothing that will be sought to be brought forth

¹See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Ullstein GmbH, 1973), p. 59: "Die Vollständigkeit der Formen des nicht realen Bewußtseins, wird

here is the Nothing as the condition of the possibility for our transcending to a world. There is no Nothing outside of, along side of, or distinct from world.

On Being and Nothing

The Relationship Between Being and Nothing: A New Look

The more "technical" human consciousness becomes, the greater the abyss grows around it. The more we engage our world in terms of the calculation, prediction, manipulation and control of things, the greater the threat of the end of our relationship with things, and the greater our forgetfulness of beginnings. The cessation of our involvement with things, i.e., death, is then the most radical negation of the prevalent understanding of consciousness in Western culture. In our current age, things endure: consciousness

sich durch die Notwendigkeit des Fortganges und Zusammenhanges selbst ergeben. Um dies begreiflich zu machen, kann im allgemeinen zum Voraus bemerkt werden, daß die Darstellung des nicht wahrhaften Bewußtseins in seiner Unwahrheit, nicht eine bloß negative Bewegung ist. Eine solche einseitige Ansicht hat das natürliche Bewußtsein überhaupt von ihr; und ein Wissen, welches diese Einseitigkeit zu seinem Wesen macht, ist eine der Gestalten des unvollendeten Bewußtseins, welche in den Verlauf des Weges selbst fällt, und darin sich darbieten wird. Sie ist nämlich der Skeptizismus, der in dem Resultate nur immer das reine Nichts sieht, und davon abstrahiert, daß dies Nichts bestimmt das Nichts dessen ist, woraus es resultiert. Das Nichts ist aber nur, genommen als das Nichts dessen, woraus es herkommt, in der Tat das wahrhafte Resultat; es ist hiermit selbst ein bestimmtes und hat einen Inhalt. Der Skeptizismus, der mit der Abstraktion des Nichts oder der Leereheit endigt, kann von dieser nicht weiter fortgehen, sondern muß es erwarten, ob, und was ihm etwa Neues sich darbietet, um es in denselben leeren Abgrund zu werfen. Indem dagegen das Resultat, wie es in Wahrheit ist, aufgefaßt wird, als bestimmte Negation, so ist damit unmittelbar eine neue Form entsprungen, und in der Negation der Übergang gemacht, wodurch sich der Fortgang durch die vollständige Reihe der Gestalten von selbst ergibt."

ceases. The abyss surrounds consciousness as both the "mystery" of beginning/source/origin and as the negativity of what-is.¹

A serious engagement of the contemporary understanding of consciousness as informing our theological reflections cannot be simply a rejection of "technology" and its manner of representing the ultimate within the human condition. We have already implicitly called into question the prevailing understanding of our world of "things" in the above discussion of the ontological difference. There is no question here of destruction of the self-understanding of our technological age; it is more importantly the desire to understand it better than it understands itself.

What is dangerous is not technology. There is no demony of technology, but rather there is the mystery of its essence. The essence of technology, as a destining of revealing, is the danger.²

The question concerning technology is the question concerning the constellation in which revealing and concealing, in which the coming to presence of truth, comes to pass. . . .

The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. Human activity can never directly counter this danger. Human achievement alone can never banish it. But human reflection can ponder the fact

¹Ernest Becker's The Denial of Death (New York: The Free Press, 1975) is a powerful description of the prevalent attempt to ignore death or to artificially create eternity within our present culture. It places before us a central question concerning our Being-in-the-world. See in addition, Bernhard Welte, Das Licht des Nichts: Von der Möglichkeit neuer religiöser Erfahrung (Düsseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 1980).

²Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology" in The Question Concerning Technology: And Other Essays, trans. by William Lovitt (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1977), p. 28.

that all saving power must be of a higher essence than what is endangered, though at the same time kindred to it.

The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought.²

The "essence of technology" in its most radical character, calls us into the questioning of Nothing. What is the meaning of Nothing?

We are already reminded that we said above that the Being-of beings is not a thing. In the discussion of the ontological difference, we find a new manner of understanding Nothing. Here we find no abyss over against things: No-thing as "ground" is to be thought as the condition of the possibility (as the Being-of beings) that we are transcendence as Being-in-the-world. Heidegger asks:

Is there a nothing only because of the not, i.e., the negation? Or is it the other way around? Is there negation and the not only because of the nothing? That has not been decided, nor has it once come into question. We maintain: nothing is more original than the not and negation.³

How do we experience this Nothing that is neither a thing or a negation? It is suggested that this Nichts is what is encountered

¹Ibid., pp. 33-34.

²Ibid., p. 35.

³Heidegger, "Was ist Metaphysik?", pp. 107-108. This is my translation of: "Gibt es das Nichts nur, weil es das Nicht, d.h. die Verneinung gibt? Oder liegt es umgekehrt? Gibt es die Verneinung und das Nicht nur, weil es das Nichts gibt? Das ist nicht entschieden, noch nicht einmal zur ausdrücklichen Frage erhoben. Wir behaupten: das Nichts ist ursprünglicher als das Nicht und die Verneinung."

in the radical experience of anxiety (distinguished from fear of a particular thing/event):¹

Anxiety reveals the nothing.

We "are suspended" in anxiety. More clearly: the anxiety suspends us, because it brings the slipping away of being in its totality. With that comes /the awareness/ that we ourselves (these beings who are humans) slip away in the middle of beings. Only the pure Dasein in the thorough shaking of this suspension, within which it can hold onto nothing, is still there (da).²

Everything is experienced in a deep and penetrating indifference in this encounter with radical anxiety. Here, Heidegger suggests, comes forth the first "positive" function of the Nothing:

The nothing is no arbitrary event, but, as the repelling refers to the slipping away of being in its totality, it reveals this being as plainly the Other--over against the nothing.

In the bright night of the nothing of anxiety, the original candor of being as such first comes forth: that it is being--and not nothing.³

¹See "The basic state-of-mind of anxiety as a distinctive way in which Dasein is disclosed" in Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 228f.

²Heidegger, "Was ist Metaphysik?," p. 111. This is my translation of: "Die Angst offenbart das Nichts.

Wir 'schweben' in Angst. Deutlicher: die Angst läßt uns schweben, weil sie das Seiende im Ganzen zum Entgleiten bringt. Darin liegt, daß wir selbst--diese seienden Menschen --inmitten des Seienden uns mitentgleiten. . . . Nur das reine Da-sein in der Durchschütterung dieses Schwebens, darin es sich in nichts halten, kann, ist noch da."

³Ibid., p. 113. This is my translation of: "Das Nichten ist kein beliebiges Vorkommnis, sondern als abweisendes Verweisen auf das entgleitende Seiende im Ganzen offenbart es dieses Seiende in seiner vollen, bislang verborgenen Befremdlichkeit als das schlechthin Andere--gegenüber dem Nichts.

In der hellen Nacht des Nichts der Angst ersteht erst die ursprüngliche Offenheit des Seienden als eines solchen: daß es Seiendes ist--und nicht Nichts."

He adds further:

Only from the foundation of the primordial manifesting of nothing can the Dasein of the human move to and enter into being. As long as Dasein in its essence is related to being, that it is and is not itself, the revealing out of the nothing has always and already occurred.

Da-sein means: holding itself into nothing.

Holding itself into nothing, Dasein is always and already beyond being in totality. This beyondness we call transcendence. Were Dasein in the foundation of its essence not transcending, means now, were it not from the beginning a holding itself into nothing, then it would never be able to have a relationship with being nor with itself.

Without the primordial revealing of nothing there is no self and no freedom.

Thereby the answer to the question concerning nothing is achieved. Nothing is neither an object nor in any sense a being. Nothing comes forth neither for itself nor next to being as if it were dependent on them. Nothing is the condition of the possibility for the revelation of being and therefore as such for human Dasein. Nothing is not first encountered as the opposite concept of being, but belongs primordially to essence itself. In the Being-of being occurs the nothing of the nothing (emphasis added).

¹Ibid., p. 114. This is my translation of: "Nur auf dem Grunde der ursprünglichen Offenbarkeit des Nichts kann das Dasein des Menschen auf Seiendes zugehen und eingehen. Sofern aber das Dasein seinem Wesen nach zu Seiendem, das es nicht ist und das es selbst ist, sich verhält, kommt es als solches Dasein je schon aus dem offenbaren Nichts her.

Da-sein heißt: Hineingehaltenheit in das Nichts.

Sich hineinhalten in das Nichts ist das Dasein je schon über das Seiende im Ganzen hinaus. Dieses Hinaussein über das Seiende nennen wir die Transzendenz. Würde das Dasein im Grunde seines Wesens nicht transzendieren, d.h. jetzt, würde es sich nicht im vorhinein in das Nichts hineinhalten, dann könnte es sich nie zu Seiendem verhalten, also auch nicht zu sich selbst.

Ohne ursprüngliche Offenbarkeit des Nichts kein Selbstsein und keine Freiheit.

Damit ist die Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Nichts gewonnen. Das Nichts ist weder ein Gegenstand noch überhaupt ein Seiendes. Das Nichts kommt weder für sich vor noch neben dem Seienden, dem es sich gleichsam anhängt. Das Nichts ist die Ermöglichung der Offenbarkeit des Seienden als eines solchen für das menschliche Dasein. Das Nichts gibt nicht erst den Gegenbegriff zum Seienden her, sondern gehört ursprünglich zum Wesen selbst. Im Sein des Seienden geschieht das Nichten des Nichts."

We encounter a second "positive" function of Nothing: 1) it is what reveals beings to be beings in our encounter of it in anxiety: and 2) it is what allows for, i.e., is the condition of the possibility for, the encounter with beings (even with the being that we are ourselves). We have here the possibility of a transcending of nihilism in a most foundational manner:

But where is nihilism really at work? Where men cling to familiar essents /beings/ and suppose that it suffices to go on taking essents as essents, since after all that is what they are. But with this they reject the question of being and treat being like a nothing (nihil) which in a certain sense it is, insofar as it has an essence. To forget being and cultivate only the essent--that is nihilism. Nihilism thus understood is the ground of the nihilism which Nietzsche exposed in the first book of The Will to Power.

By contrast, to press inquiry into being explicitly to the limits of nothingness, to draw nothingness into the question of being--this is the first and only fruitful step toward a true transcending of nihilism (emphasis added).

The irony of our contemporary understanding of what is ultimate in our experience is that the focussing of our attention more and more upon "things" (and here is meant not just "material" objects but ideas, feelings, phantasies, etc., i.e., multiplicity), i.e., the more that intentional consciousness is reduced to a subject standing over against a world, the more the threat of non-being rises as negation. Heidegger suggests, however, that we are not faced here with a choice between embracing the world or turning away from it to some "higher" essence outside of it.

¹Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 169-170. Again, it should be noted that Ralph Manheim has chosen to translate das Sein as being and das Seiende as essent. See the translator's note, pp. x-xi.

We are challenged, on the contrary, to examine our understanding of "world" all the more radically. Referring to the ontological difference that finds its meaning in Dasein, Heidegger claims:

Thus if being itself is to be disclosed and grounded in its original differentiation [negation] from the essent [Seiende], an original perspective must be opened. The beginnings of the differentiation between being and thinking, the divergence between apprehension and being, make it clear that what is at stake is nothing less than a humanity, a being-human determined by the essence of being. . . .

The question of who man is is closely bound up with the question of the essence of being. But the definition of the essence of man required here cannot be the product of an arbitrary anthropology that considers man in basically the same way as zoology considers animals. Here the direction and scope of the question of being-human are determined solely through the question of being. In accordance with the hidden message of the beginning, man should be understood within the question of being, as the site which being requires in order to disclose itself. Man is the site of openness, the there. The essent juts into this there and is fulfilled. Hence, we say that man's being is in the strict sense of the word "being-there." The perspective for the opening of being must be grounded originally in the essence of being-there as such a site for the disclosure of being.¹

That Nothing is not adequately understood (in fact, neither the meaning of a "thing" nor of "subjectivity," we are told, is adequately understood), sets before us the task to think most rigorously the meaning of this term. We find, on the other hand, that Heidegger's description of the path may not be exclusive. It may be that it is not simply through an encounter with anxiety (the experience of a pervasive slipping away of everything announcing the enduring of Dasein and the difference between nothing and "things") that Nothing/the Being-of beings comes before

¹Ibid., p. 171.

us. In fact, it has been the task and function of metaphors, symbols, and myths in our tradition to break us open to the "full" content of our experience, i.e., to break us open to Nothingness (the unsayable in the said) as the condition of the possibility of our Being-in-the-world. In such a way, I would suggest, we can understand the metaphors applied to the divine reality of "rock," "everlasting spring," and "fountain of life," for example, in the Psalms (e.g., 95:1-2; 46:1-4; 36:9). These metaphors "work" by applying a term from one region of experience to another (recognizing that they are not adequate--there is a semantic impertinence involved--to the new application in a univocal, or literal, sense) allowing for their suggestive power (a new semantic pertinence) to open up new meaning for the hearer/reader. Since all of our language (with the exception of those forms of language which either are, or function in the same way as, metaphors and symbols) are limited in their reference to "things" (i.e., multiplicity), the human has always employed metaphors and symbols (along with other forms of expression which function in an analogous manner, e.g., the parable, the work of art) to evoke the "more" that fails in every expression as what cannot be said in the said. I will argue in the concluding Chapter of this project that the symbol of the Kingdom of God, deeply rooted in the religious tradition of the Old and New Testaments and informing theological reflection throughout the Judeo-Christian tradition, has precisely this disclosive power to break us open to our role as the human, to be that place where the Being-of beings/ Nothing comes face to face with itself and is named.

The recognition of what we may name a "positive" function of Nothing is in no manner an attempt to convince the reader of the place for blind optimism in our Being-in-the-world. As will be discussed below, there should never be a forgetting of the precariousness and danger, what could be named the terror, of our Being-in-the-world. If there is hope in our present predicament, it has nothing to do with the denial of the tremendous wight of catastrophe that threatens. On the contrary, it has to do with the recognition that every dualism contains its opposite, and that the divine reality (here understood by means of the philosophical metaphor of the Being-of beings/Nothing) is the condition of the possibility for all dualisms, i.e., were the divine reality absent from either "pole" of a duality there would be no breaking open to new possibility. That the human may fail in its ontic task, however, is an equal possibility. The claim is, however, that human Being-in-the-world (intentional consciousness) is not/ will not remain passive, and its activity will reflect how it understands itself.

Given the pervasive quest for security in a culture that defines itself in terms of its technological conquering of nature (and the consequent escalation of the threat of nihilation driving the human to concentrate even more rigorously upon the "things" that it possesses), the theological task unites with that of the philosophical in attempting to think anew the meaning of Nothing and the meaning of the Being-of beings. Again, this is not in the sense of a call to turn away from the world; it is a call to come to world in the most adequate and disclosive manner.

Technology always and already understands in order for it to interpret, calculate, manipulate, and control the things it encounters. The task at hand is to point to this understanding in its most radical form. How radically we understand will determine how adequately we respond to our present human situation.

