“Freedom on This and the Other Side of Kant”
This paper was presented at the 12. International Kant Congress Nature and Freedom” (Vienna, 9/21/2015–9/25/2015). Both versions are here. The unabridged version follows the abridged. The abridged version is to be published in the Proceedings, Violetta L. Waibel and Margit Ruffing, eds., Berlin: Walter de Gruyter: 2018 (scheduled publication date).
Abridged: “Freedom on This and the Other Side of Kant” by Douglas R McGaughey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Freedom on This and the Other Side of Kant
Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor represent a tendency to trace the “archaeology” of the notion of freedom either to G.W.F. Hegel’s Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechtsor to Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty.” Without claiming to be an exhaustive investigation of the discussion of freedom since or prior to Immanuel Kant, this paper proposes, however, that the meaning of freedom since Kant has for all intents and purposes overlooks the tradition of autonomous freedom prior to Kant that stems from Pico della Mirandola and influenced Leibniz, Sulzer, and Tetens – all of whom shaped Kant’s understanding of freedom.