Limits-for, Not Just Limits-to
In other words, there are a set of limits involved even before we present an explanation of, and propose solutions to, climate change. This applies to the ‘obvious’ explanation of climate change that says we got to where we are because we are adapting to our environment by exploiting carbon resources as a consequence of our human-carbon nature. However, this explanation not only ignores the limits required for human experience and understanding that make anything like responsible agency possible, but it does so by appealing to culture war buzz terms: ‘evolution,’ ‘genetics,’ as well as ‘speciesism’ or the notion that wants to avoid anything ‘exceptional’ about humanity. I place these terms (evolution, genetics, and speciesism) in scare quotes because they are highly misleading metaphors.
For example, evolution is not reducible merely to an external ‘adaptation’ to the environment. There is a huge difference between biological interaction with the environment and intellectual interaction with the environment. Biological evolution of external adaptation presupposes internal ‘species variation.’ These internal variations ‘blindly’ happen, even though they are anomalies, as a consequence of physical lawfulness. Intellectual adaptation builds upon the material limits-to it by exploiting physical lawfulness to intentionally achieve goals that physical lawfulness, even randomly on its own, could never achieve if left on its own. Intellectual adaptation uses the limits-to nature as limits-for creativity. In short, intellectual adaptation presupposes the causal agency of autonomous freedom ‘above’ but not ‘separated from’ nature’s ‘mechanical,’ causal order.
Furthermore, intellectual adaptation is also not reducible to ‘ideological’ commitment. ‘Ideological’ commitment is the allegiance to a socially shared ‘paradigm’ (a political perspective but also the prevailing norms that govern a profession, or the system of civic law that governs a particular society etc.). ‘Ideological’ commitment consists of the shared, communal assumptions and aims that shape individuals ‘from without.’ Thomas Kuhn called them ‘sociological paradigms’ that externally provide the standards of what is acceptable understanding and behavior for a particular group.
However, transcendental consciousness (the mind) not only is shaped, unquestionably, by physical, evolutionary development from within and sociological paradigms from without, but it also shapes its intentionality by means of capacities and assumptions ‘from within,’ which are unique to particular individuals. No one can experience, think, understand, or act for someone else.
Furthermore, genetics, or the physical determinism from within, is no all-encompassing system of ‘mechanical’ determinism. For example, the fact that humanity is a carbon based ‘creature’ no more determines or encourages us, as claimed by Jackson and Jensen, to the limitless development of carbon energy than the fact that humanity is 60% moisture ties us to the limitless development of hydropower, or the fact that we are made up of atoms commits us to atomic energy, or the fact that we cannot live without air ties us to wind power, or that we are profoundly dependent upon light for nourishment and sight ties us to solar energy.
To be sure, humanity is the product of biological evolution, but it is not reducible to biological species variation and adaptation. Self-conscious, transcendental consciousness possesses an intentional creative capacity that is not reducible to ‘mechanical,’ physical creativity. If this is not the case, then we are only mechanical automatons and deluding ourselves with the notion of personal liberty, much less accountability. However, to point out that self-conscious, transcendental consciousness is ‘different’ is no grounds for a speciesism argument.
Limits and Speciesism
Speciesism is the notion that a species is uniquely different from all other species. Its logic is the same that drives racism, sexism, agism, nationalism, etc., although, paradoxically, speciesism itself in contrast to other purported claims to unique superiority is making a universal claim that all humanity is the same in that it is radically different from all other species.
The logic of speciesism is an erroneous, radical application of the logic of ‘identity’ and ‘difference.’ That a set of phenomena has a common ‘identity’ that is ‘different’ from other sets of phenomena is a necessary limit to experience. It is a limit because it is the key to our being able to say that something (or group) is ‘this’ is ‘not that.’ Thinking is shared by all transcendental consciousness, not merely self-conscious, finite, human transcendental consciousness. Thinking depends upon the logic of negation that is ‘identity’ and ‘different’. ‘this’ IS or IS NOT the same as ‘that.’
If everything was the same, then there can be no perception. Perception itself requires that things ‘be different’ from one another. Yet, the logic of ‘identity’ and ‘difference’ is no more a justification of speciesism than it is of racism, etc. Simply because some ‘thing’ is ‘different’ from other ‘things’ doesn’t mean that it is superior to all other ‘things.’ Nonetheless, it is misanthropic to ignore the difference in the degree between finite, human transcendental consciousness and all other transcendental consciousness that we’ve ever experienced.
