A ‘Practicing’ Kantian 31 March 2018

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A ‘Practicing’ Kantian by Douglas R McGaughey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

A „Practicing Kantian“

  1. Understands that every creature has LIMITS, physically and intellectually, that keep one humble.
  2. Understands that each and every human being (regardless of physical or mental limits) possesses a spark of creativity of some kind in some region of experience that is capable of INTENTIONALLY changing nature/the world in ways that nature/the world cannot change on its own.
  3. Understands that this spark of creativity is the basis of the individual’s capability to assume RESPONSIBILITY for her/his decisions/actions unlike any other species of which we are aware – although it is possible intentionally to suppress the assumption of responsibility, to have it “beaten out” of one, or can be ignored a desperate circumstance.
  4. Understands that this spark of CREATIVITY is the basis of HUMAN DIGNITY that cannot be given or taken away much less substituted for something or someone else.
  5. Understands that the issue is not “who” but “how” we respect the dignity of others that matters. We should neither allow ourselves nor the other TO BE TREATED AS A MERE MEANS FOR OUR OR SOMEONE ELSE’S ENDS BUT ALWAYS AS AN END in themselves.
  6. Understands that when one decides and acts on the basis of one’s dignity and responsibility – even when one does so contrary to what appears to be one’s self-interest, one experiences a sense of “MORAL WORTH” and a “FEELING OF BEING ALIVE” that is superior to monetary wealth, public applause, and even health.
  7. This acknowledgement of dignity REJECTS ALL DE-HUMANIZATION BASED ON THE EXTERNAL APPEARANCES AND ACTIONS OF OTHERS (e.g., racism, sexism, homophobia, nationalism, religious intolerance, etc.).
  8. Understands that there are TWO SYSTEMS OF LAWS that we must assume govern all experience, for without these there is no understanding or responsibility: PHYSICAL LAWS AND MORAL LAWS.
  9. Understands that part of our intellectual limits is our inability to causally explain the origin of or to prove or disprove that these two systems of laws apply at all times and all places. They are a NECESSARY ASSUMPTION (faith) for us to live and thrive.
  10. Understands that these two systems of physical and moral laws are NEITHER THE CIVIC LAW that govern the negotiation of a social world NOR TECHNICAL AND PRAGMATIC RULES that govern the acquisition and exercising of skills but the “lawful orders” required “below” (in nature) and “above” (in the individual) them by even the civic law, technical-. and pragmatic for the achievement of justice according to the civic law and the responsible application of technical and pragmatic skills.
  11. Understands that NOT EVERYTHING THAT IS “RIGHT” IS “MORAL.” Life is not a system of repressive, mechanical legalities but a project of spirited and creative transformations that can embrace the unexpected precisely by affirming dignity.
  12. Understands that when acknowledgement for physical and moral laws are combined with human dignity by the individual, s/he deserves the HIGHEST RESPECT of others – although it is impossible for us to know the internal principles upon which another has chosen to act.
  13. Understands that when we step outside our limits to give an explanation of things for which we are incapable of accounting, WE STORM THE CITADEL OF DIVINITY AND BECOME THE MOST DANGEROUS SPECIES ON EARTH.
  14. Understands that, although everyone is capable and does lie, LYING IS WRONG not just because it deceives the other but because it erodes the individual’s internal consistency upon which all “proper” understanding and action depends.
  15. Understands that the committing of SUICIDE out of shame or financial collapse IS THE APPLICATION OF ONE’S OWN CREATIVE SPARK TO DESTROY ITSELF, the ultimate contradiction of human dignity with all the devastating shock waves that the destruction of dignity sends out through one’s world.
  16. Understands that all human capacities as well as the very universe are a GIFT, that each individual is PRICELESS (i.e., incapable of being substituted by some-one or some-thing else – including technology), that we all have a responsibility to MAINTAIN OUR HEALTH as much as our decisions influence it, to DEVELOP OUR TALENTS, and to RESPOND TO THE SUFFERING OF OTHERS – with the limit that we ourselves don’t end up requiring the aid of others because of our own generosity.
  17. Understands that we are RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT and THE PROPER TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, not capriciously sovereign over them for the mere purpose of serving our self-interest.
  18. Understands that no one is or can be perfect, but that we have an obligation to ourselves, others, and the universe TO MAKE OUR BEST EFFORT, which only the individual can know for sure, TO ENCOURAGE ONE ANOTHER TO DO SO, AND TO AFFIRM AND SUPPORT ONE ANOTHER TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN DISCERN THAT S/HE HAS.