Summary

Possibility is the pervasive characteristic of the human that we encounter in Husserl's Phenomenology as infinite horizon of investigation and in Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology: "Higher than reality stands possibility. The understanding of Phenomenology rests solely in the apprehension of it as possibility."¹

Every destining of revealing comes to pass from out of a granting and as such a granting. For it is granting that first conveys to man that share in revealing which the coming-to-pass of revealing needs. As the one so needed and used, man is given to belong to the coming-to-pass of truth. The granting that sends in one way or another into revealing is as such the saving power. For the saving power lets man see and enter into the highest dignity of his essence. This dignity lies in keeping watch over the unconcealment--and with it, from the first, the² concealment--of all coming to presence on this earth.

But what help is it to us to look into the constellation of truth? We look into the danger and see the growth of the saving power.

Through this we are not yet saved. But we are thereupon summoned to hope in the growing light of the saving power. How can this happen? Here and now in little things, that we may foster the saving power in its increase. This includes holding always before our eyes the extreme danger.³

¹Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 38.

²Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," p. 32.

³Ibid., p. 33.

The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought.

In addition, we have seen how possibility is foundation to the constituting of meaning in intentional consciousness in the Husseralian enterprise (i.e., the understanding of temporality as the succession of nows within the horizon of simultaneity that preserves the uniqueness of the "individuum" encountered and suggests the praxis character of intentional consciousness as a constant testing out of the adequacy of its constituted meanings). This intuitive and reflective testing out of the adequacy of our constituted meanings by means of a constantly new "throwing before/projection" (Vorstellung/Darstellung) of our accumulated meanings in the midst of our encounter with "objects" (either "empirical" or "ideational") is in fact a characterization of intentional consciousness as possibility. When we press forward to examine this foundation, we find that its presupposition is itself "event," i.e., the event of the Being-of beings in, through, and as making possible the encounters of intentional consciousness. The very transcending to world, which characterizes Dasein as intentional, is itself possible because of the event character of the Being-of beings. This Being-of beings, which is No-thing, is the "groundless ground" that enables our being in a world.

. . . Dasein must traverse itself in the world projecting traversing of being in order, out of this elevation, first and foremost to be able to understand

¹Ibid., p. 35.

an abyss. This abyssness of Dasein again is nothing that a dialectic or psychological dissection can open up. The breaking open of the abyss in the grounding transcendence is much more a primordial movement, which freedom accomplishes with us and thereby gives us "to understanding." That means, as primordial world content is given, the more primordial this /world content/ is grounded, the more simple the core of Dasein encounters its selfness in engagement. The non-essence of the foundation consequently is subdued only in¹ actually existing, but never can it be eliminated.

The non-essence (Nothing) of the foundation is the "ground" as condition of the possibility that Dasein be engaged in world. This we accomplish with freedom. Freedom is here suggestively related to the "groundless ground," Nothing, that is the condition of the possibility of our being transcending Being-in-the-world. What is the meaning of freedom announced here?

On Freedom

Freedom as an Ontological Problem

The issue before us is articulated perhaps most succinctly by Werner Marx in his work Heidegger and the Tradition:

These deliberations are especially appropriate in bringing to light the extremely perilous character of Heidegger's concept of truth and at once to evoke

¹Heidegger, "Vom Wesen des Grundes," p. 172. This is my translation of: ". . . das Dasein muß im weltentwerfenden Überstieg des Seienden sich selbst übersteigen, um sich aus dieser Erhöhung allererst als Abgrund verstehen zu können. Und diese Abgründigkeit des Daseins wiederum ist nichts, was einer Dialektik oder psychologischen Zergliederung sich öffnete. Das Aufbrechen des Abgrundes in der gründenden Transzendenz ist vielmehr die Urbewegung, die die Freiheit mit uns selbst vollzieht und uns damit 'zu verstehen gibt', d.h. als ursprünglichen Weltgehalt vorgibt, daß dieser, je ursprünglicher er gegründet wird, um so einfacher das Herz des Daseins, seine Selbstheit im Handeln trifft. Das Unwesen des Grundes wird sonach nur im faktischen Existieren 'überwunden', aber nie beseitigt."

most forcefully the question of whether Heidegger has actually considered the matter correctly when he recognized not only "the mystery" but also error, sham, and evil as equal partners within the occurrence of truth. Do the fact of the sciences and their results not show that error and sham can be overcome and are therefore of lesser rank than undisguised luminosity, and this without detriment to the true insight that these results themselves continue to be pervaded by the mystery, which denies itself to these sciences? And for all our skepticism, do we not encounter a sufficient number of modes of behavior in extreme human situations which demonstrate that the good has priority over evil, just as in the bodily realm health unquestionably has priority over sickness? Perhaps a significant task for a thinking that carries on, that pursues Heidegger's insight into the mystery character of truth, lies in demonstrating, from the topic itself, that the undisguised has an essential priority over the disguised in the relationship of light and darkness.

At issue here is not a critique or defense of Heidegger. It is to think the meaning of this relationship of good and evil to the Being-of beings/Nothing as the granting of (condition of the possibility of) multiplicity, or the being that we ourselves are. Is it an adequate understanding of this Being-of beings as nothing to claim that "error, sham, and evil . . . are equal partners within the occurrence of truth?" What does "equal" mean here? Does it mean that good and evil are indifferently manifest through the event of truth? Does it mean that good and evil have cosmically the same weight or "quantity?" Does Marx's question not in fact betray a fundamental wish of the human that it could surrender its responsibility to a "foundation of existence" that is the Good; therefore assuring the priority of good over evil?

¹Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition, trans. by Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 171.

I wish to suggest here, on the contrary: the Being-of beings/ Nothing is the condition of the possibility for both good and evil. The Being-of beings, as condition of possibility, makes possible, in freedom, world. Nothing is here decided (quantities are not determined)--only possibilities are made available. (This "only," however, contains everything.) Hence, the symbol of the Kingdom of God (thought as the always and already reigning/ presencing of the divine reality as the Being-of beings/Nothing) is not here thought in terms of an already victorious "ethical reality." That would be to understand the symbol as a steno symbol (or sign) refusing to let it work tensively as a call to the individual/community to re-examine its self-understanding of world and to respond. I return to this theme following a discussion of freedom.

Access to the complexity of issues here addressed will be obtained by engaging F.W.J. Schelling's Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit and Heidegger's study of this text entitled Schelling's Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit:

Where nature is so conceived as not only something to be overcome, but as having a voice /ā mutual taking part/, there we find a moving along to a higher unity with freedom. From the other side, however, freedom invades, though as not unfolded, into nature. Schelling was the first, in his going beyond Fichte, to take the step to¹ this complete, general, essential essence of freedom.

¹Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, pp. 101-102. This is my translation of: "Wo die Natur aber so begriffen wird, nicht als das nur zu Überwindende, sondern als das Mitbestimmende, da rückt sie in eine höhere Einheit mit der Freiheit. Umgekehrt aber rückt die Freiheit ihrerseits, wenngleich als unentfaltete, ein in die Natur. Den Schritt zu diesem vollständigen allgemeinen Wesensbegriff der Freiheit hat erst Schelling in seinem Hinausgehen über Fichte getan."

The task at hand is to investigate the relationship between freedom, good, and evil. The thematic outline for this analysis is as follows:

1) Schelling's work is seen as a first attempt to address the question of freedom in a radically new form from a standpoint of "panentheism" (where the divine reality is understood as a unity in multiplicity); 2) it demonstrates, as well, that, radically understood, freedom is freedom to good and evil (rather than to good or evil); 3) it provides a foundation for turning to Heidegger's discussion of freedom in relationship to the "ground" of experience as Nothing; and finally, 4) the implications of the Heideggerian claim will be pursued that the Being-of beings (Nothing) as condition of the possibility, is freedom, i.e., is the enabling possibility to good and evil. It then becomes possible to come to terms not only with our freedom as an enabling, courage to be, but in addition as establishing our "right"/duty to be the clearing for the announcing of good and evil, i.e., freedom. Here we will encounter the suggestion that were God absent from evil we would not be able to transcend it. The enabling of this courage to be, right/duty will be returned to in the last chapter, concerned with the ability of the symbol of the Kingdom of God to "work" as a soteriological symbol in our world today as an event of ontological soteriology placing our self-understanding of world into question and challenging us to come forth into the fullness of the clearing that it can be announced in world. This fullness enables us in the struggle with evil.

Schelling on Freedom and
the Divine Reality

Schelling thinks his system through from the perspective of "absolute, general unity," i.e., from the "divine perspective." He presents three pivotal ideas shaping his description of the essence of freedom: 1) What is free "is that which is concerned only with the laws of its own essence and is determined by nothing other either within or without;"¹ 2) though God is absolute, general unity, he is completely removed from evil (and "to be taken to be accordingly good"²: "the fundamental essence of the beginning can never in itself be evil. . . ." ³); 3) the human alone has the capacity to choose good and evil (not good or evil).⁴

Our suspiscion is immediately aroused when we read "system." System building is an inheritance from Kant within German Idealism. "Kant discovered--that means always in Philosophy: he formed--for the first time the inner system character of reason as laws of the spirit."⁵ It is not an accident that "law"/"rule"

¹F.W.J. Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1977), p. 384. Pagination following the 1860 edition of Schelling's Complete Works. This is my translation of: ". . . ist, was nur den Gesetzen seines eignen Wesens gemäß handelt und von nichts anderem weder in noch außer ihm bestimmt ist."

²Ibid., p. 354. This is my translation of: "als lautere Güte betrachtet wird."

³Ibid., p. 375. This is my translation of: "Das anfängliche Grundwesen kann nie an sich Böse sein. . . ."

⁴See Ibid., p. 368: ". . . es der Mensch, die vollkommenste aller sichtbaren Kreaturen ist, der des Bösen allein fähig ist. . . ."

⁵Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 46. This is my translation of the following sentence: "Kant entdeckte - d.h. in der

and reason are here combined. For Kant and the German Idealists of the 19th century, reason has as its model mathematics, and foremost the structure and rules of geometry. Reason is thought in terms of necessity, i.e., the necessary coherence of law and rule. It is contrasted with life which is anything but the necessity of thought. This is betrayed as a principle of Schelling's system when he says:

All of nature says to us, that it is by no means there as a simple geometric necessity; there is no genuinely pure reason in it, but personality and spirit. ["There is a system of divine understanding, but God itself is no system, but a life. . . ."¹]; otherwise geometric understanding, which has ruled for so long, would have long since penetrated and would have proven more to be true according to its idol of general and eternal natural laws than it till now in fact has, while it must daily recognize all the more the irrational condition of nature. Creation is no happening, but an act. There is no effect from general laws, but God (the person God) is the general law, and everything that occurs, does so by means of the personality of God; not according to an abstract necessity. . . .

Philosophie immer auch: er gestaltete - als geistiges Gesetz erstmals den inneren Systemcharakter der Vernunft."

¹ Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, p. 399. This is my translation of: "In dem göttlichen Verstande ist ein System, aber Gott selbst ist kein System, sondern ein Leben. . . ."

² Ibid., pp. 395-396. This is my translation of: "Die ganze Natur sagt uns, daß sie keineswegs vermöge einer bloß geometrischen Notwendigkeit da ist; es ist nicht lauter reine Vernunft in ihr, sondern Persönlichkeit und Geist (wie wir den vernünftigen Autor vom geistreichen wohl unterscheiden); sonst hätte der geometrische Verstand, der so lange geherrscht hat, sie längst durchdringen und sein Idol allgemeiner und ewiger Naturgesetze mehr bewahrheiten müssen, als es bis jetzt geschehen ist, da er vielmehr das irrationale Verhältnis der Natur zu sich täglich mehr erkennen muß. Die Schöpfung ist keine Begebenheit, sondern eine Tat. Es gibt keine Erfolge aus allgemeinen Gesetzen, sondern Gott, d.h. die Person Gottes, ist das allgemeine Gesetz, und alles, was geschieht, geschieht vermöge der Persönlichkeit Gottes; nicht nach einer abstrakten Notwendigkeit. . . ." Personality here has the following

Kant had demonstrated the possibility of a system building of the reason, but in German Idealism the system was taken a step further:

. . . the laying out and promoting of a system presses directly in the direction, that the system is concerned increasingly less as the milieu for the knowing of being, and increasingly more as the fugue of Being itself and with a presenting of this fugue.

Being /Seyn/ "itself," as unity and becoming, was seen as an orderly unfolding, according to a systematic patterning of structure and levels (or stages), in and through multiplicity. German Idealism is the attempt to describe this fugue of Being. Both the character and possibility of this description is betrayed by the German word for "ground." Grund means both "foundation" and "reason"/ cause. The task of the philosopher is to see the reason informing the foundation of existence.

It is precisely here that the Pantheism Controversy engaged the problem of freedom. Reason means necessity. It is then a logical progression to say that a foundation that is necessary cannot allow for freedom. Schelling attempts in his essay to engage this problem directly. His system rests on his statement

meaning: "Nur in der Persönlichkeit ist Leben; und alle Persönlichkeit ruht auf einem dunkeln Grunde, der also allerdings auch Grund der Erkenntnis sein muß. Aber nur der Verstand ist es, der das in diesem Grunde verborgene und bloß potentialiter enthaltene herausbildet und zum Aktus erhebt. Dies kann nur durch Scheidung geschehen, also durch Wissenschaft und Dialektik" (pp. 413-414).
. . . ."

¹Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 47. This is my translation of: ". . . die Ausgestaltung der Systemforderung drängt gerade dahin, das System immer weniger nur als Rahmen des Wissens vom Seienden, sondern immer mehr als Fuge des Seyns selbst zu begreifen und dementsprechend zu gestalten."

quoted above: "There is a system of divine understanding, but God itself is no system, but a life. . . ." ¹ How is freedom possible in a system?

God, according to Schelling is thought as Creator, as self-revelation. ² Everything in this self-revelation is the consequence of two principles: "ground" (cause) and "existence." ³ Ground is the dark principle, ⁴ and turned into itself, ⁵ from which the particular comes to its existence in its definiteness in the light (the idea principle). ⁶

The first period of creation is . . . the birth of light. Light, or the idea principle, is the created Word as an eternal opposition to the dark principle, which expires the, at the foundation concealed, life of non-being, by lifting it out of potentiality into act. Spirit goes beyond Word, and spirit is the first essence, uniting the dark and the light world and subordinating both principles to realization and personality.

¹ Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, p. 118.

² See Ibid., pp. 347 and 394; Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 155.

³ See Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, p. 357.

⁴ See Ibid., p. 377.

⁵ See Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 165.

⁶ See Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, p. 404.

⁷ Ibid., p. 404. This is my translation of: "Die erste Periode der Schöpfung ist, . . . die Geburt des Lichts. Das Licht oder das ideale Prinzip ist als ein ewiger Gegensatz des finstern Prinzips das schaffende Wort, welches das im Grunde verborgene Leben aus dem Nichtsein erlöst, es aus der Potenz zum Aktus erhebt. Über dem Wort geht der Geist auf, und der Geist ist das erste Wesen, welches die finstre und die Lichtwelt vereinigt und beide Prinzipien sich zur Verwirklichung und Persönlichkeit unterordnet."