There is a spectrum when it comes to the ‘identity’ and the ‘difference’ that allows perception. The inorganic is ‘different’ from the organic although the organic shares an ‘identity’ (materiality) with the inorganic. There is a ‘difference’ among microbes, plants, animals, and human beings over against the inorganic. Again though, logical ‘difference’ is not a value judgment. There is nothing implicit about these logical differences that makes one ‘superior’ to others especially when one views them as all dependent upon the same materiality. At least one logical level of ‘identity’ among all things is that they can occur only because they are dependent upon the same physical world/universe.
Here we have a first crucial ‘limit’ to conscious experience: Experience is dependent upon the ability to distinguish between and among things that are both ‘identical’ and ‘different’ and they are capable of being ‘different’ only because their physical world is ‘the same’ although they interact with their physical environment differently.
Conscious Experience: Essences and Particulars
Consciousness itself involves a crucial ‘limit’ that enables distinguishing between and among various kinds of consciousness. This limit is the ability to distinguish between imperceptible ‘universals’ (essences/ideas/forms) and perceptible ‘particulars.’
A number of perceptible ‘particulars’ can share the same imperceptible ‘essence.’ Yet, a given set of perceived, particular things can be very ‘different’ from one another. For example, a perceptible, particular chair can be different from another chair because one has four legs and the other has five, etc. However, to be perceived as a ‘set,’ particular things must be ‘identical’ in order to be recognizable as a set that is ‘different’ from other sets of particular things (for example, tables from floors). What is ‘identical’ to a set of perceptible particular things is their imperceptible ‘essence’, which can also be called their ‘idea’ or ‘form.’ The particular, yet universal, essence is inseparable from consciousness. Unlike particular physical objects that are perceptible, material, divisible, measurable, and changing, though, these universal essences are imperceptible, immaterial, indivisible, immeasurable, and unchanging. Consciousness, then, a paradoxical indivisible dimension of experience that is divisible but without beginnings and ends. Intentional consciousness brings this paradoxical dimension into every particular situation. The situation can change, but the essences remain the same although we are incapable of determining where they begin and end. This inescapable limitation is a crucial limit-for conscious experience.
Imagine what it would be like not to be able to grasp the ‘essences’ of things. Not only would we not know what a room was that we could possibly enter, but when we entered a room, we somehow would have to learn all over again what it was as well as what the various objects in it were. We would have to learn ever again what makes a room different from the yard outside, a chair different from a table, a bookshelf different from a workbench, etc. All of our energy would be completely exhausted by our having to learn everything in our environment all over again, every time we experienced it anew. Of course, having to relearn each time assumes that there already would be things like rooms and their contents that are different from yards and their contents of which we could ‘make sense.’ All of these imperceptible capacities and perceptible ‘things’ that are ‘identical’ and ‘different’ are required for a transcendental consciousness to be and become what it is.
Unlike other forms of consciousness, though, a self-conscious, transcendental consciousness must possess the capacity simultaneously not only to perceive physical things but also to think a dimension of imperceptible essences in the context of a ‘world’ of particular things. Without these limiting conditions, not only could we not be a self-conscious transcendental consciousness, but also we could not even consider the possibility of assuming responsibility for our agency.
Consciousness: Stimulus-Response Structure and
Contemplated Reflection
To be able to perceive identity and difference in and among things, we have to be sentient, to be sure! Yet, there must be a degree of consciousness that includes an awareness of essences to be able to discern that ‘this’ is not ‘that.’
Given the limits to consciousness that we can only experience effects, not causes directly, it is not possible for us to say for sure, what the cause of a set of effects is. However, as far as we can determine from effects within the larger framework of coherent phenomena, a stone is not able to perceive identity and difference self-consciously. Animism, of course, claims that even stones have ‘spirits,’ but that is a causal account that self-conscious, transcendental consciousness generates, analogically, to ‘explain’ the role of stones in events. In other words, attributing a ’spirit’ to inorganic phenomena is based on an analogy to human, self-conscious, transcendental consciousness. Clearly, though, microbes do function within the limits of a stimulus-response structure that, in degree, presupposes a minimal grasp of imperceptible essence and perceptible ‘things.’ The same is true, as well, for ‘higher’ plants and animals (again, there is no value judgment in this ‘higher’ – only a logical judgment).