Just as a “practicing Christian, Jew, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Sikh, Taoist, Shinto (not to speak of the Aboriginist religions of the world and all of the sub-sects of religion)” etc., does not require a personal grasp of the intricacies of “theology” or “religious teaching” much less a command of the ritual and history of the respective tradition involved, so too, a “practicing Kantian” does not require a grasp of Kant’s notions of “theoretical” and “practical” reason, determining and reflecting judgment, and aesthetics (beauty and the sublime) with all of their esoteric jargon.

At the risk of sinking into jargon …, Kant wrote in the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge ed., 193; AA VI, 443-444):

[…] we have a duty with regard to what lies entirely beyond the limits of our experience but whose possibility is met with [only] in our ideas, for example, the idea of God; it is called the duty of religion, the duty ‘of recognizing all our duties as […] divine commands.’  But this is not consciousness of a duty [owed] to God […] Rather, it is a duty of a human being to himself [sic.] to apply this idea, which presents itself unavoidably to reason, to the moral law in him, where it is of the greatest moral fruitfulness.  In this (practical) sense it can therefore be said that to have religion is a duty of the human being to himself.

In short, religion is concerned with “faith” in the reality of the physical law without and the moral law within, and its aim is to make us “better” human beings – not to guarantee our happiness in this or some other life.  In this respect, there is only “one” religious faith although there are many religious traditions.

Critical Idealism’s Defense of Investment in the Liberal Arts: Precise

Critical Idealism’s Defense of Investment
in the Liberal Arts:  Precise

Doug McGaughey

Welcome to Critical Idealism!

A Critical Idealist begins by asking what are the (usually, unquestioned) presuppositions of the issue at hand.  Appropriately, in my humble opinion, the usual defense of the Liberal Arts builds on issues of change, skills, knowledge, and creativity.  However, these terms are employed as if they are self-evident.  Maybe they’re not self-evident!


Succinctly, rather than acquiring skills in order to create, we are a creating species that must acquire skills – our instincts are so lousy.  The symbolic (figurative language) and responsibility (morality) are not after-thoughts or “frosting-on-the-cake” but at the very core of what it means to be and become human.  Creativity, the symbolic, and morality all require education because they are not “natural.”

“Reason Suppresses Feelings? or Moses Mendelssohn’s Influence on Kant’s Project of Three Critiques” – Revision 09 May 2017

Reason Suppresses Feelings? Or Moses Mendelssohn’s Influence on Kant’s Project of Three Critiques by Douglas R McGaughey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Written version of a paper
presented at Stellenbosch University
in Stellenbosch, South Africa,
24 April 2017

PDF version with page #s:  Reason Suppresses Feelings? Or Moses Mendelssohn’s Influence on Kant’s Project of Three Critiques Reason-Suppresses-Feelings 09 May 2017

Reason Suppresses Feelings?[1]
Moses Mendelssohn’s Influence on Kant’s Project of Three Critiques

Abstract:  A common claim is that the proper functioning of reason requires the suppression of feelings because feelings are a debilitating, merely subjective pathology that cloud and/or distort clear thinking. Frequently, as well, it is claimed that Enlightenment reason’s suppression of feelings is exemplified by Kant. This post argues to the contrary that for Kant’s Critical Idealism feelings, rather than being a pathological hindrance to reason, are positive and ubiquitous to all aspects of reason as they, not by their content but by their function, motivate creativity and the assumption of moral responsibility for the decisions driving, and the actions deriving from, such creativity.  Mendelssohn’s Morgenstunden is examined as the source for the reflections that led to the three-element structure to Kant’s project of three Critiques.