God alone "lives in pure light, because it alone is from itself,"¹ but the ground of his existence is something in him that is "not himself."²

This ground of its existence that God in itself has, is not God absolutely viewed, i.e., insofar as it exists; for it is only the ground of its existence, it is nature --in God; that which is inseparable from it [God] but still a distinguishable essence.

Were we to make this essence more human for us, we could say: it is desire/yearning, which the eternal One experiences in giving itself birth. It is not the One itself, but still eternal with it. Yearning wants God, i.e., to give birth to the infathomable unity. Therefore, insofar, is it itself not yet the unity. . . . After the act of self-revelation, everything in the world is, as we now see, rule, order, and form, but always laying at the foundation is chaos, as if it once again could break through. Now here it does appear as if order and form were the primordial, but that is a bringing forth of order out of chaos. This is in fact the unconceivable basis of reality, the never consumed extra, which even with the most strenuous effort never comes into understanding, but eternally stays in the foundation. Out of this non-understanding is born understanding in its real sense. Without this presupposed darkness, there is no reality⁴ of the creative; obscurity is its necessary inheritance.

¹ Ibid., p. 360. This is my translation of: "wohnt im reinen Lichte, denn er allein ist von sich selbst."

² See Ibid., p. 359: ". . . was in Gott selbst nicht Er selbst ist. . . ."

³ Ibid., p. 358. This is my translation of: "Dieser Grund seiner Existenz, den Gott in sich hat, ist nicht Gott absolut betrachtet, d.h. sofern er existiert; denn er ist ja nur der Grund seiner Existenz, Er ist die Natur--in Gott; ein von ihm zwar unabtrennliches, aber doch unterschiednes Wesen."

⁴ Ibid., pp. 359-360. This is my translation of: "Wollen wir uns dieses Wesen menschlich näherbringen, so können wir sagen: es sei die Sehnsucht, die das ewige Eine empfindet, sich selbst zu gebären. Sie ist nicht das Eine selbst, aber doch mit ihm gleich ewig. Sie will Gott, d.h. die unergründliche Einheit gebären, aber insofern ist in ihr selbst noch nicht die Einheit. . . . Nach der ewigen Tat der Selbstoffenbarung ist nämlich in der Welt, wie wir

In an attempt to describe the divine ground (distinct from the divine existence) Schelling speaks of a yearning/striving. Yearning and striving are not "the thing itself;" they are the driving to become something out of chaos. Heidegger speaks of this yearning in this way:

The eternal yearning is a striving that never allows itself to come to an established picture, because it wants to always remain yearning; as un-understandable striving it is nothing understandable and nothing that is brought to a standing or stationary. There is nothing about it that could be called definite or of its own. It is nameless, it knows no name, it fails the possibility of words.

. . . Yearning is the stirring that is the stretching away and apart from itself; and even in this stirring resides and occurs, the arousal of (itself) the being active to itself.

This yearning to become is the yearning to give birth to the divine unity which can only be announced through the becoming of multiplicity, i.e., duality. Every essence can be revealed/announced

sie jetzt erblicken, alles Regel, Ordnung und Form; aber immer liegt noch im Grunde das Regellose, als könnte es einmal wieder durchbrechen, und nirgends scheint es, als wären Ordnung und Form das Ursprüngliche, sondern als wäre ein anfänglich Regelloses zur Ordnung gebracht worden. Dieses ist an den Dingen die unergreifliche Basis der Realität, der nie aufgehende Rest, das, was sich mit der größten Anstrengung nicht in Verstand auflösen läßt, sondern ewig im Grunde bleibt. Auf diesem Verstandlosen ist im eigentlichen Sinne der Verstand geboren. Ohne dies vorausgehende Dunkel gibt es keine Realität der Kreatur: Finsternis ist ihr notwendiges Erbteil."

¹Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 151. This is my translation of "Die ewige Sehnsucht ist ein Streben, das aber selbst es nie zu einem festen Gebilde kommen läßt, weil sie immer Sehnsucht bleiben will; als verstandloses Streben hat es nichts Verstandenes und zum Stehen und Stand zu Bringendes, nichts, was es als ein Bestimmtes, Einiges, nennen könnte; 'namenlos' ist sie, sie weiß keine Namen, sie vermag nicht zu nennen, was sie erstrebt; ihr fehlt die Möglichkeit des Wortes."

. . . Die Sehnsucht ist die Regung, das sich von sich weg und eben in dieser Regung liegt und geschieht die Erregung des (sich) Regenden zu sich selbst."

only in its opposite. This is a central pillar of Schelling's system:

. . . each essence can only be revealed through its opposite, love only in hate, unity in struggle. Were there no separation of the principles /ground and existence/darkness and light/, there could be no recognition of the unity of their omnipotence; were there no discord, then love could not really be (emphasis added).

Schelling adds, that in order to exist, God must reveal itself,² and in order to reveal itself it must do so through the becoming in the separation of the two principles of ground and existence. This becoming, however, is not simply an irregular, constant change, Heidegger wishes to point out:

What is meant is not this platitude, that all things pursue change; also not meant is the external statement, that there is overall in the world no standing still and in fact beings have no Being (Seyn). But the statement /The fact of the case consists in the fact that God's essence is revelation/revealing./⁷ wishes to express: Things are indeed, but the essence of their Being (Seyn) consists of always a level being presented /darstellen/ and a manner in which the absolute establishes and presents itself. Being is not unravelled or become named in an external flowing, but becoming is the way Being (Seyn) is to be understood. But Being (Seyn) is now primordially to be understood as will. Being (das Seiende) is being (seiend) always according to the fuging of the fugue of Being (Seyn) belonging to the moments of "ground and existence" as a willing. That Being of a thing is becoming says: The being (seienden) thing strives for a definite level of the will; there is never

¹ Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, pp. 373-374. This is my translation of: ". . . jedes Wesen kann nur in seinem Gegenteil offenbar werden, Liebe nur in Haß, Einheit in Streit. Wäre keine Zertrennung der Prinzipien, so könnte die Einheit ihre Allmacht nicht erweisen: wäre nicht Zwietracht, so könnte die Liebe nicht wirklich werden."

² See Ibid., p. 374: ". . . weil Gott notwendig sich offenbaren muß. . . ."

in its domain an indifferent uniformity to a merely present multiplicity. Becoming is one of Being's most serviceable ways of being preserved, and is not simply the opposite of Being (emphasis added). . . .

There is order and rule to the self-revelation of God according to Schelling. Each level in the development of things out of the separation of the two principles of ground and existence announces the deeper unity that is the binding of the two principles, i.e., the divine. This deeper unity binding the two principles is love (according to Schelling), and it is more "original" than Geist (Spirit/Reason). "Spirit is the self-knowing unity of ground and existence [darkness and light] (emphasis added)."² Geist, on the other hand, stands on the "other side" of the self-revelation (on the other side of the separation of the two principles) from love:

¹Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 148. This is my translation of: "Gemeint ist nicht jener Gemeinplatz, daß eben alle Dinge sich fortgesetzt verändern; gemeint ist auch nicht jene äußerliche Feststellung, daß überall in der Welt überhaupt kein Stillstand sei und eigentlich die Dinge kein Seyn haben, sondern der Satz /Die Dingheit der Dinge besteht darin, das Wesen Gottes zu offenbaren./ will sagen: Die Dinge sind freilich, aber das Wesen ihres Seyns besteht darin, je eine Stufe darzustellen und eine Weise, in der das Absolute sich fest- und darstellt. Das Seyn wird nicht in ein äußerliches Zerfließen, genannt Werden, aufgelöst, sondern das Werden wird als eine Weise des Seyns begriffen. Seyn wird aber jetzt ursprünglich begriffen als Wollen. Das Seiende ist seiend je nach der Fügung der zur Seynsfuge gehörigen Momente 'Grund und Existenz' in einem Wollenden. Das Seyn der Dinge ist ein Werden, besagt: Die seienden Dinge erstreben je bestimmte Stufen des Wollens; es gibt in ihrem Bereich niemals die gleichgültige Gleichmäßigkeit eines nur vorhandenen Vielerlei. Das Werden ist eine dem Seyn dienstbare Weise der Seinsbewahrung, und nicht das einfache Gegenteil zum Seyn. . . ."

²Ibid., p. 178. This is my translation of: "Geist . . . ist die sich selbst wissende Einheit von Grund und Existenz."

. . . spirit is not yet the highest: it is only spirit, or the breath of love. Love is the highest. It is that, which was there, even before the ground and before the existing (as separation) were. . . .

At the most complex and sophisticated level of becoming stands the human. Here we find the greatest separation of the principles and, therefore, the richest announcement of the unity (God).

When . . . finally, through developing transformation and separation of all the powers of the most inner and deepest point of the original darkness is transfigured completely in light in an essence, so is, of course, the will of this essence, insofar as it is separate, likewise in itself a particular will, or as the center of all other particular wills, but one with the primordial will or understanding, so that out of both now becomes a single whole. This raising of the deepest center into the light occurs in no other evident creature outside of humanity. In humanity is the complete power (Macht) of the dark principle and equally so the complete power/energy (Kraft) of light. . . . The eternal spirit speaks unity or the Word in nature. The spoken (real) Word is only in the unity of light and darkness (the "said" and the "said with"). Of course, the two principles are in all things, but without full consonance because of the imperfection in the rising out of the ground. First with humanity is that still held back and incomplete word completely said. But spirit is in the spoken word revealed, i.e., God as existing act. Now, in that the soul is the living identity of both principles, it is spirit; and spirit is in God. Were, though, the identity of both principles in the spirit of humanity just as insoluble as they are in God, there would be no distinction, i.e., God as spirit would not be revealed. The unity, which is inseparable in God, must therefore be separable in humanity,--and this is the possibility to good and evil (emphasis added).

¹Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, pp. 405-406. This is my translation of: ". . . der Geist ist noch nicht das Höchste; er ist nur der Geist, oder der Hauch der Liebe. Die Liebe aber ist das Höchste. Sie ist das, was da war, ehe denn der Grund und ehe das Existierende (als getrennte) waren. . . ."

²Ibid., pp. 363-364. This is my translation of: "Wenn . . . endlich durch fortschreitende Umwandlung und Scheidung aller Kräfte der innerste und tiefste Punkt der anfänglichen Dunkelheit in einem Wesen ganz in Licht verklärt ist, so ist der Wille desselben Wesens zwar, inwiefern es ein Einzelnes ist, ebenfalls ein Partikularwille, an sich aber, oder als das Zentrum aller andern Partikularwillen, mit dem Urwillen oder dem Verstande eins, so daß aus beiden jetzt ein einiges Ganzes wird. Diese Erhebung des allertiefsten Centri

Why does Schelling speak of the greatest separation as the possibility to good and evil? We are told:

. . . evil is actually the external antithesis and rebellion of the spirit against the absolute in the essence of humanity (the tearing away from universal will, the opposed-to, in the "opposed," displacing will). Evil 'is' as freedom, the external freedom against the absolute within the whole of being; because freedom 'is' the ability to good and evil. Good 'is' evil and evil 'is' good (emphasis added).

Here we learn why Schelling says that humanity ". . . alone is capable of evil. . . ." ² The most complex separation of the

in Licht geschieht in keiner der uns sichtbaren Kreaturen außer im Menschen. Im Menschen ist die ganze Macht des finstern Prinzips und in ebendemselben zugleich die ganze Kraft des Lichts. . . . der ewige Geist spricht die Einheit oder das Wort aus in die Natur. Das ausgesprochene (reale) Wort aber ist nur in der Einheit von Licht und Dunkel (Selbstlauter und Mitlauter). Nun sind zwar in allen Dingen die beiden Prinzipien, aber ohne völlige Konsonanz wegen der Mangelhaftigkeit des aus dem Grunde Erhobenen. Erst im Menschen also wird das in allen andern Dingen noch zurückgehaltne und vollständige Wort völlig ausgesprochen. Aber in dem ausgesprochenen Wort offenbart sich der Geist, d.h. Gott als actu existierend. Indem nun die Seele lebendige Identität beider Prinzipien ist, ist sie Geist; und Geist ist in Gott. Wären nun im Geist des Menschen die Identität beider Prinzipien ebenso unauflöslich als in Gott, so wäre kein Unterschied, d.h. Gott als Geist würde nicht offenbar. Diejenige Einheit, die in Gott unzertrennlich ist, muß also im Menschen zertrennlich sein, und dieses ist die Möglichkeit des Guten und des Bösen."

¹Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 216. This is my translation of: ". . . das Böse ist eigentlich im Wesen des Menschen als der äußerste Gegensatz und Aufstand des Geistes gegen das Absolute (das Sich-losreißen vom Universalwillen, das Gegen-ihn, im 'Gegen' ihn ersetzender Wille). Das Böse 'ist' als die Freiheit, die äußerste Freiheit gegen das Absolute innerhalb des Ganzen des Seienden; denn Freiheit 'ist' das Vermögen zum Guten und zum Bösen. Das Gute 'ist' das Böse und das Böse 'ist' das Gute." See in addition, Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, p. 352: "Der Idealismus gibt nämlich einerseits nur den allgemeinsten, andererseits den bloß formellen Begriff der Freiheit. Der reale und lebendige Begriff aber ist, daß sie ein Vermögen des Guten und des Bösen sei."

²Ibid., p. 368. This is my translation of: ". . . der des Bösen allein fähig ist. . . ."

principles occurs in humanity when the human, as Geist, seeks its own self rather than its unity in God.

The elevated principle out of the ground of nature, whereby man is separated from God, is his self: This is spirit, however, through its unity with the ideal principle. The self as such is spirit, or man is spirit as a selfish, special (separated from God) essence, whose connection is made by the personality. Because the self is spirit, however, it is at the same time lifted out of creatureliness into the over-creatureliness. It is will, which catches sight in itself of complete freedom that is no longer a tool of the creating universal will in nature, but is above, and outside of all nature. Spirit is above light, while it in nature is elevated above the unity of the light and dark principles. . . . Because the self has spirit (because this rules over light and darkness)--when it, of course, is not the spirit of eternal love--the self can separate itself from the light, or the wilfulness can strive to be a particular will (this striving being what identity it has with the universal will). It can be a particular will only insofar as it remains in the center. . . . Thereby, a separation of the spirit in the self from the light also arises in the human will (because spirit stands above light), i.e., an unraveling of the always intertwined principles in God. When the opposition of the wilfulness of humanity as the central will remains in its foundation, so that the divine relationship of the principles is maintained . . . , and when in place of the spirit of discord (in which the one principle wants to separate itself from the general), the spirit of love holds sway, then the will is of a divine type and order.--But that each elevating of wilfulness is evil, is clear from the following. The will which comes forth in its above natureness literally super-naturalness in order to make itself as general will at the same time particular and creaturely, the relationship of the principles strives in reverse. Then the ground foundation/dark principle is elevated above the cause, the spirit, and is now taken to be the center. Out of the ground it is used against the creature whereby disorder follows both in and outside of the self. The will of man can be seen as a bond of living powers. As long as man remains in unity with the universal will, so remain each of the powers in their divine proportion and equality. Hardly is there a giving in of the wilfulness itself out of the center of its position, so is there a giving in of the bond of the powers: In its place the particular will controls, which can no longer unite the powers as they originally were, and

therefore must strive, out of the disarray of the powers as a rebellious army of desire and lust, . . . to form or bring together its own peculiar life (which in itself is possible while evil persists as the first bond of the powers, the ground of nature). But that it is in no way a true life (which can only occur in the original relationship), so arises one's own (but a false) life, a life of lies, a tumor of unrest and destruction. The best image here is that of sickness, which is the true counterpart to evil or sin through the misuse of freedom in nature resulting in disarray.