In other words, there is a spectrum to ‘conscious’ awareness if we define conscious to mean the capacity to perceive similarities and differences among ‘things.’ Despite the differences, all ‘consciousness’ shares a common experiential structure. It is the structure of ‘stimulus’ – ‘response.’ Yet, even this ‘identity’ to consciousness involves a ‘difference.’ Not all stimulus/response structures are identical.
Things that instinctually distinguish between ‘essences’ and ‘particulars’ can interact with their environment only by an embedded structure of ‘stimulus’ and ‘response.’ We use the metaphor ‘blind’ in a most rudimentary sense (by no means appropriate for a blind person) when we speak of ‘stimulus’ and ‘response.’ An organism that is limited to a ‘stimulus’ and ‘response’ structure can only act out of ‘mechanical’ determinism or ‘instinct,’ not by anything remotely like contemplated reflection. In other words, we experience other organic beings as possessing self-consciousness, but not the capacity of contemplated reflection that is self-conscious, transcendental consciousness. Only a ‘thing’/’animal’ that is capable of distinguishing not only essences from particulars but also possesses all the capacities of transcendental self-consciousness is capable intentionally of distinguishing among imperceptible essences themselves, distinct from their particulars. Only such a being can ‘think.’
Thinking, then, requires two capacities neither of which is achieved by so-called Artificial Intelligence: 1) The capacity to consciously distinguish among imperceptible essences and 2) the capacity to intentionally initiate on its own sequences of events that nature left to itself can never accomplish. Both capacities are a product of the creator(s) of AI, not the AI itself. Furthermore, AI limits ‘intelligence’ to ‘instrumental’ reason, that is, information processing and the achievement of ‘technical’ goals. It itself is neither self-aware nor a form of causal agency irreducible to physical causality. However, in contrast, self-conscious, transcendental consciousness is both self-aware and possesses the ability to initiate sequences of events that physical cause on its own cannot accomplish. Crucially, in addition, self-conscious, transcendental consciousness possesses the capacity to assume responsibility for its agency – even if it chooses to ignore it.
Nonetheless, self-conscious, transcendental consciousness is not ‘morally better’ than other microbes, plants, and animals simply because it intentionally, self-consciously experiences, understand, and acts not merely out of an instinctual stimulus-response structure. Rather, this ‘limit’ that distinguishes us from other ‘things’ is what makes it possible for us to be what we are, and can intentionally become. These capacities in themselves are amoral, as I discuss below.
Stimulus-Response Structure Plus Sign/Symbol Systems:
Not Natural but Learned
This ‘limit’ that distinguishes self-conscious, transcendental consciousness from other forms of consciousness opens up the entire imperceptible dimension of consciousness to us and transforms the very brute, instinctual stimulus-response structure that we share with all other sentient beings. We can attach signs and symbols (including mathematics and music) to the imperceptible essences that we apply in order to understand the stimuli and to plan our response. In short, our experience of the stimulus-response structure of perception includes the insertion of ‘symbol and sign systems’ in-between the stimulus and the response. These symbol/sign systems are not ‘natural.’ They must be learned. The capacity to learn them is ‘natural,’ but there is no other species that must learn symbol systems anywhere near to the degree that self-conscious, transcendental consciousness (human beings) must as a matter of survival, not to speak of enjoyment.
Extra-Ordinary Causality in Addition to Physical Causality:
The Capacity that Makes Possible Responsibility
In addition to our dependence upon imperceptible symbol systems that are inserted into the shared stimulus-response structure with other sentient beings, the fact that we must learn appropriate symbol/sign systems not only confronts us as capable of understanding and acting ‘differently’ from other ‘things.’ It also illuminates that we are not entirely determined by inescapable, physical causality. We don’t act solely out of ‘blind’ instinct but also by self-directed intentions that can accomplish things that, left on its own, the physical world could never achieve.
On the one hand, self-directed, intentional agency is capable, at least in principle, of turning all other ‘things’ into ‘means’ to achieving personal ‘ends’ – unfortunately, climate change and nuclear power illustrate this as the power to destroy nature upon which we depend. BTW: Kant recognized already in 1775 that the capacity of self-conscious, transcendental consciousness to initiate sequences of events that nature left to itself could not accomplish gives us the power, in principle, to destroy nature. Oh, that he was wrong!?