“Was Kant a Racist?” with Addendum on South Sea Islanders 01 May 2017 – Rejection of Slavery, Colonialism, the Inhumane Treatment of Animals, and Wanton Destruction of the Environment

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Was Kant a Racist? Can Critical Idealism Contribute to Combating Racism? With an Addendum: On South Sea Islanders in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals by Douglas R McGaughey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

PDF VERSION (with page #s):  Was Kant a Racist with Addendum on South Sea Islanders Revised 10 April 18

Revised 10 April 2018 with the addition of documentation of Kant’s explicit rejection of slavery as well as rejection of colonialism, the inhumane treatment of animals, and call for the protection of the environment (page 12 and two first footnotes).

Revised 20 January 2017 with the addition of a quote (page 17 below) from the Metaphysics of Morals (AA VI, 467-468):  The statement here by Kant constitutes an explicit rejection not only of racism, ageism, sexism, power or weakness, status and prestige (e.g., aristocracy) as criteria for judging others, but it is also an implicit rejection of homophobia, nationalism, populism, and any other criteria for judging others, which are all based on merely empirical criteria of “theoretical reason” to the entire neglect of the capacities and moral significance of “practical reason.”  Thanks to Birgit Recki who cited the second of the two paragraphs of this “Remark” from the MM for a very different but equally laudable purpose in her Ästhetik der Sitten. Die Affinität von ästhetischem Gefühl und praktischer Vernunft bei Kant (Frankfurt a.M.:  Vittorio Klostermann, 2001):  255, n. 43.


Was Kant a Racist?
Can Critical Idealism Contribute to Combating Racism?

With an Addendum:  On South Sea Islanders in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

Overview: In which Kant’s comments on race are discussed in light of his philosophy of history, critiques of theoretical and practical reason, and his biological reflections on “evolution.” Humanity is seen as the “ultimate end” of nature. Although this sounds anthropocentric and suggests the justification of the indiscriminate exploitation of nature, it is manifest not by means of a culture of “skill”, but by a culture that promotes the individual’s assumption of moral responsibility for her/his decisions and actions.

“Critique, not Emotionless, Critical Thinking” – Revised 04 May 2016

“Critique, Not Emotionless Critical Thinking” by Douglas R McGaughey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Revised version (04 May 2016) of “‘Critique,’ not ‘Criticism’”(8 March 2016) in response to Rob Jenkins’ “What is Critical Thinking, Anyway?”

Critique, Not Emotionless Critical Thinking

When one encounters the word “critique,” one readily thinks of a negative strategy, frequently of negative dismissal, in the spirit of “criticism,” or perhaps one thinks of emotionless “critical thinking.”   As a consequence, it is easy to miss a profound difference between “critique” and “critical thinking.”  Given the difference in what each does with respect to the phenomena that initiates them, the difference is so great that one can even speak of “critique” as 180 degrees opposite to both “criticism” and “critical thinking.”

Design: A Heuristic Strategy, not a Metaphysical Doctrine 11 July 2008 — Key Paper

Design: A Heuristic Strategy, not Metaphysical Doctrine by Douglas R McGaughey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

A Heuristic Strategy, Not Metaphysical Doctrine


Because there’s only indirect access to causes, given effects can be understood to have multiple causes, and the same cause can produce multiple effects, the criterion for the evaluation of a causal explanation is neither empirical proof nor disproof.  Rather, the evaluation must be in terms of the consequences of holding the cause for an adequate explanation of the event.  The Physico-Theological argument for design as a form of cause in nature cannot serve to give us any information about the Noumenon (God) that it presupposes – certainly not any information about anthropomorphic characteristics of that Noumenon.  Rather, its value is to confirm our confidence in the intelligibility (the rule-governed character) of nature in contrast, for example, to the chaos of nocturnal dreams.  To the extent of confidence in this intelligibility, our “explanations” of nature involve necessity, that is, a presumed necessity based upon the functional relationality that accounts for the phenomena.  Because all our capacities both theoretical (science) and practical (religion) are dependent upon the material conditions of experience, this criterion is important not only for the furtherance of the natural scientific enterprise but also for religion.  Drawing on pre-critical and critical writings of Kant, I reject the Naturalistic reading of Kant by P.F. Strawson et al. to argue that Kant’s Critical Idealism is beneficial for an investigating of the meaning and role of design in experience.