¹Ibid., pp. 364-366. This is my translation of: "Das aus dem Grunde der Natur emporgehobne Prinzip, wodurch der Mensch von Gott geschieden ist, ist die Selbstheit in ihm die aber durch ihre Einheit mit dem idealen Prinzip Geist wird. Die Selbstheit als solche ist Geist, oder der Mensch ist Geist als ein selbstisches, besondres (von Gott geschiedenes) Wesen, welche Verbindung eben die Persönlichkeit ausmacht. Dadurch aber, daß die Selbstheit Geist ist, ist sie zugleich aus dem Kreatürlichen ins Überkreatürliche gehoben, sie ist Wille, der sich selbst in der völligen Freiheit erblickt, nicht mehr Werkzeug des in der Natur schaffenden Universalwillens, sondern über und außer aller Natur ist. Der Geist ist über dem Licht, wie er sich in der Natur über der Einheit des Lichts und des dunkeln Prinzips erhebt. Dadurch, daß sie Geist ist, ist also die Selbstheit frei von beiden Prinzipien. . . . daß sie den Geist hat (weil dieser über Licht und Finsternis herrscht)--wenn er nämlich nicht der Geist der ewigen Liebe ist--kann die Selbstheit sich trennen von dem Licht, oder der Eigenwille kann streben, das, was er nur in der Identität mit dem Universalwillen ist, als Partikularwille zu sein, das, was er nur ist, inwiefern er im Centro bleibt. . . . Dadurch also entsteht im Willen des Menschen eine Trennung der geistig gewordenen Selbstheit (da der Geist über dem Lichte steht) von dem Licht, d.h. eine Auflösung der in Gott unauflöselichen Prinzipien. Wenn im Gegenteil der Eigenwille des Menschen als Zentralwille im Grunde bleibt, so daß das göttliche Verhältnis der Prinzipien besteht . . . , und wenn statt des Geistes der Zwietracht, der das eigne Prinzip vom allgemeinen scheiden will, der Geist der Liebe in ihm waltet, so ist der Wille in göttlicher Art und Ordnung. --Daß aber eben jene Erhebung des Eigenwillens das Böse ist, erhellet aus folgendem. Der Wille, der aus seiner Übernatürlichkeit heraustritt, um sich als allgemeinen Willen zugleich partikular und kreatürlich zu machen, strebt das Verhältnis der Prinzipien umzukehren, den Grund über die Ursache zu erheben, den Geist, den er nur für das Zentrum erhalten, außer demselben und gegen die Kreatur zu gebrauchen, woraus Zerrüttung in ihm selbst und außer ihm erfolgt. Der Wille des Menschen ist anzusehen als ein Band von lebendigen Kräften; solange nun er selbst in seiner Einheit mit dem Universalwillen bleibt, so bestehen auch jene Kräfte in göttlichem Mass und Gleichgewicht. Kaum aber ist der Eigenwille selbst

Schelling's system is a system of the "fugue" of Being as the absolute unity that in its eternal first moment of creation is a separation of ground (striving/yearning) and existence.¹ By means of, and through, this becoming through separation,² the reason observes the necessary stages/levels that lead to the highest and most complex independent dependence of the individual, humanity. God as love (the living unity/personality) may be perceived by the reason as the principle of unity binding the two principles (ground and existence) together.³ In nature we have a separation of the two principles, but the separation never comes to "the light," i.e., it remains a blind striving and desire without reason and spirit.⁴ "Nature comes to a boundary which consists in its never coming to itself."⁵ In humanity, however, spirit becomes perceived in reason.

aus dem Centro als seiner Stelle gewichen, so ist auch das Band der Kräfte gewichen: statt desselben herrscht ein bloßer Partikularwille, der die Kräfte nicht mehr unter sich, wie der ursprüngliche, vereinigen kann, und der daher streben muß, aus den voneinandergewichenen Kräften, dem empörten Heer der Begierden und Lüste . . . ein eignes und absonderliches Leben zu formieren oder zusammzusetzen, welches insofern möglich ist, als selbst im Bösen das erste Band der Kräfte, der Grund der Natur, immer noch fortbesteht. Da es aber doch kein wahres Leben sein kann, als welches es nur in dem ursprünglichen Verhältnis bestehen konnte, so entsteht zwar ein eignes, aber ein falsches Leben, ein Leben der Lüge, ein Gewächs der Unruhe und der Verderbnis. Das treffendste Gleichnis bietet hier die Krankheit dar, welche als die durch den Mißbrauch der Freiheit in die Natur gekommene Unordnung das wahre Gegenbild des Bösen oder der Sünde ist."

¹See Ibid., pp. 359-360 and p. 404. See in addition, Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, pp. 147 and 155.

²See Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, p. 404.

³See Ibid., pp. 373-376.

⁴See Ibid., p. 372.

⁵Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 172. This is my translation of: "Die Natur kommt an eine Grenze, die darin besteht, daß sie nie zu sich selbst kommt."

Humanity is free,¹ i.e., it is free to decide what it is/will be without being determined either from within (i.e., the divine principle of unity binding the separation of ground and existence in the human does not determine the particularity of the individual) or from without (the human can strive/yearn for its own self-identity). In its freedom, then, the human as spirit, i.e., knowing unity,² can in its freedom turn everything upside down. It is not individuality alone that leads to evil,³ but individuality that becomes mere personal striving and yearning (ground) tearing itself away from light. Evil in humanity, according to Schelling, is a striving for individuality that employs spirit to "go beyond" nature not to a seeking of original unity, but to control and dominate for personal end. It is an effecting of the separation from the divine in the most radical way, because it is a radical maintenance of the separation between the two first principles (ground and existence). It is possible only for the human to be evil as the "opposite"/"opposed to" from the divine unity/love.⁴ The paradox of the human is that as spirit humanity is divine,⁵ but, as freedom to good and evil, humanity is opposite/opposed to

¹See Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, p. 373.

²See Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 178.

³See Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, pp. 399-340: "Denn nicht die erregte Selbstheit an sich ist das Böse, sondern nur sofern sie sich gänzlich von ihrem Gegensatz, dem Licht oder dem Universalwillen, losgerissen hat."

⁴See Ibid., pp. 410-411.

⁵See Ibid., p. 373.

the divine. God, as love, is necessarily love.¹ It is this absolute that is the inner core of freedom allowing for the possibility that the separation of the divine becoming can in and through freedom (as the opposite of the inner necessity) conquer evil in the encountering of the unity as the core of multiplicity. In order for humanity to be free, God is necessarily love and becoming, and evil is itself a metaphysical necessity.² The divine love/unity is announced only in the human ("Man must be, that God will be revealed."³). God as ground (not as existence) is the enabler of evil and good, though not itself evil. Precisely because humanity is free, God is not evil for Schelling.

The freedom to good and evil in Schelling's system is a "necessary" freedom. The necessity to be free, to choose to employ Geist as a "rising above" nature to serve the purpose of the particular will, this necessity is announced in the teleological goal of the self-revelation:

The end of the revelation is therefore the expulsion of evil from the good, the declaration of evil as total unreality. Opposed to this, the good (elevated to eternal

¹See Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 192.

²See Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, p. 373 and Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 193.

³Ibid., p. 143. "Der Mensch muß sein, damit Gott offenbar werde." See in addition, Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, pp. 374-374: "Wäre keine Zertrennung der Prinzipien, so könnte die Einheit ihre Allmacht nicht erweisen; wäre nicht Zwietracht, so könnte die Liebe nicht wirklich werden. Der Mensch ist auf jenen Gipfel gestellt, wo er die Selbstbewegungsquelle zum Guten und Bösen gleicherweise in sich hat: das Band der Prinzipien in ihm ist kein notwendiges, sondern ein freies. Er steht am Scheidpunkt; was er auch wähle, es wird seine Tat sein, aber er kann nicht in der Unentschiedenheit bleiben, weil Gott notwendig sich offenbaren muß, und weil in der Schöpfung überhaupt nichts Zweideutiges bleiben kann."

unity out of the ground) will be combined with the primordial good. That which was born out of the darkness into the light attaches itself to the ideal principle as a limb on its body in which this is realized perfectly and only as completely personal essence. As long as the original duality lasts, the creating Word rules in the ground, and this period of creation goes through to its end. But when the duality is destroyed through the separation, the Word (or the ideal principle itself and what has become a real solidarity with him) is subordinated to the Spirit, and this /Spirit/, as the divine consciousness, lives in the same way in both principles; as the writing from Christ says: he must rule until all his enemies are under his feet. The last enemy, which is to be neutralized /aufgehoben/, is death (for death was the necessary separation, the good must die, in order to separate itself from evil, and for evil to separate itself from good). But when everything is subject to him /Geist/ Spirit/, then will the Son himself be also subject to that, which subjected him to everything, in order that God be in all and through all.

Further:

. . . the good should be elevated out of the darkness to actuality in order to live everlasting with God; but the evil should be separated from good in order to be eternally expelled into non-being. For this is the final intention of creation, that what cannot be for itself, be for itself, in that it is elevated out of the darkness (as an independent ground from God) into existence. Therefore the necessity of birth and death. God grants the ideas, which were in him without independent life, that state of self and non-being, that (in that they

¹Ibid., p. 405. This is my translation of: "Das Ende der Offenbarung ist daher die Ausstoßung des Bösen vom Guten, die Erklärung desselben als gänzlicher Unrealität. Dagegen wird das aus dem Grunde erhobene Gute zur ewigen Einheit mit dem ursprünglichen Guten verbunden; die aus der Finsternis ans Licht Gebornen schließen sich dem idealen Prinzip als Glieder seines Leibes an, in welchem jenes vollkommen verwirklicht und nun ganz persönliches Wesen ist. Solange die anfängliche Dualität dauerte, herrschte das schaffende Wort in dem Grunde, und diese Periode der Schöpfung geht durch alle hindurch bis zum Ende. Wenn aber die Dualität durch die Scheidung vernichtet ist, ordnet das Wort oder das ideale Prinzip sich und das mit ihm eins gewordene reale gemeinschaftlich dem Geist unter, und dieser, als das göttliche Bewußtsein, lebt auf gleiche Weise in beiden Prinzipien; wie die Schrift von Christus sagt: Er muß herrschen, bis daß er alle seine Feinde unter seine Füße lege. Der letzte Feind, der aufgehoben wird, ist der Tod (denn der Tod war nur notwendig zur Scheidung, das Gute muß sterben, um sich vom Bösen, und das Böse, um sich vom Guten zu scheiden). Wenn aber alles ihm

/the ideas/ will be called out into life) they as independent can again be in him. The ground in its freedom brings about separation and judgment . . . , and thereby the perfect actualization of God (emphasis added).¹

It is this character of "necessity" (not the necessity of a blind fatalism coming from pantheism, but the necessity of freedom as the condition of the possibility for the announcing of the divine unity) that led Hegel to criticize Schelling's system.

The life of God and divine perception may well be expressed as a game of love with itself. But this idea is degraded to devotionalism and to triteness when thereby fails earnestness, pain, patience and the work of the negative.²

Hegel adds:

The true is the whole. But the whole is only through its development a perfecting essence. What may be said of the absolute is that it is essentially result, that it is first at the end what it is in truth. . . . The beginning (the principle or the absolute) as it is expressed first and unmediated, is only the general. So little does it count for a zoology when I say all animals, so is it striking, that the words God, absolute,

untertan sein wird, alsdann wird auch der Sohn selbst untertan sein dem, der ihm alles untergetan hat, auf daß Gott sei Alles in Allem."

¹Ibid., p. 404. This is my translation of: ". . . das Gute soll aus der Finsternis zur Aktualität erhoben werden, um mit Gott unvergänglich zu leben; das Böse aber von dem Guten geschieden, um auf ewig in das Nichtsein verstoßen zu werden. Denn dies ist die Endabsicht der Schöpfung, daß, was nicht für sich sein könnte, für sich sei, indem es aus der Finsternis, als einem von Gott unabhängigen Grunde, ins Dasein erhoben wird. Daher die Notwendigkeit der Geburt und des Todes. Gott gibt die Ideen, die in ihm ohne selbständiges Leben waren, dahin in die Selbstheit und das Nichtseiende, damit, indem sie aus diesem ins Leben gerufen werden, sie als unabhängig existierende wieder in ihm seien. Der Grund wirkt also in seiner Freiheit die Scheidung und das Gericht . . . , und eben damit die vollkommene Aktualisierung Gottes."

²Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 22. This is my translation of: "Das Leben Gottes und das göttliche Erkennen mag also wohl als ein Spielen der Liebe mit sich selbst ausgesprochen werden; diese Idee sinkt zur Erbaulichkeit und selbst zur Fadheit herab, wenn der Ernst, der Schmerz, die Geduld und Arbeit des Negativen darin fehlt."

eternal, etc., cannot express what is contained within them. And only such words express in fact perception as unmediated. What more such a word is, is a mediation only in the transition to the sentence involving a change that must be canceled. But this is that which is repulsively disgusting, as if thereby absolute knowledge would be surrendered that more is to be made out of the mediation than only this: ¹it is nothing absolute and can not be the absolute.

It is in this sense that Hegel criticizes Schelling's system as an "empty" epistemological system in which we experience "a night in which all the cows are black."

To consider any life as it is in the absolute consists of nothing else than to say about it, of course, it is a speaking about something in the absolute (in the $A=A$), yet that doesn't exist, because in the absolute everything is one. This one knowledge is the naivete of empty knowledge, that everything in the absolute is the same (whether seen as a distinguishing and coming to fulfilment or as a setting in opposition seeking fulfilment and claimed knowledge)--or to propagate one's absolute as the night in which, as one carefully says, all cows are black.²

¹Ibid., pp. 23-24. This is my translation of: "Das Wahre ist das Ganze. Das Ganze aber ist nur das durch seine Entwicklung sich vollendende Wesen. Es ist von dem Absoluten zu sagen, daß es wesentlich Resultat, daß es erst am Ende das ist, was es in Wahrheit ist. . . . Der Anfang, das Prinzip oder das Absolute, wie es zuerst und unmittelbar ausgesprochen wird, ist nur das Allgemeine. So wenig, wenn ich sage: alle Tiere, dies Wort für eine Zoologie gelten kann, ebenso fällt es auf, daß die Worte des Göttlichen, Absoluten, Ewigen usw. das nicht aussprechen, was darin enthalten ist;--und nur solche Worte drücken in der Tat die Anschauung als das Unmittelbare aus. Was mehr ist als ein solches Wort, der Übergang auch nur zu einem Satze, enthält ein Anderswerden, das zurückgenommen werden muß, ist eine Vermittlung. Diese aber ist das, was prehorresziert wird, als ob dadurch, daß mehr aus ihr gemacht wird denn nur dies, daß sie nichts Absolutes und im Absoluten gar nichts sei, die absolute Erkenntnis aufgegeben wäre."