It is not possible to ignore the crucial (if not an ‘essential’) difference between other, even self-conscious beings and self-conscious, transcendental consciousness (humanity). Not only do we have this capacity to add essences to our perceptions by intentionally inserting symbol systems/signs into our stimulus-response structure of perception, but also it is only a capacity of self-directed, intentional agency that makes possible assumption of responsibility for agency. This is a ‘limit-for’ responsible agency that distinguishes self-conscious transcendental consciousness from all other forms of consciousness that we have ever encountered – although it is not impossible that there is elsewhere in the universe such a consciousness. Crucially, it is no limit of ‘can’t’ but a limit that enables a ‘can.’
Our purported ‘superiority’ over all other ‘things’ is precisely the same set of capacities that makes possible the assumption of responsibility for our agency. Without self-conscious, transcendental consciousness, there is no capability of taking responsibility for agency. The threatening danger here, though, is that precisely because the individual alone can self-govern her/his agency, s/he can choose to ignore the assumption of responsibility. Only the individual can experience, understand, and intentionally give her-/himself permission to act.
The ’Mechanics’ of Consciousness are
Inseparable from Feelings
The emphasis, thus far, on the ‘mechanics’ of physical events and the ‘logical elements’ that make possible self-conscious, transcendental consciousness by no means constitutes an eclipsing of the central role of feeling in consciousness. Both perception and desire are constitutive of consciousness.
Rational desire drives the quest for experiences as it drives the quest for understanding. Not all desire is rational any more than all capricious choice (liberty) is equivalent to the capacity to intentionally initiate sequences of events that nature on its own cannot (autonomous freedom). Furthermore, although driven by desire, neither reason nor perception are in themselves morally ‘good’ or ‘evil.’ Desire becomes a moral issue only when an individual chooses to act on the basis of a desire alone by suppressing any and all moral maxims for giving oneself permission to exercise one’s agency. Reason that would be ‘good’ by nature could only apply to an angel, and reason that would be ‘evil’ by nature could only apply to a demon. Finite self-conscious, transcendental consciousness is neither angelic nor demonic. Furthermore, perceived things that would be ‘good’ or ‘evil’ by nature would be materially determined. Finite self-conscious, transcendental consciousness that was ‘good’ or ‘evil’ because of what it perceived would be an animal blindly driven by instinct.
Rather than some kind of moral capacity that is ‘good’ or ‘evil’ from the get-go, the amoral, rational desire that propels the quest for experience and understanding is grounded in ‘order,’ not capricious wish. The world of perception evokes our desire to experience and understand it because it is ‘lawfully’, hence, predictably, ordered. ‘Basic trust’ in order drives the quest for investing the attention and energy that commits one to experience and understanding because lawful order is imperceptible, hence, neither provable nor disprovable.
Nonetheless, rational experience teaches that the more we extend our understanding on the basis of an ever-expanding horizon of coherent, lawful order, the more we are able to anticipate events and (even productively) influence how they transpire.
Most importantly, though, there is no deeper satisfaction (fulfilment of rational desire) than that which comes from the individual’s own discovery of imperceptible, lawful order. Eureka satisfaction of a discovery of a new piece of lawful order that fits into the larger coherence of lawful order trumps all leaning by rote memorization as well as social status and prestige precisely because it is the achievement of the individual. ‘Memorized facts’ were once eureka moments for someone else that have made it onto the list because they save time for the learner. They reward memorizing them not as eureka moments in themselves but, having grasped them, the individual can investigate experience and gain new eureka moments of understanding for her-/himself. Status and prestige is fleeting in contrast to the satisfaction of a eureka moment because status and prestige is dependent not upon what the individual has actually done but on the judgment of those bestowing the status and prestige.
An Amoral (neither Immoral nor Moral) Capacity
that Makes Possible Morality
Paradoxically, then, the capacity to take responsibility for one’s agency is amoral! The capacity itself is neither good nor evil. This amoral status of finite self-conscious, transcendental consciousness flat out contradicts those misanthropists who think it would be better were self-conscious, transcendental consciousness not to exist because the Anthropocene has only brought destruction of nature. However, the moral issue arises with the individual’s giving itself permission to exercise its amoral capacities. Only the individual, not a universal capacity, can give her-/himself permission to act. Furthermore, not all imperatives (“I must”) are moral imperatives.
Before turning to the issue of morality, though, it is valuable to examine the amoral capacities of self-conscious, transcendental consciousness more generally. Most significant when it comes to amoral capacities is that they ground universal dignity. In short, individuals possess dignity neither because of their capabilities to exercise a particular skill nor because of what they do or don’t accomplish. What they, in fact, do does not establish their dignity.