A Post-Factual World?

A Post-Factual World? by Douglas R McGaughey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

A Post-Factual World?

The boogey-man is alive and well in our scientifically “enlightened” age:  Knowledge is profoundly under siege by a threatening relativism called the “post-factual” and “post-truth” world.  Even well-intended proponents of cultural relativism have been seduced by a “world view” that at first appears to be a challenge to all “dogmatisms” but in the end undermines the very confidence in understanding that is necessary for humanity to constructively and responsibly play its role in the order of things.  The consistent relativist, like the radical skeptic, is left with no foot on which to stand to question anything, not least the injustices of her/his own society much less injustices in another society.

Zero Sum or Principles? 13 November 2016

Zero Sum or Principles? by Douglas R McGaughey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Zero Sum or Principles?[1]

Abstract:  If we refuse to accept materialistic reductionism that makes our social lives exhaustively the product of capricious genetics, the amygdala, and chemicals in the brain like oxytocin, we are the species that can ask what we should do.  By playing a zero sum game,[2] one knows who “won” whereas acting on principle gives one the satisfaction that one tried to do more than “win.” However, here it is claimed that the alternative of a zero sum game and principles represents not an exclusive dyad as if one can pursue one of the options only by exclusion of the other.  Both are symptomatic of humanity’s “radical” evil and “radical” goodness.  We can pursue one or the other only because we have the capacity to do both. Hence, deeper than decline, progress, or stagnation is an understanding of humanity as the source of a causal efficacy that is not reducible to physical causality and, therefore, this suggests that with humanity we find in degree an “openness” in nature that allows for creative change while demanding assumption of moral responsibility for the exercise of humanity’s creative power.

What is ‘Radical Evil?:’ A Reading of Ricoeur on Kant and Religion 16 December 2014

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The following paper was presented at at the Society for Ricoeur Studies at the University of Oregon, October 27, 2013

PDF Version:  What is ‘Radical’ Evil? A Reading of Ricoeur on Kant and Religion

What is ‘Radical’ Evil?
A Reading of Ricoeur on Kant and Religion


What follows I can best describe as a “lover’s quarrel” anchored, for my part, in deep gratitude and respect.  On the one hand, I will strenuously critique Ricoeur’s reading of Kant, particularly with respect to 1) the ontological status of “radical” evil, 2) the anchoring of morality in violence, 3) Ricoeur’s “deliberative,” hence, consequentialist ethic, and 4) his limiting of religion to historical religion.  On the other hand, the “ontology” of his theory of metaphor as well as the centrality of the “productive imagination” in his theory of discourse are applauded vigorously and can be viewed as thoroughly in harmony with the “ground” of Kant’s ethical reflections, “autonomous freedom,” which will be proposed as a more comprehensive “ground” for morality, and a more adequate “ground” for understanding of religion.

Reflections on the Symbol:  A Quasi-Transcendental Assumption that “Gives Rise to Thought”

I begin my investigation of Ricoeur’s reading of Kant by examining the notion of “symbol.”  I will seek to demonstrate that the pre-figuration, which is the symbolic for Ricoeur, functions in a quasi-transcendental sense that makes symbols a posteriori synthetic judgments and, therefore, hypothetical, not, as for Kant, a priori synthetic judgments that are categorical (I will speak to the difference between a posteriori and a priori synthetic judgment below).