²Ibid., p. 19. This is my translation of: "Irgendein Dasein, wie es im Absoluten ist, betrachten, besteht hier in nichts anderem, als daß davon gesagt wird, es sei zwar jetzt von ihm gesprochen worden als von einem Etwas, im Absoluten, dem $A=A$, jedoch gebe es dergleichen gar nicht, sondern darin sei alles eins. Dies Eine Wissen, daß im Absoluten Alles gleich ist, der unterscheidenden

This becomes a key to Hegel's assertion: "According to my understanding . . . everything depends upon truth not as substance, but to perceive and express truth so much more as subject."¹ The "result" or "end" for Hegel, which includes all of the negativity, pain, and suffering, is not a simple return to the beginning (i.e., to a pure Absolute); it is the movement to subjectivity (a form of holding all of the complexity in the simple unity of the concept).

Heidegger, on the other hand, is as critical of Hegel as he is of Schelling, though he defends Schelling from Hegel's criticism to the extent that it is unfair to Schelling to reduce his system to one element.² Heidegger suggests, however, that the system building of philosophy "fails," because it begins with an answer rather than a question:

It will now be prudent to determine in what respect Hegel's recognizable judgment about this essay /Schelling's/ is false: In that it /the essay/ only concerned itself with a special question /"The special question of freedom as the ruling middlepoint of the system."/: Were we to understand the essay from the very beginning and constnatly in the light and intention of the fundamental question of philosophy, the question of Being /Sein/, then we grasp straight from it, why Schelling's philosophy despite all must founder, i.e., in the way it must founder, as it founders. Every philosophy

und erfüllten oder Erfüllung suchenden und fordernden Erkenntnis entgegensetzen,--oder sein Absolutes für die Nacht auszugeben, worin, wie man zu sagen pflegt, alle Kühe schwarz sind, ist die Naivität der Leere an Erkenntnis."

¹Ibid., p. 29. This is my translation of: "Es kommt nach meiner Einsicht, . . . alles darauf an, das Wahre nicht als Substanz, sondern eben so sehr als Subjekt aufzufassen und auszudrücken."

²See Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 15.

founders, and that belongs to their concept. The general understanding follows freely: it does no one good to philosophize, because that only serves which is tangible. Philosophy concludes on the contrary that there is an indestructible necessity to philosophy. This is not in the opinion that someday this denial could be overcome and philosophy would be "complete." Philosophy will be consummated always where its end is and remains what its beginning is, the question. Only in that philosophy truly stays with the question can it bring what is worthy of question into sight. In that she accomplishes that, to open that which is worthy of question, does it bring about the fulfilling of the revelation which surmounts and passes over from the ground out of nothing and the negation, the fulfilling of the revelation of Being /Seyn/. Being /Seyn/ is the aether that humanity breathes. Without such aether he sinks to a simple cow and his entire activity to simple cattle-breeding.

Heidegger wrote a book on Schelling not simply to suggest that his system (as does every system and philosophical enterprise)

¹Ibid., pp. 117-118. This is my translation of: "Es wird jetzt auch einsichtig, inwiefern Hegels zwar anerkennendes Urteil über diese Abhandlung /Schelling's/ ein Fehlurteil ist: daß sie nur eine Sonderfrage behandle /Die Sonderfrage nach der Freiheit als der herrschende Mittelpunkt des Systems./! Verstehen wir sie aber von Anfang an und ständig im Lichte und in der Absicht der Grundfrage der Philosophie nach dem Seyn, dann begreifen wir gerade von ihr aus, nach vorn blickend, warum Schelling trotz allem mit seiner Philosophie scheitern mußte, d.h. in der Weise scheitern mußte, wie er scheiterte; denn jede Philosophie scheitert, das gehört zu ihrem Begriff. Der gemeine Verstand freilich folgert daraus: Also lohnt es sich nicht zu philosophieren, weil ihm ja nur das als etwas gilt, was greifbar sich lohnt. Der Philosoph folgert umgekehrt daraus die unzerstörbare Notwendigkeit der Philosophie, und dieses nicht in der Meinung, als könnte eines Tages doch dieses Versagen überwunden und die Philosophie 'fertig' gemacht werden. Vollendet ist die Philosophie immer dann, wenn ihr Ende das wird und bleibt, was ihr Anfang ist, die Frage. Denn nur indem die Philosophie wahrhaft im Fragen stehen bleibt, zwingt sie das Frag-würdige in den Blick; indem sie aber dieses, das höchst Frag-würdigste, eröffnet, wirkt sie mit am Vollzug der Offenbarkeit dessen, was von Grund aus das Nichts und das Nichtigste überwindet und übersteigt, am Vollzug der Offenbarkeit des Seyns. Das Seyn ist das Würdigste, weil es den höchsten Rang vor allem Seienden und in allem Seienden und für alles Seiende behauptet. Das Seyn ist der Aether, in dem der Mensch atmet ohne welchen Aether er zum bloßen Vieh und sein ganzes Tun zur bloßen Viehzüchtung herabfällt."

"fails."¹ He engages Schelling's discussion, because Schelling
1) sees the task of philosophy to think the fugue of Being in
beings,² and 2) while Schelling sees that freedom "is one of the
essential ingredients" in that philosophical reflection:

. . . freedom is here considered not as the possession
of the human, but in reverse: the human is at most the
possession of freedom. Freedom is the all encompassing,
thorough essence in whose restoration the human first
becomes human. That says: the essence of the human is
grounded in freedom. Freedom itself, however, is, in
terms of all human Being /Seyn/, a transcending destiny
of true/intrinsic Being /Seyn/. Insofar the human is
human, this destiny of Being /Seyn/ must play a part,
and the human is insofar as it fulfils this participa-
tion in freedom. (Sentence to be born in mind: Free-
dom is not the possession of the human, but the human
is the possession of freedom.)³

A third issue that arises in Heidegger's analysis of Schelling's
text is a suggestion of the relationship between philosophy and
theology as that is understood by Heidegger in contrast to the
dogmatic understanding of theology he articulated in his famous
essay "Phänomenologie und Theologie:"⁴

¹See Ibid., p. 194.

²See Ibid., pp. 34 and 47.

³Ibid., p. 11. This is my translation of: ". . . hier gilt
die Freiheit nicht als Eigenschaft des Menschen, sondern um-gekehrt:
Der Mensch gilt allenfalls als Eigentum der Freiheit. Freiheit ist
das umgreifende und durchgreifende Wesen, in das zurückversetzt der
Mensch erst Mensch wird. Das will sagen: Das Wesen des Menschen
gründet in der Freiheit. Die Freiheit selbst aber ist eine alles
menschliche Seyn überragende Bestimmung des eigentlichen Seyns
überhaupt. Sofern der Mensch als Mensch ist, muß er an dieser
Bestimmung des Seyns teilhaben, und der Mensch ist, soweit er diese
Teilhabe an der Freiheit vollzieht. (Merksatz: Freiheit nicht
Eigenschaft des Menschen, sondern: Mensch Eigentum der Freiheit.)"

⁴Martin Heidegger, "Phänomenologie und Theologie" in Weg-
marken, pp. 45-77.

Every philosophy is theology in the most original and essential sense in that what is asked about is the understanding of being /das Seienden/ in its totality in terms of the ground of Being /des Seyns/ and this ground is named God. . . . One is never permitted to appraise the theology in philosophy according to some dogmatic church theology, i.e., one is definitely not permitted to suggest that philosophical theology is an enlightened, reasonable form of a church theology.

This is not the place to pursue Heidegger's understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology. I make reference to this element in his study of Schelling only to cryptically suggest that his essay "Phänomenologie und Theologie" is not his "last" word concerning this relationship, and his suggestion here is helpful for one seeking to understand the philosophical metaphor of the Being-of beings as the meaning of God. I must quickly add that Heidegger does not establish for us today, given our need(s) and our quest for understanding, what we must understand to be the relationship between philosophy and theology. What is disclosive and helpful for our understanding remains the criterion for making this judgment.

That Heidegger suggests that Schelling's system and German Idealism "fails," however, should not be understood as a simple rejection of an attempt (or "path") in philosophy. He repeats often that "the ground/foundation of the system remains dark/in darkness."²

¹Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 61. This is my translation of the following material: "Jede Philosophie ist Theologie in dem ursprünglichen und wesentlichen Sinne, daß das Begreifen ($\lambda\delta\gamma\omicron\sigma$) des Seienden im Ganzen nach dem Grunde des Seyns fragt und dieser Grund ($\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\sigma$), Gott, genannt wird. . . . Man darf die in der Philosophie liegende Theologie aber niemals abschätzen nach irgendeiner dogmatisch-kirchlichen, d.h. man darf insbesondere nicht meinen, die philosophische Theologie sei nur die vernunftmäßige aufklärerische Form einer kirchlichen."

²See, for example, Ibid., pp. 50 and 53.

The ground of ideas and their unity, i.e., the ground of the system, is dark. The path to the system is not secured. The truth of the system is questionable. Yet the summons of the system is not uncompanionable.¹

The ground/foundation remains, will remain, dark or "concealed." The task is not the turning away from the unground that grounds; it is to seek/to point to that which is concealed in what is revealed.

Schelling ends his work on human freedom suggesting: "The time of simple historical faith is past, when the possibility of unmediated knowledge is given. We have an older revelation than any written, nature."² Heidegger comments:

This taking of everything into account is the essence of 'historicism' / "Historicism makes present the past and explains it by means of what happened before this past."³; making this fit is the essence of 'actualism.' / "Actualism is the other side of historicism. . . . It

¹ Ibid., pp. 53-54. This is my translation of: "Der Grund der Ideen und ihrer Einheit, d.h. der Grund des Systems ist dunkel. Der Weg zum System ist nicht gesichert. Die Wahrheit des Systems ist fraglich. Und doch--die Forderung des Systems ist unumgänglich."

² Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, pp. 415-416. This is my translation of: "Die Zeit des bloß historischen Glaubens ist vorbei, wenn die Möglichkeit unmittelbarer Erkenntnis gegeben ist. Wir haben eine ältere Offenbarung als jede geschriebene, die Natur."

³ Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, p. 204: "Der Historismus vergegenwärtigt das Vergangene und erklärt es aus dem Vorvergangenen."

miscalculates the past out of a value of the present."¹⁷
Both belong together. They are the nearly open, nearly
concealed enemy of resolving thinking.

If there is no unmediated knowledge, we are told, in addition,
that neither have we "immediate knowledge:"

In fact when the historical consideration of German
Idealism is sought, our thought is no historical orien-
tation; it is also no 'unmediated knowledge' according
to the type of metaphysics in German Idealism. The
thinking that has become necessary is a historical
/geschichtliches/ thinking.³

Thinking that is "geschichtliches" rather than "historisch" is not
an "immediate knowing," but a mediating encounter of revealing and
concealing not as something "nearly open" or "nearly concealed,"
but a revealing and concealing that discloses itself in its full-
ness. It attempts to think freedom, for example, at a most radical
level. Not in terms of explanation (either as "historicism" or
"actualism"), but in terms of the "essential" character of the Being-
of beings and Dasein. What is the meaning of freedom for Heidegger's
path of thought? Does it provide an insight into freedom as dis-
cussed by Schelling as human freedom to good and evil?

¹ Ibid., p. 204: "Der Aktualismus ist die Kehrseite des Hi-
storismus. . . . Er verrechnet das Vergangene auf einen Gegenwarts-
wert."

² Ibid., p. 203: This is my translation of: "Jenes Zusammen-
rechnen ist das Wesen des 'Historismus', dieses Gemäßmachen ist das
Wesen des 'Aktualismus'. Beide gehören zusammen. Sie sind die bald
offenen, bald versteckten Feinde des entscheidenden Denkens."

³ Ibid., p. 204. This is my translation of: "In der Tat,
unser Denken ist, wenn es die geschichtliche Besinnung auf den
deutschen Idealismus versucht, keine historische Orientierung; es
ist aber auch keine 'unmittelbare Erkenntnis' nach der Art der
Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus. Das notwendig gewordene Denken
ist ein geschichtliches Denken." This reminds us of Gadamer's claim
for Wirkungsgeschichte. See above, Chapter I, pp. 22-24.

Heidegger on Freedom

"Freedom is . . . not simply a capacity among others, but it is the capacity of all possible capacities."¹

The definition of this essence . . . , i.e., the primordially free in freedom, is this comprehending beyond itself as an apprehending of itself, that comes out of the originating essence of human being /des Menschseins/.²

Heidegger attempts to think foundation, truth, and freedom as an essential belonging together. Freedom brings us to the core of the "fugue of Being," and is, therefore, to be thought of not as a possession of humanity--rather, humanity is a possession of freedom.³

The human does not 'possess' freedom as attribute, but at best in reverse: freedom, the ex-istent, disclosing Da-sein, possesses the human, and does so so primordially, that only it /freedom/ grants to humanity that all historical, first establishing and inventorying relation to being /Seienden/ in totality as such.

¹Ibid., p. 186. This is my translation of: "Die Freiheit ist . . . nicht irgendein Vermögen unter andern, sondern sie ist das Vermögen aller möglichen Vermögen."

²Ibid., p. 186. This is my translation of: "Die Bestimmung des eigenen Wesens . . . , d.h. das ursprünglichste Freie in der Freiheit, ist jenes Über-sich-hinweggreifen als Sich-selbst-ergreifen, das aus dem anfänglichen Wesen des Menschseins herkommt."

³See above, p. 285.

⁴Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" in Wegmarken, p. 187. This is my translation of: "Der Mensch 'besitzt' die Freiheit nicht als Eigenschaft, sondern höchstens gilt das Umgekehrte: die Freiheit, das ek-sistente, entbergende Da-sein besitzt den Menschen und das so ursprünglich, daß einzig sie einem Menschentum den alle Geschichte erst begründenden und auszeichnenden Bezug zu einem Seienden im Ganzen als einen solchen gewährt."

This strikes us in its strangeness, because Heidegger suggests that freedom is above all not a capacity to choose.¹ We are to engage the question of freedom at another level than that achieved by Schelling (even though Schelling, by means of his system as a thinking the fugue of Being understands humanity, as well, as a possession of freedom).

In contrast to Schelling, Heidegger speaks of individuality (Selbstheit) not in terms of the freedom to choose good and evil (i.e., as a human capacity to strive for the self effecting most radically the separation of the fundamental principles of ground and existence/darkness and light), rather, as suggested above in the discussion of the "priority" of Dasein as both "ontic" and "ontological:" "The selfness of the all spontaneous and already underlying self rests . . . in transcendence."² He adds immediately:

The throwing/covering over, allowing world to do as it pleases, is freedom. . . . Freedom as transcendence is, however, not only a 'type' of ground, but in fact, is primordial ground. Freedom is freedom to ground.