Dignity is possessed by every self-conscious, transcendental consciousness regardless of physical or mental limitations because dignity is established by the universal elements and conditions that make any and all self-conscious, transcendental consciousness possible, in the first place. In other words, dignity is not a ‘Western’ value. It is the universal basis upon which all other values depend as well as the ground for all social justice.
Dignity is distinct from respect. Respect is owed only to those who acknowledge, and commit to effort in conformity with, ‘lawfulness’ – that is, to imperceptible, heteronomous physical and autonomous moral lawfulness.
To be sure, there is no proof/disproof of either physical or moral lawfulness because both are causal systems. We can only experience directly the effects of causal systems, not the causal order itself. Nonetheless, if there is anything like coherent experience, understanding, and responsible agency, we must assume that all causal systems are governed by ‘lawfulness.’
There are physicists today who suggest there are no physical laws and that time and space are illusions. We can be quite confident, though, that, should such a physicist be invited to be a keynote speaker at a conference half-way around the world, s/he will not hesitate to board a plane to fly there.
Furthermore, already in 1783, Immanuel Kant pointed out that ‘space’ and ‘time,’ themselves, are imperceptible. We experience events ‘in’ space and ‘in’ time, but we do not experience ‘pure’ space and time. Nonetheless, for us to experience, understand, and act responsibly, we have to assume there is such a thing as space and time. We can engage in thought experiments that deny lawfulness, space, and time, but our actual experience requires us to employ them as the condition of any and all experience, etc. The ‘fact’ that our notion of space and time is something that we must add to our perceptions of ‘things’ and ‘events’ and not something empirically provable/disprovable is the fundamental assumption invoked by Einstein to talk about the ‘relativity’ of space and time in his theory of relativity. He owes the thought to Kant!
Descartes pointed out that we can doubt all (!) sense perception. What we can’t doubt is our own consciousness that is experiencing sense perception. Why? Because in order to experience sense perception, there must be consciousness. In other words, the only thing that doubt proves, which cannot be doubted, is the condition of consciousness – so long as we have sense perception! Kant extended this insight to point out that cogito ergo sum (‘In think, therefore, I am’) includes not only some ‘empty slate’ of consciousness but all of the imperceptible capacities that consciousness requires in order to be able to experience sense perception. Among these elements that consciousness itself must contribute (but not create) in order to perceive anything are ‘lawfulness’ and ‘space and time.’ When it comes to doubting, then, the only ‘certainties’ that we can know are those that are the conditions and capacities of consciousness. Yet, Jackson and Jensen, deny the notion of ‘mind’ and reduce it to the physically perceptible brain.
Dignity and the capacity of responsibility, then, are themselves the product of limits to self-conscious, transcendental consciousness, and they are shared by all self-conscious, transcendental consciousness. Furthermore, dignity and the capacity for assuming responsibility for one’s agency are both amoral. Their ‘amoral goodness’ is established merely because they are, not because of what one does with them. The moral status of the imperceptible, amoral capacities of self-conscious, transcendental consciousness arises only when the individual exercises her/his capacities.
Not all ‘Shoulds’ are Moral:
On ‘Hypothetical’ and ‘Categorical’ Imperatives
However, when it comes to assuming responsibility for one’s ‘free’ agency (not liberty’s mere choice) that can accomplish things that, left on its own, nature could not accomplish, not all ‘shoulds’ (imperatives) are ‘moral shoulds’ (categorical imperatives). The overwhelming majority of imperatives are ‘hypothetical,’ not ‘categorical’ imperatives.
A ‘hypothetical’ imperative is what one must do to successfully accomplish a task. Whether the task is building a house or creating a work of art, the success of one’s efforts depends upon one following the ‘right’ sequence in order to achieve one’s intended end. However, ‘right’ here is not a moral right of good or evil. Rather, it is a technical ‘right’ that one must learn in order to accomplish one’s end. One can’t construct a house by hanging the roof first. One can’t write a piece of music without first learning music notation and the ‘rules’ of harmony (even when one intentionally writes disharmony). Neither the house nor the piece of music that one achieves is morally ‘good’ or ‘evil’ but rather a ‘success’ or a ‘failure.’ Success and failure are a matter of judgment according to the technical guild that oversees the activity of one’s agency. Success and failure is measured by whether one conformed to the ‘hypothetical’ imperatives of the respective skill set.