On Martha Nussbaum’s Reading of Kant March 31, 2016

On Martha Nussbaum’s Reading of Kant by Douglas R McGaughey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

On Martha Nussbaum’s Reading of Kant: Aristotelian Teleology Meets Kantian Archaeology

The following is an email that was sent to Herman Waetjen, Emeritus Professor of the San Francisco Theological Seminary and Berkeley’s GTU.  During a recent visit with him in San Anselmo, Herman shared with me passages from Martha Nussbaum’s Frontiers of Justice that offer her reading of Kant on reason, morality, and humanity’s responsibilities to nature, other species, and the physically and mentally challenged. Herman had written a paper on “The Theology of Animals” for the Spring 2016 meeting of the Pacific Coast Theological Society meeting. His paper is available on-line at the PCTS webpage. This email provides my response to what I take to be a serious but, unfortunately, all too frequent “mis-reading” of Kant.  To be sure, every reading of a text is an interpretation, but that fact is no license to generate any whimsical reading that serves one’s purposes in the moment.  As Paul Ricoeur proposed: A good reading is congruent with the text and generates a plenitude of rich meaning. A poor reading is narrow and far-fetched. In my judgment, Martha Nussbaum’s reading of Kant is incredibly narrow and far-fetched, even if there are powerful voices in the academy today who share her reading.

Should Foreign Language Acquisition be Required? 29 December 2016

“Should Language Acquisition be Required” by Douglas R McGaughey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Should Foreign Language Acquisition be Required?
29 December 2016

According to today’s NY Times (29 December 2016), Princeton University is making the learning of a new language a mandatory requirement of its General Education program — even for those already proficient in a second language.  I’m commenting here because I don’t have a Facebook account, which the NY Times requires for commenting on their blog.

In our day, it is an incredible privilege as a US citizen to know a second language if you are not an immigrant or from a recently immigrated family.  It is a privilege because foreign languages unlike in almost all other industrialized nations are not required in elementary school, and, increasingly, they are not required in high school even for those intending to go on to college because even colleges are rapidly dropping the requirement. After all, all one needs to get ahead in the world these days is English because the whole world has committed to English as the lingua franca of research and business.  I am among the privileged able to afford two summers at Middlebury College’s Summer German School at the ripe age of 31.  I know full well that the costs in time and money make such an experience simply impossible for most Americans. Continue reading “Should Foreign Language Acquisition be Required? 29 December 2016”

Incomplete Copernican Revolution 27 October 2016

The Incomplete Copernican Revolution in Popular Legend, the Natural Sciences, and in Practical Reason (Morality) by Douglas R McGaughey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

The Incomplete Copernican Revolution in Popular Legend, the Natural Sciences, and in Practical Reason (Morality)

Abstract: There are three senses in which the Copernican Revolution of the 16th century is not yet complete today. The first sense is in terms of the popular account about what Copernicus actually accomplished and the reaction on the part of the church in Rome to Copernicus’ writings. The second sense is in terms of the meaning of the revolution for the natural sciences and what it means to do science after Copernicus. The third sense is in terms of practical reason (morality) or the religious consequences of the CR.

“What is Categorical about the Categorical?” Updated 3 September 2012

What is Categorical about the Categorical? by Douglas R McGaughey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.
Based on a work at criticalidealism.com.

What is Categorical about the Categorical?
On the Sensible and the Supersensible

Human experience is dependent upon the inseparable, yet distinguishable, interaction between two dimensions:  the sensible and the supersensible.  Each dimension must simultaneously make a contribution, or else there can be no experience.  Although we must speak of two dimensions that make our experience possible, we are no more talking about dualism as the explanatory ground of experience than attributing multiple, interacting causes to a physical event shatters the unity of efficient causality.  We would be concerned with dualism only if we succumbed to a Cartesian dual-substance notion of experience, but that would, of course, presume that we had access to such things as substances that could confirm their reality.  Rather, we do not experience substances, only their appearances.  Granted, “hardness” (Unnachgiebigkeit) and “durableness” (Dauerhaftigkeit) are strong indicators of the presence of substance, but we too quickly substitute substance for its appearance.  We live in a world of appearances and a priori synthetic judgment, and any conclusions about the nature and character of substance are among our synthetic judgments either a posteriori or a priori since we cannot experience substances themselves.