¹See Ibid., p. 186: "Freiheit ist nicht nur das, was der gemeine Verstand gern unter diesem Namen umlaufen läßt: das zuweilen auftauchende Belieben, in der Wahl nach dieser oder jener Seite auszuschlagen. Freiheit ist nicht die Ungebundenheit des Tun- und Nicht-tunkönnens."

²Heidegger, "Vom Wesen des Grundes," p. 162. This is my translation of: "Die Selbstheit des aller Spontaneität schon zugrunde liegenden Selbst liegt . . . in der Transzendenz."

³Ibid., p. 162. This is my translation of: "Das entwerfend-überwerfende Waltenlassen von Welt ist die Freiheit. . . . Die Freiheit als Transzendenz ist jedoch nicht nur eine eigene 'Art' von Grund, sondern der Ursprung von Grund überhaupt. Freiheit ist Freiheit zum Grunde."

He proceeds to discuss three meanings of "establishing"/"founding" (Grund): 1) as "world sketching, projecting of possibility;" 2) as "predilection/prepossession" in the midst of beings (thrownness); and 3) as an understanding of Being as ontological truth making possible the revealing of beings.¹ He concludes this discussion saying:

Accordingly, ground suggests: possibility, base, documentary evidence. The ground of transcendence strewn in the threefold brings about for the first time the primordial uniting as a whole, in which always a Dasein is able to exist. Freedom is in this threefold manner freedom to ground."²

Here we encounter a "deeper level" to freedom that is the presupposition of freedom understood as a choosing.

The ground has its non-essence, because it arises in finite freedom. It is not able to avoid this out of which it arises. The transcending arising ground gives itself back to freedom itself, and will be itself, as primordial, ground. Freedom is the ground of ground. . . . The being as ground of freedom does not have . . . the character of being one of the ways of establishing, but is determined as the establishing unity of the transcendental strewnness of establishing. As this ground, freedom is the abyss /der Ab-grund/ of Dasein. That doesn't suggest that the one free concealing is without ground, but freedom in its essence as transcendence presents Dasein as a being able to be /Sein-können/ in possibilities which are broken open before it in unlimited choice, i.e., in its fate.

But Dasein must transcend itself in its world sketching of being /Seienden/, in order to be able to understand itself above all as abyss out of this elevation. . . . The breaking out of the abyss in the grounding transcendence is much more the primordial

¹See Ibid., pp. 162-169.

²Ibid., p. 168. This is my translation of: "Demnach besagt Grund: Möglichkeit, Boden, Ausweis. Das dreifach gestreute Gründen der Transzendenz erwirkt ursprünglich einigend erst das Ganze, in dem je ein Dasein soll existieren können. Freiheit ist in dieser dreifachen Weise Freiheit zum Grunde."

moving, which freedom accomplishes with us and thereby "gives us understanding," i.e., as the primordial world is given, the more primordially it is grounded, it touches all the more simply the core of Dasein--its self in engagement.

. . . Dasein is thrown . . . as a free being able to be within being /Seiende/. That it is the possibility to be a self, and its freedom is always this factual conforming; and, that transcendence as primordial event produces itself, this transcendence does not stand under the power of this freedom to be a self. Such powerlessness (thrownness) is not first the consequence of the breaking in of being /Seienden/ upon Dasein, but this powerlessness determines its Being /Sein/ as such. All world sketching is therefore thrown.

. . . The essence of Dasein's finitude reveals itself in transcendence as the freedom to ground.¹

¹Ibid., pp. 171-173. This is my translation of: "Der Grund hat sein Un-wesen, weil er der endlichen Freiheit entspringt. Diese selbst kann sich dem, was ihr so entspringt, nicht entziehen. Der transzendierend entspringende Grund legt sich auf die Freiheit selbst zurück, und sie wird als Ursprung selbst zum 'Grund'. Die Freiheit ist der Grund des Grundes. . . . Das Grundsein der Freiheit hat nicht . . . den Charakter einer der Weisen des Gründens, sondern bestimmt sich als die gründende Einheit der transzendentalen Streuung des Gründens. Als dieser Grund aber ist die Freiheit der Ab-grund des Daseins. Nicht als sei die einzelne freie Verhaltung grundlos, sondern die Freiheit stellt in ihrem Wesen als Transzendenz das Dasein als Seinkönnen in Möglichkeiten, die vor seiner endlichen Wahl, d.h. in seinem Schicksal, aufklaffen.

Aber das Dasein muß im weltentwerfenden Überstieg des Seienden sich selbst übersteigen, um sich aus dieser Erhöhung allererst als Abgrund verstehen zu können. . . . Das Aufbrechen des Abgrundes in der gründenden Transzendenz ist vielmehr die Urbewegung, die die Freiheit mit uns selbst vollzieht und uns damit 'zu verstehen gibt', d.h. als ursprünglichen Weltgehalt vorgibt, daß dieser, je ursprünglicher er gegründet wird, um so einfacher das Herz des Daseins, seine Selbstheit im Handeln trifft.

. . . Das Dasein ist . . . als freies Seinkönnen unter das Seiende geworfen. Daß es der Möglichkeit nach ein Selbst und dieses faktisch je entsprechend seiner Freiheit ist, daß die Transzendenz als Urgeschehen sich zeitigt, steht nicht in der Macht dieser Freiheit selbst. Solche Ohnmacht (Geworfenheit) aber ist nicht erst das Ergebnis des Eindringens von Seiendem auf das Dasein, sondern sie bestimmt dessen Sein als solches. Aller Weltentwurf ist daher geworfener.

. . . Das Wesen der Endlichkeit des Daseins enthüllt sich aber in der Transzendenz als der Freiheit zum Grunde."

A contrast is here set before us between freedom and powerlessness. Both terms are now shifted to a new "level" of understanding. Freedom is now to be thought not in terms of a human capacity, but in terms of the primordial breaking open into the manifest that is Dasein's thrownness. Only because of this original transcending, only because of freedom, is Dasein able to transcend to world to engage in its "world sketching" projects. Thrownness sets before Dasein its being able to be, i.e., freedom sets before Dasein its possibilities as a primordial breaking open to world. Hence, powerlessness is discussed in terms of our relationship to freedom as thrownness. Our powerlessness occurs not because of an obtrusive breaking in upon us of the beings /Seienden/ of world. On the contrary, world is possibility. Our powerlessness occurs in relationship to the conditions of the possibility that Dasein is world, i.e., in terms of our freedom. Freedom is not something we choose; freedom chooses us.

What is the relationship between world, truth and freedom? Within a year of having written the essay "Vom Wesen des Grundes," Heidegger wrote another entitled "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit." An easily overlooked theme in this essay on the essence of truth is a radical thinking of the meaning of freedom. It is possible in turning to this latter essay to obtain a clearer understanding of freedom as "freedom to ground." In our presentation thus far, we have found the claim that freedom is transcendence in the sense discussed above in clarifying the ontological difference, i.e., Dasein is a transcending to/in world. We have encountered the

claim, as well, that freedom is the ground/foundation of the establishing as the "prior" unity of the three meanings of possibility, "base," and "documentary evidence"/"substance." As such, freedom is spoken of as the "abyss" of Dasein, i.e., the No-thing as transcendence enabling Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Dasein, we are told, is thrown Being-in-the-world. The primordial possibility of this thrownness is freedom as transcendence. Freedom is thought here and in the Essay "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" as the coming to be of thrownness, which we read is what places Dasein as transcendence in the encounter with being (Seiende).

In turning to this essay "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit," a further clarification of the relationship between freedom and thrownness is sought. We are told, freedom is truth,¹ thought as a primordial revealing/concealing of the Being-of beings. The discussion here will attempt to follow the structure of Heidegger's essay: 1) a treatment of the meaning of truth as related to the statement; 2) a discussion of representation as the presupposition of truth as statement; 3) pointing to the clearing as the presupposition of representation; 4) freedom as the enabling of the emergence in/with the clearing; 5) freedom/truth as revealing of what is; 6) un-truth as a concealing rather than falsehood; and 7) error as necessity rather than freedom.

1) Heidegger begins the discussion with the question: what do we "usually" mean when we speak of truth? Truth in everydayness means a speaking and judging about something. We say that

¹See Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit," p. 183: "Das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Freiheit."

this is a gold piece rather than fake gold. Truth is, however, in this sense confusing, because it is clear that truth is not here meant as "the reality itself." Both a piece of "real" gold and "fake" gold can be actually/really there. The truth or falsehood is a function of the agreement or non-agreement between the sentence and the thing meant. Hence, Heidegger says:

A statement is true when what it means and says corresponds with the thing about which it speaks. . . .

/H/ere we say: it is correct. But the correctness is not the thing but the sentence.

Truth, whether as a true thing or a true sentence, is that which is correct, correctness. To be sure and truth means here correctness, and in a double sense: on the one hand the agreement of a thing with what it was before and, on the other, the agreement of the statement meant with the thing.

This double character of correctness reveals the traditional essential understanding of truth: *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*. That can mean: Truth is the approximation of the thing to knowledge. But it can also mean: Truth is the approximation of knowledge to the thing. . . . Both essential concepts of *veritas* mean persistently an orientation . . . and thinking of truth as correctness.

¹Ibid., pp. 177-178. This is my translation of: "Eine Aussage ist wahr, wenn das, was sie meint und sagt, übereinstimmt mit der Sache, worüber sie aussagt. . . . hier sagen wir: es stimmt. Jetzt aber stimmt nicht die Sache, sondern der Satz.

Das Wahre, sei es eine wahre Sache oder ein wahrer Satz, ist das, was stimmt, das Stimmende. Wahrsein und Wahrheit bedeuten hier Stimmen, und zwar in der gedoppelten Weise: einmal die Einstimmigkeit einer Sache mit dem über sie Vorgemeinten und zum andern die Übereinstimmung des in der Aussage Gemeinten mit der Sache.

Diesen Doppelcharakter des Stimmens bringt die überlieferte Wesensumgrenzung der Wahrheit zum Vorschein: *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*. Das kann bedeuten: Wahrheit ist die Angleichung der Sache an die Erkenntnis. Es kann aber auch sagen: Wahrheit ist die Angleichung der Erkenntnis an die Sache. . . . Beide Wesensbegriffe der *veritas* meinen stets ein Sichrichten nach . . . und denken somit die Wahrheit als Richtigkeit."

The question then presents itself: what/how is this agreement/ approximation between the statement and the thing referred to? It is certainly not a "material" agreement, e.g., the statement is not itself the piece of gold. We have here a distinct form of relationship presenting itself in the statement: this relationship is a representation/representing.

The statement about the piece of gold refers . . . to this thing, in which it re-presents and speaks of the represented, as it is disposed in terms of the ever governing perspective/view. The representing statement says of what it speaks as much of the represented thing as, it is as this. The 'as much as' touches both the re-presentation and what it re-presents.¹

2) What is the meaning of representation? How is something represented?

Re-presenting means here (given the closing out of all "psychological" and "consciousness theory" presuppositions) the allowing to stand over against of the thing as object. The allowing to stand over against must, as so situated, traverse an openness to what is opposite, and still thereby remain as the thing and show itself as established.²

The "how" of representation, then, is an allowing/letting of an object stand over-against, hence, a showing of this standing over-against.

¹Ibid., p. 181. This is my translation of: "Die Aussage über das Geldstück bezieht 'sich' . . . auf dieses Ding, indem sie es vor-stellt und vom Vor-gestellten sagt, wie es mit ihm nach der je leitenden Hinsicht bestellt sei. Die vorstellende Aussage sagt ihr Gesagtes so vom vorgestellten Ding, wie es als dieses ist. Das 'so--wie' betrifft das Vorstellen und sein Vor-gestelltes."

²Ibid., p. 181. This is my translation of: "Vor-stellen bedeutet hier, unter Ausschaltung aller 'psychologischen' und 'be-wußtseinstheoretischen' Vormeinungen, das Entgegenstehenlassen des Dinges als Gegenstand. Das Entgegenstehende muß als das so Ge-stellte ein offenes Entgegen durchmessen und dabei doch in sich als das Ding stehenbleiben und als ein Ständiges sich zeigen."

3) In the letting of an object stand over-against, there is a presupposition announced in the event: the presupposition of a clearing/an opening "between" the representer and the represented.

This appearing of the thing in the traversing to an opposite is accomplished within an opening. This openness is not first created by the re-presentation, but is received and taken up as a sphere of relation. The relationship of the representing statement to the thing is the achievement of the relationship that occurs primordially and at any given time as a procedure of a leap. All relating has its distinctiveness that it stands in the open, always concerns itself with a manifesting. The so, and in the strictest sense only, manifesting was experienced early in Western thought as "the present" and for a long time named "being" /das Seiende¹.

It is this clearing/opening "between" that allows for the thing/object to be represented in the statement which is then taken to be true or false.

To that end it occurs only when being /das Seiende¹ presents its own case in the representing statement, so that it itself, under the command of an instruction, says the being /das Seiende¹ as it is. In that the statement follows such an instruction, it is concerned with the being /das Seiende¹. The then designated speaking is correct (true). The so stated is correct (true).²

¹Ibid., pp. 181-182. This is my translation of: "Dieses Erscheinen des Dinges im Durchmessen eines Entgegen vollzieht sich innerhalb eines Offenen, dessen Offenheit vom Vorstellen nicht erst geschaffen, sondern je nur als ein Bezugsbereich bezogen und übernommen wird. Die Beziehung des vorstellenden Aussagens auf das Ding ist der Vollzug jenes Verhältnisses, das sich ursprünglich und jeweils als ein Verhalten zum Schwingen bringt. Alles Verhalten aber hat seine Auszeichnung darin, daß es, im Offenen stehend, je an ein Offenbares als ein solches sich hält. Das so und im strengen Sinne allein Offenbare wird frühzeitig im abendländischen Denken als 'das Anwesende' erfahren und seit langem 'das Seiende' genannt."

²Ibid., pp. 182. This is my translation of: "Dazu kommt es nur wenn das Seiende selbst vorstellig wird beim vorstellenden Aussagen, so daß dieses sich einer Weisung unterstellt, das Seiende

Heidegger then observes that, since representation presupposes the clearing/opening in order for the truth of the thing to be disclosed, then this clearing/opening must be a more primordial essence of truth than the truth related to the statement:

If . . . only through this standing in the open of relating the correctness (truth) of the statement is made possible, then that which first makes possible correctness must count with more primordial right as the essence of truth.

Thereby the traditional and exclusive attribution to the sentence as the only essential place of truth is brought down. Truth is not primordially at home in the sentence. At the same time the question is lited up concerning the ground of the inner possibility of a constantly open and already given standard gauge of being related to, whose possibility alone provides the considering of the correctness of the sentence (when at all to realize the essence of truth).