‘Hypothetical’ imperatives are called ‘hypothetical’ because they are governed by an ‘if.’ If I want to achieve this end, then there is a ‘proper’ sequence and ‘set of standards’ that I am required to follow if I am to successfully achieve my ends. In addition to creating my ‘artifact,’ I must also learn the technical skills of the guild overseeing my agency. This requires schooling and, if I wish to be a professional in the skill, certification by the guild. All of these requirements are governed by ‘if.’ I could choose another domain of agency, which would require that I acquire a different certification ‘if’ I wanted to be successful in that other domain of agency.
What distinguishes ‘hypothetical’ imperatives is that they are externally observable and measurable. An examining board of the guild supervising the domain of my agency can test and certify my qualifications to work in the domain. A ‘technician’ can examine the effects of my agency and evaluate it. One can view such training as preparing oneself to be ‘just another brick in the wall,’ or one can view such training as preparing oneself to exercise one’s creative talents that, otherwise, one would be unable to exercise.
When it comes to ‘categorical’ imperatives, though, one is no longer concerned with rules that are manifest perceptibly in effects. Just as an individual’s experience and understanding is not externally manifest, so too, giving oneself permission to acquire the skills and to pursue a concrete, creative end is not externally manifest.
‘Categorical’ imperatives are not ‘narrow’ rules that govern the acquisition or exercising of a particular skill. Rather, they are ‘wide’ ‘shoulds’ that one invokes to give oneself permission to do something. Such ‘wide’ shoulds are ‘universals,’ not narrow ‘rules.’ Categorical imperatives cannot be written on tablets or placed on a check list. Exodus 20 and 34 clearly are lists of hypothetical rules required for a particular sociological system to function. Social rules can be posted on tablets to guide the individual with respect to what is productive behavior sustaining of, and sustained by, a group. Depending upon the kind of social group (hunting and gathering, agriculture, industry, post-everything), the social rules are different and ‘narrowly’ specific to the group, hence, by definition, not wide, ‘universal’ maxims that one employs to give oneself permission to do something.
Examples of such wide, ‘universal’ maxims are: One should treat oneself (and allow oneself to be treated) as well as treat all others as self-determining ends and not as mere means to one’s own or someone else’s ends. One should not capriciously destroy the natural order to serve exclusively one’s self-interest or capriciously take one’s own life out of social disgrace. In both cases, one is acting in a way that contradicts (destroys) the very capacities that make it possible for one to be a self-conscious, transcendental consciousness. Other ‘wide’ maxims are that one should think for oneself, one should think from the perspective of the other, and one should acknowledge the dignity of the other that allows them to be self-determining just as one is self-determining of one’s agency.
What clearly distinguishes ‘categorical’ imperatives from ‘hypothetical’ imperatives, though, is that they are not externally perceptible or measurable. Only the individual can know what ‘wide’ maxim s/he invoked to give her-/himself permission to do what one does.
Morality: Decided not by External Consequences
When we approach humanity’s limits from the side of imperceptible capacities that amorally distinguish us form all other species of which we are aware and serve as the condition of possibility (but do not require) our morally responsible exercising of our imperceptible capacities, we can recognize that morality is not defined by perceptible consequences as in the case of hypothetical rules that govern technical skills and social success/failure. We have control over consequences only in the very short term. Our environmental crisis is an example of short-sightedness when it comes to consequences. What we do have control over is the moral maxim that one invokes in order to give her-/himself permission to act – and only the individual can know what that maxim was. Yet, unless beaten out of one or one is in an existentially precarious situation, everyone experiences remorse when one fails to act according to one’s own categorical maxims.
There is No Moral High Ground,
Only Internal Moral Effort
A ’moral culture,’ then has nothing to do with taking ‘the’ moral high ground either that one can strive for or that enables one to condemn others out of moral superiority. Given the limits to, and for, self-conscious transcendental consciousness, any talk of a moral high ground is a delusion of arrogance. Not the least, it substitutes the appearance of agency’s consequences for the confirmation of moral intent. This is delusionary for four reasons: 1) The moral high ground substitutes external finger-wagging for the individual’s internal permission-giving for agency on the basis of internal, imperceptible ‘autonomous’ maxims. Socially constructed rules of externally imposed, ‘heteronomous’ maxims replace internally, self-imposed ‘categorical’ maxims. 2) ‘The’ moral high ground presupposes moral perfection, which is a self-delusion of the highest degree. Self-conscious, transcendental consciousness is limited. The expectation of perfect behavior not only a) substitutes ‘hypothetical imperatives’ for ‘categorical imperatives,’ but it b) fosters the illusion that one has control over the consequences of one’s agency. c) There can be no perfect moral agency because it is impossible to know the degree to which one has acted on self-interest rather than a ‘wide,’ categorical maxim. However, one can know whether one has acted exclusively (or nearly exclusively) on the basis of self-interest that turns one’s environment and others into mere means to one’s personal ends. 3) The agent has no way of calculating (with the possible exception of a limited ‘short run’) the consequences of her/his agency. 4) Only the individual agent can (and does) know the maxim s/he invoked to give her-/himself permission to act precisely because such permission is not perceptible.