These two dimensions appear to be 180° opposite to one another.  The sensible world consists of a set of appearances that are perceptible, material, divisible, measurable, and constantly changing.  The supersensible world consists of a set of “appearances” that are imperceptible, immaterial, indivisible, immeasurable, and, when it comes to concepts, unchanging.  Observation of these contrasting sets of appearances by no means presumes what needs to be proved.  Rather, it is only a contrast between descriptive sets, and it is the task of Critical Idealism to sort out what is necessary and what is purely accidental about these sets of appearances.

December 9, 2011: Freedom! What’s it good for?

Freedom! What is it good for? by Douglas R McGaughey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.

Freedom! What’s it good for?

In his 1979 essay “What’s wrong with Negative Liberty,[1]” Charles Taylor identifies Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty[2]” as the archaeological heritage to which he appeals in order to engage a discussion of freedom.  However, Taylor employs Berlin’s concept of negative freedom (freedom from external interference) as the straw man for formulating an alternative notion of positive freedom to Berlin’s positive freedom.  Berlin’s positive freedom is “coercive freedom” in the sense of Rousseau’s Social Contract through which the individual subordinates her-/himself to a “higher authority” such as parents or the state in order to increase one’s, or to achieve a greater, freedom.  In contrast, Taylor’s positive freedom is not “coercive” but “purposive.”  In other words, Taylor wants to acknowledge that freedom involves not merely an alternative between radical independence and external coercion, but positive freedom is concerned with “internal” elements (the individual’s desires) that lead to our pursuing purposive ends.  For Taylor, then, Berlin’s notions of negative and positive freedom are inadequate to grasp the true character of positive freedom:  the pursuit of ends governed by our internal desires.  Since not all desires are moral, though, the desires that govern Taylor’s notion of positive freedom as “purposive” require a “second-order” reflection that invokes moral principles to govern our desires.  For Taylor, the source of these moral principles is religion.

Critical Idealism and Postmodernism 13 November 2011

Critical Idealism and Postmodernism by Douglas R McGaughey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.
Based on a work at criticalidealism.com.

Critical Idealism and Postmodernism

One of the intriguing ironies of the history of philosophy is that Enlightenment Modernism already anticipated and provided a strategy for responding to the skepticism of Postmodernism.

Postmodernism is usually linked to Jean-François Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition (1979, English 1985), in which he dismisses the meta-narratives of Western culture as bankrupt because of their destructiveness.  It is also associated with a movement in architecture that is characterized by the demolition of gigantic buildings (e.g., hotels in Las Vegas) and sport facilities as a symbol of the impermanence of even the most massive of human constructions.  In the theory of knowledge, Postmodernism is intimately connected with Deconstructionism that seeks to cultivate the virtues of vulgar skepticism for a project of justice.

Meta-narratives are attempts to place us into explanatory answers to the questions:  where have we come from?, why are we here?, where are we going?  Such narratives are communal by nature, and they place the individual into a historical context to which one is indebted and for which one is called to sacrifice.  Such meta-narratives can be religious, political, and/or economic, and they have proven to be incredibly destructive.  The meta-narratives of racism, nationalism, religious confessionalism, sexism, and gender orientation have been devastating and constitute an indictment of our species.  However, such meta-narratives reach down to sub-narratives that define us by gang affiliation and or sport teams, and the violence associated with such “explanations of who we are” continue to shock us from drug cartel violence, to mafia murders, to soccer hooligans.  The destructiveness of the Russian Gulag and the German death camps, but more recently the genocide of Ruanda, the Balkans, and clan violence, can all be traced to meta-narratives that were/are used to justify the violent dominance of one group over others.  Lyotard’s critique of such meta-narratives is not new in the French tradition.  François-Marie Arouet (Voltaire), arguably the most famous Enlightenment thinker, guesstimated  that a million people a century have been killed out of religious intolerance.  Europe was devastated by the (not exclusively but primarily) religiously motivated Thirty Years War from 1618-1648 that pitted Catholic against Protestant and saw the slaughter of up to 50% of the population in parts of southern Germany and Austria.  However, one also remembered the atrocities and slaughter of peasants and nobility in the bloody Peasants War a century earlier that swept across eastern France, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, which sought to overcome the injustices of the feudal system on the basis of biblical warrants and backings.