4) We are brought to the point where we must ask again: what is the essence of truth? What is "it" that makes possible the standing-over-against in the clearing/opening as the condition of the possibility for a statement to be correct (true)? Curiously, we encounter at this point "the essence of freedom:"

so--wie es ist, zu sagen. Indem das Aussagen solcher Weisung folgt, richtet es sich nach dem Seienden. Das dergestalt sich anweisende Sagen ist richtig (wahr). Das so Gesagte ist das Richtige (Wahre)."

¹Ibid., pp. 182-183. This is my translation of: "Wenn . . . nur durch diese Offenständigkeit des Verhaltens die Richtigkeit (Wahrheit) der Aussage möglich wird, dann muß das, was die Richtigkeit erst ermöglicht, mit ursprünglicherem Recht als das Wesen der Wahrheit gelten.

Damit fällt die herkömmliche und ausschließliche Zuweisung der Wahrheit an die Aussage als ihren einzigen Wesensort dahin. Wahrheit ist nicht ursprünglich im Satz beheimatet. Zugleich aber erhebt sich die Frage nach dem Grunde der inneren Möglichkeit des offenständigen und ein Rechtmaß vorgegeben Verhaltens, welche Möglichkeit allein der Satzrichtigkeit das Ansehen leiht, überhaupt das Wesen der Wahrheit zu erfüllen."

The free giving for a binding correctness is only possible as the being free to the manifestation of an openness. Such being free points to the till now ungrasped essence of freedom. The constant open of the being related to, as the inner condition of the possibility of correctness, is grounded in freedom. The essence of truth is freedom.¹

Heidegger admits that "The sentence, the essence of truth (the correctness of the statement) is freedom, must . . . appear strange."² What is this essence of freedom?

5) Freedom is thought as the letting-be of the thing through (by means of) the opening/clearing. Freedom is a primordial "letting-be."

Freedom is to be established above all as freedom for the manifesting of the open. How is this essence of freedom to be thought? The manifesting, which a representing statement approximates as correct, is the actual open being /Seiende/ in a constant open of being related to. The freedom to manifest an open allows the actual being /Seiende/ to be the being /Seiende/ that it is. Freedom shows itself now as the letting be of a being /Seiende/.³

¹ Ibid., p. 183. This is my translation of: "Das Sich-freigeben für eine bindende Richte ist nur möglich als Freisein zum Offenbaren eines Offenen. Solches Freisein zeigt auf das bisher unbegriffene Wesen der Freiheit. Die Offenständigkeit des Verhaltens als innere Ermöglichung der Richtigkeit gründet in der Freiheit. Das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Freiheit."

² Ibid., p. 184. This is my translation of: "Der Satz, das Wesen der Wahrheit (Richtigkeit der Aussage) sei die Freiheit, muß . . . befremden."

³ Ibid., p. 185. This is my translation of: "Die Freiheit wurde zunächst als Freiheit für das Offenbare eines Offenen bestimmt. Wie ist dieses Wesen der Freiheit zu denken? Das Offenbare, dem sich ein vorstellendes Aussagen als richtiges angleicht, ist das jeweils in einem offenständigen Verhalten offene Seiende. Die Freiheit zum Offenbaren eines Offenen läßt das jeweilige Seiende das Seiende sein, das es ist. Freiheit enthüllt sich jetzt als das Sein-lassen von Seiendem."

It is quickly added, however, that this "letting-be" is not to be thought as an "indifference" or an "abstaining" from involvement with "things."¹

To let be--namely the being as it is--means, to insert one's self into the open and its openness, in which each being /Seiende/ comes to stand, that each "as if" brings with it. This open was conceived at the beginning of the Western tradition as τὰ ἀληθῆα, the uncovering. . . . To allow to be, i.e., freedom, is in itself setting forth, ex-istence. The essence of freedom in terms of a looking at the essence of truth shows itself as the₂ setting forth into the unveiling of being /Seiende/.

Rather than an indifference or an abstaining, freedom is here thought as the primordial condition of the possibility for an encounter. This is clearly distinct from the general understanding of freedom as a "choosing."

Freedom is not only what common understanding takes it to be: the occasionally surfacing discretion sprouting in the choice for this or that side. Freedom is not the unrestrainedness of being able or not able to do something. Freedom is also not foremost readiness for a challenge and inevitable (and thereby somehow being /Seiende/). Freedom is before all of this (before "negative" and "positive" freedom) as the entering into the unveiling of being /Seiende/ itself. The unveiling itself is an enduring in ex-isting entering into (by means of the openness of the open), i.e., the "there" /Da/ is what it is.

¹See Ibid., p. 185.

²Ibid., p. 186. This is my translation of: "Seinlassen--das Seiende nämlich als das Seiende, das es ist--bedeutet, sich einlassen auf das Offene und dessen Offenheit, in die jegliches Seiende hereinsteht, das jene gleichsam mit sich bringt. Dieses Offene hat das abendländische Denken in seinem Anfang begriffen als τὰ ἀληθῆα, das Unverborgene. . . . Das Sein-lassen, d.h. die Freiheit ist in sich aus-setzend, ek-sistent. Das auf das Wesen der Wahrheit hin erblickte Wesen der Freiheit zeigt sich als die Aussetzung in die Entborgenheit des Seienden."

In Da-Sein is kept open humanity's long ungrounded essential ground,¹ out of which it is possible to exist (emphasis added).

Freedom is to be thought as the primordial breaking open of the clearing (i.e., as the essence of truth) that constitutes the "thereness" of Da-sein.

Freedom as letting be of being /Seiende/ fulfils and achieves the essence of truth in the sense of the unveiling of being /Seiende/. "Truth" is no feature of a correct sentence, that through a human "subject" says something about an "object," and then somewhere, one knows not in what region, is valid. Truth is the unveiling² of being /Seiende/ through the being of an openness.

Heidegger then adds that, precisely because this primordial breaking open of the clearing is freedom, there occurs a concealing and a substitution that can lead to a mere appearance rather than an enduring in truth.³ The possibility of un-truth is a concomitant

¹Ibid., p. 186. This is my translation of: "Freiheit ist nicht nur das, was der gemeine Verstand gern unter diesem Namen umlaufen läßt: das zuweilen auftauchende Belieben, in der Wahl nach dieser oder jener Seite auszuschlagen. Freiheit ist nicht die Ungebundenheit des Tun- und Nicht-tunkönnens. Freiheit ist aber auch nicht erst die Bereitschaft für ein Gefordertes und Notwendiges (und so irgendwie Seiendes). Die Freiheit ist alldem (der 'negativen' und 'positiven' Freiheit) zuvor die Eingelassenheit in die Entbergung des Seienden als eines solchen. Die Entborgenheit selbst wird verwahrt in dem ek-sistenten Sich-einlassen, durch das die Offenheit des Offenen, d.h. das 'Da' ist, was es ist.

Im Da-sein wird dem Menschen der langehin ungegründete Wesensgrund aufbehalten, aus dem er zu ek-sistieren vermag."

²Ibid., p. 188. This is my translation of: "Freiheit als das Sein-lassen des Seienden erfüllt und vollzieht das Wesen der Wahrheit im Sinne der Entbergung von Seiendem. Die 'Wahrheit' ist kein Merkmal des richtigen Satzes, der durch ein menschliches 'Subjekt' von einem 'Objekt' ausgesagt wird und dann irgendwo, man weiß nicht in welchem Bereich, 'gilt', sondern die Wahrheit ist die Entbergung des Seienden, durch die eine Offenheit west."

³See Ibid., p. 188.

possibility of the revealing of truth. The essence of truth is a revealing/concealing.

Because . . . truth in its essence is freedom, therefore historical man within the letting be of being /Seiende/ cannot itself let be the being /Seiende/ that it is and how it is. Being /Seiende/ is then covered over and disguised. Appearance comes to power. In it prospers the non-essential truth. Untruth must come . . . out of the essence of truth. Only because truth and untruth in their essence are not meaningless, but belong together, can in any way a true sentence in the sharpness of its opposite come forth as a corresponding untrue sentence. . . . When the essence of truth is not exhausted in the correctness of the sentence, then untruth can also not be equal to the incorrectness of judgment.

6) What is the meaning of un-truth? Un-truth, we are told, is not to be confused with error or falsehood. If the essence of truth/freedom is to be thought as a revealing or opening that enables the dis-closing of the realm of things as an over-against in the clearing that is the thereness of the Being-of beings (Dasein), then un-truth is a concealing that is the free possibility when Dasein merely engages the things/essents of its world rather than giving attention to the essence of freedom/truth that as transcendence is the condition of the possibility that it is world.

¹Ibid., pp. 188-189. This is my translation of: "Weil . . . die Wahrheit im Wesen Freiheit ist, deshalb kann der geschichtliche Mensch im Seinlassen des Seienden das Seiende auch nicht das Seiende sein lassen, das es ist und wie es ist. Das Seiende wird dann verdeckt und verstellt. Der Schein kommt zur Macht. In ihr gelangt das Unwesen der Wahrheit zum Vorschein. . . . Die Unwahrheit muß . . . aus dem Wesen der Wahrheit kommen. Nur weil Wahrheit und Unwahrheit im Wesen sich nicht gleichgültig sind, sondern zusammengehören, kann überhaupt ein wahrer Satz in die Schärfe des Gegenteils zum entsprechend unwahren Satz treten. . . . Wenn das Wesen der Wahrheit sich nicht in der Richtigkeit der Aussage erschöpft, dann kann auch die Unwahrheit nicht mit der Unrichtigkeit des Urteils gleichgesetzt werden."

Concealing, thought from out of the truth of unveiling, is un-unveiling and thereby in terms of the essence of truth its only and actual un-truth. The concealing of being /Seiende/ in totality never focuses itself above all as a subsequent sequel to the always piecemeal knowing of being /Seiende/. The concealing of being /Seiende/ in its totality, the actually un-true, is older than any manifesting of this or that being /Seiende/. It is also older than the letting be itself, that includes already concealing in revealing and holds itself back in the concealing. What does the letting be resist in this relation to the concealed? Nothing less than the concealed of the concealing in its totality; the concealed of being /Seiende/ as such, i.e., the mystery. . . . The actual non-essence of truth is mystery.

"Non-essence" is here understood as a "prior-essencing" essence.²

The "prior-essencing" that is "mystery" is the Being-of beings that is "forgotten" in the encounter with beings.

The "non-" of the beginning non-essence of truth signifies (for knowing) to be sure the un-truth in the not yet experienced region of the truth of Being /Sein/ (not at first of being /Seiende/).

Freedom as the letting be of being /Seiende/ is in itself the resolved, i.e., a relationship of a closing in itself. In this relationship all being related to is established and out of it is conceived the direction of its unveiling. Yet this relationship to concealing conceals itself with it, in that it allows priority to a forgetting of the mystery and in that forgetting disappears.

¹Ibid., p. 191. This is my translation of: "Die Verborgenheit ist dann, von der Wahrheit als Entborgenheit her gedacht, die Un-entborgenheit und somit die dem Wahrheitwesen eigenste und eigentliche Un-wahrheit. Die Verborgenheit des Seienden im Ganzen stellt sich nie erst nachträglich ein als Folge der immer stückhaften Erkenntnis des Seienden. Die Verborgenheit des Seienden im Ganzen, die eigentliche Un-wahrheit, ist älter als jede Offenbarkeit von diesem und jenem Seienden. Sie ist älter auch als das Seinlassen selbst, das entbergend schon vorborgen hält und zur Verbergung sich verhält. Was verwahrt das Seinlassen in diesem Bezug zur Verbergung? Nichts Geringeres als die Verbergung des Verborgenen im Ganzen, des Seienden als eines solchen, d.h. das Geheimnis. . . . Das eigentliche Un-wesen der Wahrheit ist das Geheimnis."

²See Ibid., p. 191.

³Ibid., p. 192. This is my translation of: "Für den Wissenden allerdings deutet das 'Un-' des anfänglichen Un-wesens der Wahrheit

As a forgetting of the essence of freedom; Dasein loses itself in the relationship to its world of things/essents. As such Dasein is no longer an ex-isting (the clearing of the encounter); Dasein becomes an in-sisting in terms of satisfying its desires through the manipulation of the things it encounters in terms of their attractions.

In that the mystery fails through forgetting, it allows that historical man stay with the customary and the creature. Therefore humanity creates its world out of every new desire and intention and fills it with its proposals and plans. From these the human takes . . . its standard. The human then insists on, and provides itself constantly with, new standards without ever thinking about the ground or essence of the measure itself. The measuring forgottenness of humanity insists on establishing its security through the accessibly customary in any given time. This insistence has its unrecognized prop in that Dasein not only ex-ists, but also insists, i.e., hardens itself in terms of what is, on what being /Seiende/ in and of itself offers.

als der Un-wahrheit in den noch nicht erfahrenen Bereich der Wahrheit des Seins (nicht erst des Seienden).

Die Freiheit ist als das Seinlassen des Seienden in sich das entschlossene, d.h. das sich nicht verschließende Verhältnis. In diesem Verhältnis gründet alles Verhalten und empfängt aus ihm die Weisung zum Seienden und seiner Entbergung. Doch dieses Verhältnis zur Verbergung verbirgt sich dabei selbst, indem es einer Vergessenheit des Geheimnisses den Vorrang läßt und in dieser verschwindet."

¹Ibid., p. 193. This is my translation of: "Indem das Geheimnis sich in der Vergessenheit und für sie versagt, läßt es den geschichtlichen Menschen in seinem Gangbaren bei seinen Gemächten stehen. So stehengelassen ergänzt sich ein Menschentum seine 'Welt' aus den je neuesten Bedürfnissen und Absichten und füllt sie aus mit seinem Vorhaben und Planungen. Diesen entnimmt dann der Mensch . . . seine Maße. Auf diesen beharrt er und versieht sich stets mit neuen Maßen, ohne noch den Grund der Maß-nahme selbst und das Wesen der Maßgabe zu bedenken. . . . Er vermißt sich, je ausschließlicher er sich selbst als das Subjekt für alles Seiende zum Maß nimmt. Die vermessene Vergessenheit des Menschentums beharrt auf der Sicherung seiner selbst durch das ihm jeweils zugängige Gangbare. Dieses Beharren hat seine ihm selbst unkennbare Stütze im Verhältnis, als welches das Dasein nicht nur ek-sistiert,

7) If we are to think un-truth as a "forgetting" and as the concealing that occurs in the encounter with things, then what is error? Heidegger suggests that falsehood as related to judgment (the opposite of the statement as true) is in fact a "superficial" understanding of error. The condition of the possibility for encountering is freedom/truth as the letting into the open/the clearing that the "object" can be. This is the presupposition of all encountering, though the easiest to forget. Hence, it remains a mystery seldom attracting our attention as Dasein. In the forgetting Dasein turns to what does attract its attention--the popular, the intriguing, the multiplicity of what comes forth in encountering in all of its variety, appeal and confusion. The more Dasein is so engaged, the more inaccessible is the forgotten which remains the un-truth. What is forgotten is the un-truth; what is engaged is the error: "Error is the machinations of the human away from mystery into the customary, on into the fleeting and what is next, and a passing by of the mystery."¹ Hence,

What one normally and according to the teaching of philosophy knows to be error (the incorrectness of the judgment, and the falseness of knowledge) is only one and therefore the most superficial manner of erring. Error (in which historical humanity must actually move that its course be wrong)² is an essential fudging with the openness of Dasein.

sondern zugleich in-sistiert, d.h. sich versteifend auf dem besteht, was das wie von selbst und an sich offene Seiende bietet."