The difference between ‘the moral high ground’ and a ‘moral culture’ is that ‘the’ moral high ground confuses a set of external, hypothetical rules and standards to measure the effects of agency in an arrogant belief that it deserves applause or condemnation. In contrast, a ‘true,’ moral culture is entirely imperceptible and self-governing with the humility that the individual alone is the judge of one’s moral status.
One knows when one has acted purely out of self-interest to ‘use’ nature and the ‘other’ merely to serve one’s selfish ends. In other words, ‘moral consequentialism’ is a non sequitur because it substitutes externally, perceptible, particular consequences (over which one has little if any control and whose calculation are possible at best only in the short run) for internally, imperceptible, universal moral maxims that solely the individual can know and only the individual can apply for her-/himself.
A ‘moral culture’ has nothing to do with moral arrogance that seeks the applause of, or stands in judgement over against, one’s social world. Rather, moral culture begins with the acknowledgement of limits, both physical and mental, and is grounded in humility, not arrogance. Moral culture is not socially relative. By no means is it defined by ‘narrow,’ socially constructed, ‘hypothetical’ imperatives. Rather, it encourages awareness of, and allegiance to, those universal, imperceptible capacities and ‘wide,’ ‘categorical’ imperatives that everyone invokes to give oneself permission to exercise her/his agency. Moral culture supports the individual with respect to recognizing the importance of imperceptible, universal, wide moral maxims and to invoke them to give oneself permission to act regardless of personal self-interest or even communal self-interest – and provides support to those who endure social condemnation for having done so.
Neither Eco-Optimism nor by Merely Restricting Limits:
Hope is Justified by Limits that Make Possible
Creative, Responsible Change
Simply because humanity possesses the capacities that make technological innovation possible does not mean that we can be confident that technological innovation is going to be sufficient to solve the climate crisis (or any other crisis). The solutions to the climate crisis, though, is not going to come about by simply limiting consumption, generally, or limiting the use of carbon energy, in particular.
Granted, the climate crisis confronts us with issues of our external limits. However, the sole focus on the consequences of human agency is no meaningful, much less helpful, solution. The approach to the climate crisis on the basis of consequences takes limits to be focused on ‘can’t.’ In contrast, the imperceptible, moral culture that is capable of playing a crucial and constructive role in the face of the climate crisis profiles the imperceptible limits that make possible any and all experience, understanding, and responsible agency, whatsoever. This approach to the climate crisis on the basis of the always and already existing, imperceptible, moral culture takes limits to be focused on ‘can.’
Neither ‘can’t’ nor ‘can’ is appropriate to the exclusion of the other, but if we don’t address the presence and need for emphasis on the imperceptible, moral culture that ‘can,’ regardless of self- and communal interest, we can never succeed to rein in much less reverse climate destruction.
Conclusions
Clearly, the kinds of limits discussed here do not fit into a dualistic scheme ‘spiritual’ over against ‘material.’ As far as we have experienced, the ‘spiritual’ is always dependent on the ‘material,’ but no one can experience the ‘material’ without immaterial, imperceptible capacities shared by all self-conscious, transcendental consciousness. Simply to equate ‘mind’ and ‘brain,’ then, is to reduce everything to physical processes and determinism.
Given our limits, it is as equally impossible to prove physical lawfulness as it is to prove moral lawfulness. There is a difference between them not because they constitute a dualist view of reality but because, remarkably, they are two, inseparable, complementary causal systems. A causal system can occur only if it has a (lawful) order. A self-conscious, transcendental consciousness is the only location of which we are aware that can be intentionally governed by both.
The location of ‘hope’ for self-conscious, transcendental consciousness is not in a speculative (read: groundless) order ‘beyond’ the material either in this or a next life. Of course, given the limits to self-conscious, transcendental consciousness, it is not possible for us to prove (but also it is not possible for us to disprove) that such a speculative, non-material existence occurs or is ‘waiting for us.’ However, placing all of our self-worth and hope in such a speculative claim is like a dove flying through the air and dreaming that it would be easier to fly in a vacuum. The notion of ‘dreaming’ here is as significant as the notion of a ‘vacuum.’
Nocturnal dreams are distinct from ‘waking’ states because the former are not governed by a causal order and the latter are. To be sure, the importance of nocturnal dreams can be described as their providing us ‘deep’ insight into pre-consciousness drives. That may (mor may not) be the case. As with all imperceptible, transcendental capacities, though, the least that nocturnal dreams can teach us is that ‘clarity and distinctness of perception’ alone is not sufficient to justify ‘truth’ claims or causal explanations. Only in those domains of experience where we have ‘clarity and distinctness of perception’ and (!) lawfulness (physical and moral) can serve as the ground for ‘truth’ claims and causal explanations. Yet, ‘truth’ involves more than merely ‘opening our eyes,’ clearly!
Capacities do not guarantee their cultivation, much less their responsible application. However, arguably there is no experience of greater satisfaction (meaning) than when the individual has the experience of the combination of a cultivated set of capacities in harmony with physical and moral lawfulness – even when one is empirically a ‘failure’ (think of the experience of playing a parlor game, pursuing a hobby, raising a child, as well as practicing a chosen profession). Self-conscious, transcendental consciousness is the only place in the physical universe (of which we are aware, although it is not impossible that there are other examples of it, elsewhere) that is not ‘blindly’ governed by physical lawfulness. Is it not remarkable that not only such a creature can experience the satisfaction of creative effort in harmony with physical and moral lawfulness but also only such a creature can experience ‘beauty’ and ‘sublimity’?
The extra-ordinariness of the judgment of beauty is stimulated by but not reducible to the physical phenomena that evokes it. The extra-ordinariness, though, is more than the ability intentionally to form an imperceptible, mental judgment about a set of perceptible phenomena. The judgment of beauty is an exceptional kind of judgment because it is not governed by a ‘concept’ (essence, idea, or form) that unites all that one can experience as beautiful. There is no concept that is common to a rose, a sunset, a vast desert, a waterfall, etc. A judgment of beauty is extra-ordinary because it activates all of the imperceptible capacities of self-consciousness as a conceptual scheme of transcendental consciousness without a dominant concept. Yet, it insists (without need of proof/disproof) that all self-conscious, transcendental consciousness would experience the same sense of beauty. In short, a judgment of beauty involves the ‘free play’ of the imperceptible capacities of self-conscious, transcendental consciousness – stimulated by phenomena but not reducible either to the phenomena or a common essence.
The extra-ordinariness of the sublime is particularly relevant when it comes to awareness of the climate crisis. Not that the sublime alone can solve the crisis, but experience of the sublime reminds us that we possess an extra-ordinary power in the order of things for which we, alone, can assume responsibility. Yes, nature confronts us with our insignificance and our powerlessness. The mathematical expansiveness of the universe silences all of our arrogance, and the forces of nature can snuff us out with impunity. However, only a self-conscious, transcendental consciousness is able to grasp (not contain) the mathematical expansiveness of the universe, and only a self-conscious, transcendental consciousness has the power to change nature in ways that nature alone cannot. Ironically, this power can itself destroy nature as we so woefully know.
The meaning that self-conscious, transcendental consciousness is capable of experiencing by its grasp of, and exercising its agency in response to, the physical and moral lawfulness of experience as well as the experience of beauty and the sublime all combine to empower realistic hope in the face of any and all crises – even should we fail. Our hope does not reside in ‘God’ that places humanity by means of an anthropomorphic analogy as thinker, creator, or intervenor in the natural order on the divine throne long before philosophy. Furthermore, hope does not reside in a ‘spiritual’ escape from the material world, in arrogance of any kind, in either reception of applause or condemnation from our social world, in our condescending judgment of ourselves and others solely on the basis of the consequences of agency, or in the ability of technical skill (hypothetical imperatives) to solve our problems, or in the mere reduction of consumption. Our hope resides in what our limits make possible for us to do, responsibly. Anything short of that means catastrophe because it would mean that we can’t do otherwise than what we do.