¹ Ibid., p. 194. This is my translation of: "Die Umgetriebenheit des Menschen weg vom Geheimnis hin zum Gangbaren, fort von einem Gängigen, fort zum nächsten und vorbei am Geheimnis, ist das Irren."

² Ibid., p. 194. This is my translation of: "Was man jedoch gewöhnlich und auch nach den Lehren der Philosophie als Irrtum

Lost in the whirl of the ever appealing and attractive in the encountering; insisting on the satisfying of desires; planning, calculating, controlling and manipulating; Dasein encounters the opposite of freedom--necessity. This belongs essentially to its constitution, however. It is not as if a simple turning to truth, a remembering of the mystery, of the letting-into-the-clearing as freedom, would lead to an end to error. Freedom and necessity go together announcing our "need."

Because the insisting ex-istence of the human moves in error, and because error oppresses as a leading astray and is powerful out of this oppressing of mystery (which remains of course forgotten), the human therefore in its ex-istence is subjugated to the control of mystery and above all to the insistence of error. He is in need through both. The entirety of its own non-essence, the resolving essence of truth, places Dasein (as a constant turning first in one and then another direction) in need. Dasein is the turning in need. Out of the Da-sein of the human, and out of it alone, arises the unveiling of necessity and its consequence: the displacing into the not companionable.

. . . The concealing of the concealed and error belong in the initial essence of truth.

kennt, die Unrichtigkeit des Urteils und die Falschheit der Erkenntnis, ist nur eine und dabei die oberflächlichste Weise des Irrs. Die Irre, in der jeweils ein geschichtliches Menschentum gehen muß, damit sein Gang irrig sei, fügt wesentlich mit die Offenheit des Daseins."

¹Ibid., p. 195. This is my translation of: "Weil die insistente Ek-sistenz des Menschen in der Irre geht und weil die Irre als Beirrung in je einer Weise bedrängt und aus dieser Bedrängnis des Geheimnisses mächtig ist, und zwar als eines vergessenen, deshalb ist der Mensch in der Ek-sistenz seines Daseins dem Walten des Geheimnisses und der Bedrängnis der Irre zumal unterworfen. Er ist in der Not der Nötigung durch das Eine und das Andere. Das volle, sein eigenstes Unwesen einschließende Wesen der Wahrheit hält das Dasein mit dieser ständigen Wende des Hin und Her in die Not. Das Dasein ist die Wendung in die Not. Aus dem Da-sein des Menschen und aus ihm allein entspringt die

Summary

We return to Werner Marx's comment at the beginning of this discussion of freedom as an ontological problem: He asks ". . . whether Heidegger has actually considered the matter correctly when he recognized not only 'the mystery' but also error, sham, and evil as equal partners within the occurrence of truth."¹ Heidegger's discussion of mystery and error, however, occurs at the "deeper" level informed by the ontological of the ontological difference. Freedom (the mystery) is not a possession of Dasein; it possesses Dasein. Error/evil are constitutive of Dasein's thrown Being-in-the-world as the free possibility of Dasein's being the clearing where both the encounter with things/essents and the Being-of beings occurs.² Error/evil are inherent to the risk of freedom. At the conclusion of his discussion of Schelling's essay on human freedom Heidegger writes:

The human is no observable object standing before us that we then cover with the little feelings of the everyday. The human is experienced in the insight into the abyss and height of Being /Sein, with regard to the

Entbergung der Notwendigkeit und ihr zufolge die mögliche Versetzung in das Un-umgängliche.

. . . Die Verbergung des Verborgenen und die Irre gehören in das anfängliche Wesen der Wahrheit."

¹See above, pp. 261-262 and Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition, p. 251.

²This is to claim agreement and similarity of understanding with Ricoeur's understanding of evil. He speaks of evil as "the reign of the already there" (See The Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 304f.). He then adds: "At its base the symbolism of evil is never purely and simply the symbolism of subjectivity, of the separated human subject, of interiorized self-awareness, of man severed from being, but symbol of the union of man with being. One must, then, come to the point where one sees evil as the adventure of being, as part of the history of being" (Ibid., p. 309).

terrifying of the divine, the living anxiety of all that is created, the sadness of all creating creation, the malice of evil and the will of love.

Here God is not brought down to the level of the human, but the reverse; the human is to be experienced in that which drives it outside of itself; out of that necessity by means of which the human is ascertained as this other. It is what "normal human beings" in every age will not want to be true, because it means the destruction of Dasein pure and simply. The human --that other, which must be, whose power God alone is able to make manifest when it reveals.

The "terrifying" of the divine comes forth for Schelling as the human in its freedom to good and evil chooses self-interest over and over-against the divine unity. In so choosing, however, the divine unity as "victor" is even more strongly announced as the terrifying:

. . . the seeking of itself by evil gives in its seeking of self-consumption a reflection of that initial ground in God before all existence, how it in itself is striving to return to itself, and this is the terrifying in God.²

¹Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, pp. 197-198. This is my translation of: "Der Mensch ist nicht ein vorhandener Beobachtungsgegenstand, den wir dann noch mit kleinen Gefühlen des Alltags behängen, sondern der Mensch wird erfahren im Einblick in die Abgründe und Höhen des Seyns, im Hinblick auf das Schreckliche der Gottheit, die Lebensangst alles Geschaffenen, die Traurigkeit alles geschaffenen Schaffens, die Bosheit des Bösen und den Willen der Liebe.

Hier wird nicht Gott auf die Ebene des Menschen herabgezogen, sondern umgekehrt: Der Mensch wird in dem erfahren, was ihn über sich hinaustreibt; aus jenen Notwendigkeiten, durch die er als jener Andere festgestellt wird, was zu sein der 'Normalmensch' aller Zeitalter nie wahr haben will, weil es ihm die Störung des Daseins schlechthin bedeutet. Der Mensch--jener Andere, als welcher er der sein muß, kraft dessen der Gott allein sich überhaupt offenbaren kann, wenn er sich offenbart."

²Ibid., p. 189. This is my translation of: ". . . die Selbstsucht der Bosheit gibt in ihrer Sucht des Sichselbstverzehens einen Widerschein jenes anfänglichen Grundes in Gott, vor aller Existenz, wie er ganz in sich zurückstrebend für sich ist, und dieses ist das Schreckliche in Gott."

An understanding of the "terrifying" is announced at an entirely other level of human experience than the possibility that evil might triumph over good as an "equal" possibility of the free "dispensation" of the clearing (i.e., as the granting of world) to Dasein by the Being-of beings that is the concern of Werner Marx. The terrifying and dangerous are themes uniting the discussion of technology, freedom, and mystery that have surfaced in this discussion. A turning to Heidegger's essay, again, entitled "The Question Concerning Technology" helps to point to the fugue that is occurring in this path of thought:

What is dangerous is not technology. There is no demonry of technology, but rather there is a mystery of its essence. The essence of technology, as a destining of revealing, is the danger.

All revealing belongs within a harboring and a concealing. But that which frees /^πFreedom governs the open in the sense of the cleared and lighted up, i.e., of the revealed. It is to the happening of revealing, i.e., of truth, that freedom stands in the closest and most intimate kinship."²7--the mystery--is concealed and always concealing itself. All revealing comes out of the open, goes into the open, and brings into the open. The freedom of the open consists neither in unfettered arbitrariness nor in the constraint of mere laws. Freedom is that which conceals in a way that opens to light, in whose clearing there shimmers that veil that covers what comes to presence of all truth and lets the veil appear as what veils. Freedom is the realm of the destining that at any given time starts a revealing upon its way.

. . . Since destining at any given time starts man on a way of revealing, man, thus under way, is continually approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering, and of deriving all his standards on this basis. Through this the other possibility is blocked, that man might be admitted more and sooner and ever more

¹Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," p. 25.

²Ibid., p. 25.

primally to the essence of that which is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order that he might experience as his essence his needed belonging to revealing.

Placed between these possibilities, man is endangered from out of destining. The destining of revealing is as such, in every one of its modes, and therefore necessarily, danger.

In whatever way the destining of revealing may hold sway, the unconcealment in which everything that is shows itself at any given time harbors the danger that man may quail at the unconcealed and may misinterpret it.

"'But where the danger is, grows
The saving power also.'"²
Hölderlin²

The question concerning technology is the question concerning the constellation in which revealing and concealing, in which the coming to presence of truth, comes to pass. . . .

The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. Human activity can never directly counter this danger. Human achievement alone can never banish it. But human reflection can ponder the fact that all saving power must be of a higher essence than what is endangered, though at the same time kindred to it.

The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought.

The issues are shifted to a new way of focussing. We have a shift in focus to the understanding of individuality (Selbstheit). Hence, the essence of freedom is seen at another "level" than the

¹Ibid., pp. 25-26.

²Ibid., p. 28.

³Ibid., pp. 33-34.

⁴Ibid., p. 35.

choosing between good and evil). Individuality, as discussed above,¹ consists in the transcending to/in world.² It is the enabling by the Being-of beings (the "is") as the opening of the clearing in which world can occur that for the first time we encounter the individuality of the individual. Freedom (or the essence of freedom) is this enabling of "thrownness" into the necessity/need/possibility to be world. This is, however, the opposite of fatalism. Freedom, the mystery, the coming to be of the thrownness, is the enabling of possibility in the clearing. This is an inheritance from Phenomenology: greater than reality is possibility. This is no insignificant shibboleth. It is the essence of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. Here thrownness is not a thrownness into necessity as fatalism; the coming to be of thrownness as the essence of freedom itself is the enabling condition of possibility. The risk of freedom is the risk of the forgotten. The forgetting of the mystery is the error/evil and announcement of our "need" for Heidegger. It is in the forgetting that necessity prevails as an enslaving and fatalism. The human becomes mere in-sisting rather than the ex-isting in the clearing. In the turning to the thinking of the Being-of beings; in seizing the "whole" announced in the mystery of the clearing; the breaking open to world as the fugue of the Being-of beings is dis-closed as the "need" where humanity reaches the essence of its freedom to possibility:

¹See above, p. 290.

²See above, pp. 207f.

In the thinking of Being /Sein comes the historically grounded liberating of the human to the ex-istence in the world that is not first the "expression" of a meaning, but is always and already the preserving¹ fugue of the truth of being /Seiende in its totality.

The terrifying assumes two dimensions: 1) the provisional, everyday temporality, of Dasein as a striving by the unity of the Being-of beings to be named in the clearing, i.e., the ultimate "victory" of the Being-of beings/Nothing and time; and 2) the essence of freedom as the enabling of both good and evil as the risk of free possibility. Here we have the radical disturbing of humanity to which Heidegger refers:

. . . the human is to be experienced in that which drives it outside of itself; out of that necessity by means of which the human is ascertained as this other. It is what "normal human beings" in every age will not want to be true, because it means the destruction of Dasein pure and simply. The human--that other, which must be, whose² power God alone is able to make manifest when it reveals.

In the "turning" to the clearing as an enabling condition of possibility, Dasein finds its need as the essence of freedom. The Being-of beings/Nothing is precisely the Being-of beings. The unity as enabling condition of possibility is the enabling of the transcending to/in world. Dasein, as Other, is world that forgets its enabling "ground," which is the Nothing of the Being-of beings. In the "turning," Dasein radically encounters terror and anxiety, but equally the condition of its possibility. Both the terror of

¹Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit," p. 196. This is my translation of: "Im Denken des Seins kommt die geschichtegründende Befreiung des Menschen zur Ek-sistenz ins Wort, das nicht erst der 'Ausdruck' einer Meinung, sondern je schon das gutverwahrte Gefüge der Wahrheit des Seienden im Ganzen ist."

²Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, pp. 197-198.

human finitude and the essence of freedom (as a revealing/concealing of truth, i.e., as the letting-be of the clearing that is the enabling condition of the possibility for encountering and engaging); both are more easily forgotten, because they mean a radical disturbing of "normal" human encountering.¹ The challenge of truth is the challenge to break open the human to the essence of freedom, to awareness of need.

Truth and untruth (as the condition of the possibility for good and evil) are equiprimordial as revealing and concealing. These are the "opposite" through which the Being-of beings may be disclosed. (This "opposite" refers to Schelling's observation that all "essence" comes to be only through its opposite.) The Being-of beings must be concealed (absent) in order for it to be revealed (present). Hence, the "opposite" of the Being-of beings is not "mere" nothing. The "opposite" of the Being-of beings is un-truth (the concealing of the condition of the possibility for Dasein's Being-in-the-world).

In addition, the Being-of beings, Nothing, freedom, truth (as well as their "opposites:" multiplicity, something, necessity as mechanistic determinism by means of the causal chain of things, and error) are all ways of speaking of the "how" of the coming-to-be of world, i.e., of the condition of the possibility for Dasein's encounter with world as transcending. At the same time, the Being-of beings, Nothing, freedom, and truth are "nowhere" else but to

¹Hence, the suggestive power of Ricoeur's statement: ". . . the hermeneutics of evil is not an indifferent domain but the most significant domain, perhaps the very source of the hermeneutic problem itself" (The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 317).

be encountered only in and through world--Being is always the Being-of beings. Hence, they are the condition of the possibility for the disclosure of all other dualities in experience. The Being-of beings, Nothing, freedom, and truth possess Dasein and not vice versa. They are the condition of the possibility for both sides of all polarities comprising Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Hence, they are the condition of the possibility for hate as well as love; for darkness as well as light; for despair as well as hope; for depression as well as joy; for evil as well as good; for death as well as life.

The Being-of beings, Nothing, truth, freedom cannot be thought as "outside" of the coming-to-be of all dualities, since they are the very condition of the possibility that Dasein be Being-in-the-world. To think of the Being-of beings as the divine reality means to think the divine reality, then, as intimately (organically) present, as always and already presencing, in and through all duality/multiplicity. The Being-of beings is as much "present" as "absent" in darkness as it is in light; as much "present" and "absent" in hate as it is in love; as much "present" and "absent" in despair as it is in hope; as much "present" and "absent" in depression as it is in joy; as much "present" and "absent" in evil as in Good; as much "present" and "absent" in death as in life. It is precisely because the divine reality is "present" and "absent" in all dualities that we are able to move beyond (to transcend) our being "trapped" on one side of any polarity. The divine reality is a "calling out" of our need; a risking into future; the promise of "more."

Is this discussion of freedom as an ontological engagement of terror and possibility any assistance to an understanding of the soteriological significance (the "turning") that challenges us in the symbol of the Kingdom of God? Is it possible to see this as a way of thinking into the "depth" dimension of the symbol, and to understand Husserl's description of intentional consciousness in life-world as an entrance into understanding the "breadth" of the symbol functioning together with the disclosive power in terms of human Being-in-the-world?